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ART. I. — *The Two Brothers ; or, Why are you a Protestant ?* — Continued.

VII. ONLY a few days elapsed before John, finding his brother apparently at leisure, pressed him to redeem his promise.

“ You are prepared, brother, by this time, I presume, to undertake your vindication of the Reformers, and to prove that they were sound lawyers and rigid reasoners.”

“ The Church has so spread out her claims over every thing, that it is hard to construct an argument against her, which does not apparently take for granted some point which she contends is the point to be proved ; but the devil, though cunning, can be outwitted.”

“ What ! by heretics ? ”

“ Protestants are not heretics.”

“ The Church is in possession ; and since Protestants break away from her and contend for what she declares to be contrary to the faith, they are at least presumptively heretics, and are to be treated as such, unless they prove the contrary.”

“ The Church is in possession *de facto*, not *de jure*. She is a usurper.”

“ Possession *de facto*, we have agreed, is *primâ facie* evidence of title. The Reformers were, therefore, as we have seen, bound either to admit it, or show good and valid reasons for questioning it.”

“ True ; but they showed such reasons.”

“ So you have said, but you have not told me the reasons themselves.”

"I gave you as one of those reasons, the fact that our Lord founded no such church as the Romish."

"But that was a reason you could not assign, because the simple fact of the existence of the Church in possession was *primâ facie* evidence to the contrary."

"I offered to prove my position from the word of God."

"But could not, because the Church was in possession as the keeper and interpreter of the word, and you could not adduce it in a sense contrary to hers without begging the question."

"I have the word as well as she, and it interprets itself."

"That you have the word, or that it interprets itself, you were not able to prove. Moreover, the argument may be retorted. The Church has the word as well as you, and the word interprets itself. She alleges that the word is against you, and her allegation, at the very lowest, is as good against your position as yours is against hers."

"I deny her infallibility."

"Do you claim infallibility for yourself?"

"I claim infallibility for the word of God."

"That is what logicians call *ignorantia elenchi*. But do you claim infallibility for your own private understanding of the word?"

"No."

"Then you are fallible, and may fall into error?"

"I do not deny it."

"The Church, at the very worst, is only fallible, and therefore, at the very worst, is as good as you at the very best, for at the very best you are not infallible. Consequently, your allegations of what is the word of God can never be a sufficient motive for setting aside hers. Nothing, then, which you can adduce from the Scriptures, even conceding you all the right to appeal to them you claim, can be sufficient to invalidate her title. As she, at worst, stands on as high ground as you can even at best, her simple declaration that the word of God is in her favor is as good as any declarations you can make to the contrary. The proof, then, which you offered to introduce, would have availed you nothing, even if you had been permitted to introduce it."

"I do not admit that. I offered to prove, and I am able to prove, from the Holy Scriptures, that our Lord founded no such church as the Romish."

"It is certain that you can introduce no passage of Scrip-

ture which expressly, in so many words, declares that our Lord founded no such church. If, then, you can prove it from the Scriptures at all, you can prove it only by means of the interpretations you put upon the sacred text. But, at any rate, and on any conceivable hypothesis, the Church has as much right to interpret the sacred text as you have, and her interpretations have, to say the least, as high authority as, granting you all you ask, yours can have. But she interprets the word in her favor, and, according to her interpretations of the word, it is clear and undeniable that it is in her favor, and that our Lord did found such a church as she claims to be. Since, then, your interpretations can never be a sufficient motive for setting aside hers, for they at best can be no better than hers at worst, it follows necessarily that you can never, under any supposable hypothesis, prove from the Scriptures against her, that our Lord did *not* found such a church as she assumes to be. All this I could say, even waiving the argument from prescription. But I do not waive that argument. You have conceded that the Church was in possession. She is, then, presumptively what she claims to be. Then her interpretations are presumptively the true interpretations, and yours against her presumptively false. For you to say, then, that no such church was ever instituted, is a plain begging of the question, and so is every argument you can construct against her, drawn from the Holy Scriptures."

"But I may disprove the claims of the Romish Church by proving positively that some other church is the one actually founded by our Lord."

"Unquestionably; but you cannot plead at one and the same time an adverse title, and that no such title was ever issued. If you plead that there was no such church ever instituted, you are debarred from pleading an adverse title; for you plead that the Church has no title, because none was ever issued. If none was ever issued, there can be none in an adverse claimant. On the other hand, if you plead an adverse title, you concede, what you have denied, that our Lord did institute such a church as the Catholic Church claims to be; that the title she possesses has been issued and vests somewhere. This changes the whole question. There is no longer any controversy between us as to the fact whether our Lord did or did not found a church in the sense alleged, but simply a question whether it be the Roman Catholic Church or some other."

“Grant that our Lord did found such a church as is pretended, — and I believe in the Holy Catholic Church as well as you, — still I deny that it is the Romish Church.”

“You join a new issue, then, and plead now, not no title, but an *adverse* title?”

“Be it so, for the present.”

“And what is the adverse claimant you set up against Rome?”

The Church of which, by God’s grace, I am an unworthy minister.”

“That is to say, the Presbyterian?”

“Yes. The Presbyterian Church is the visible Catholic Church, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation.”

“So says the Westminster Confession of Faith. But which Presbyterian church do you mean?”

“I do not understand you.”

“There are, you know, brother, quite a number of Presbyterian churches; for instance, in Scotland, the Kirk by law established, the Free Kirk, and the Seceders; in this country, the Old School, the New School, and the Cumberland Presbyterians; in England, the Presbyterian Dissenters, for the most part Unitarian; and on the Continent, the Dutch Reformed, the Reformed German, the Genevan, and the French Huguenots, all virtually Presbyterian churches, and very generally fallen into Socinianism, Rationalism, Deism, or Transcendentalism. Which of these, not to mention several others, is the one you mean?”

“It is not necessary to particularize; I mean the Presbyterian Church in general.”

“Do you include even those who have become Socinian, Rationalistic, Deistical, Transcendental?”

“It is to be regretted that in many of the old Presbyterian churches grievous, and, as I hold, damnable, errors have crept in.”

“But are those which have lapsed into these damnable errors still integral portions of the Presbyterian Church? Do you claim the English Presbyterians, the Genevan, and French?”

“The Church is never free from error, taken as a whole, but there are always in the Church a remnant who are faithful, and somewhere in it there is always the pure preaching of the word, as well as the maintenance of the true ordinances of God’s house.”

“ You forget that you have just conceded that our Lord did found such a church as the Roman Catholic claims to be ; but the Roman Catholic Church claims to have authority from God to teach, and to teach everywhere, and at all times, one and the same doctrine, free from all admixture of error.”

“ I do not forget what I have conceded. I say, in the language of the Westminster Confession of Faith, that ‘ the purest churches under heaven are subject both to mixture and error ; and some have so degenerated as to become no churches of Christ, but synagogues of Satan. Nevertheless, there shall be always a church on earth to worship God according to his will.’ ”

“ But this does not relieve you, for it says positively the purest churches under heaven are subject to mixture and error. Then there is no church not liable to error and corruption. Then, whatever your Presbyterian Church may claim, it does not claim, even as the Church, to be able to teach infallibly ; therefore does not even claim to be such a church as the Roman Catholic claims to be. Consequently she cannot be set up as an adverse claimant. The title she claims is not the title the Catholic Church claims, and therefore, if established, does not necessarily negative hers. If, then, you concede that our Lord did found such a church as the Roman Catholic Church claims to be, you must concede that it is not the Presbyterian.”

“ Not at all ; for does not the Confession say, ‘ Nevertheless, there shall be always a church on earth which shall worship God according to his will ’ ? ”

“ True ; but this either amounts to nothing, or it contradicts what you have just alleged. If it means that there shall always be on earth a church which teaches God’s word infallibly, then it is false to say that the purest churches under heaven are subject to mixture and error ; but if it means that the church which worships God according to his will is not free from mixture and error, it amounts to nothing, for it proposes no church claiming to be what the Catholic Church claims to be, since it is undeniable that she claims to teach without the least mixture or error.”

“ But one may be subject to error, and yet not err in fact. The Church is not exempt from the liability to err, but there is always a portion of it which, as a matter of fact, does not err.”

“ What prevents it ? ”

“The grace of God ; for God will not suffer the gates of hell wholly to prevail against his Church.”

“Very well ; but is the Church, what your Confession calls the ‘visible Catholic Church,’ herself always preserved by this grace from error ? and if so, can she be said to be subject to error ?”

“The visible Catholic Church consists of all those persons throughout the world who profess the true religion, together with their children. There is always a portion of these who are, through grace, preserved from error ; and therefore there is always a church or body of worshippers who worship God according to his will. In some periods the number of these is very small, in others it is large.”

“But you do not answer my question. Individuals may err, particular branches of the Church may fail ; but does the Church, the teaching and judging authority of the Church, in matters of faith and morals, ever err ?”

“Individual members and particular churches may err, but God always preserves some individuals who do not err, who are witnesses for him in the darkest and worst of times. Consequently, the whole Church never falls into error.”

“But your Confession declares the visible Catholic Church to be a *kingdom*. Jesus Christ, it says, ‘hath erected in this world a *kingdom*, which is his Church.’ Now to a kingdom it is essential that there be a supreme authority. There may be provincial and communal governments with local authority, customs, and usages, but they must all be subordinated to one supreme central authority, or else you have not one kingdom, but as many separate kingdoms as you have separate local governments. The kingdom erected by our Lord is one, not many, and therefore must have somewhere, somehow constituted, a supreme central authority, from which all the subordinate authorities derive their authority, and to which they are responsible. This supreme central authority is, in the case of the Church, the Church teaching and governing, and is what is specially meant by *the Church*, when speaking of its fallibility or infallibility. Now my question is, whether the Church herself, that is, the supreme central authority from which all the particular and local authorities are derived, is subject to error, or by grace rendered infallible.”

“I know no such authority as you speak of but that of Jesus Christ himself, who is the head and husband of the faithful, and he of course cannot err.”

“ You admit that the Church is a *kingdom* ? ”

“ Yes.”

“ And a kingdom erected in *this world* ? ”

“ I do.”

“ And that where there is no supreme central authority there is no kingdom ? ”

“ There must be such authority, but it may be in Jesus Christ, who is the invisible head of the Church.”

“ It is the authority that constitutes the kingdom, not the kingdom the authority ; for prior to the authority, the kingdom is not. The authority and kingdom must be in the same order. If, then, the kingdom is in the visible order, the authority which makes it a visible kingdom must be in the visible order, and therefore itself be visible. You could not call Great Britain or France a visible kingdom, if one or the other had no visible supreme authority. The most you could say would be, that there is an invisible kingdom in Great Britain or France, not that either is itself a visible kingdom. So of the Church. If it is a visible kingdom, it must have a supreme visible authority ; if not, it is not a visible, but an invisible kingdom. The individuals might be visible as individuals, but not as members of the Church, or subjects of the invisible authority. In such case, the distinction your Confession makes, and which you contend for, between the visible Church and the invisible, would be a distinction without a difference. When, therefore, you tell me, as you do in your Confession, that the visible Church is a *kingdom in this world*, you necessarily tell me that it has in this world a supreme visible central authority. And in point of fact, Presbyterians themselves do recognize such authority ; for they regard their Church as a polity, and it has its constitution, its officers, its supreme legislature, and supreme judicatory. If not, what means the General Assembly, which ‘ represents in one body ’ all the particular churches of the Presbyterian denomination, and to which belongs ‘ the power of deciding in all controversies respecting doctrine and discipline ; of reproof, warning, of bearing testimony against error in doctrine, or immorality in practice, in any church, presbytery, or synod ; of erecting new synods when it shall be judged necessary ; of superintending the concerns of the whole Church ; of suppressing schismatical contentions and disputations,’ &c., and to which every candidate for ordination must promise obedience and subjection ? ”

“ There is a supreme visible government of the Church, *under God*, I admit.”

“ *Under God* ; and who ever dreamed of a supreme government of the Church *over* God ? ”

“ The Papists.”

“ Nonsense ! Do you not know that Catholics hold Jesus Christ to be the supreme invisible Head of the Church, and that they call the Pope his vicar ? If the Pope is the *vicar* of Jesus Christ, how can he be above him ? God is supreme, the sovereign of sovereigns, and there is no power not from him and subject to him. So no more of this nonsense. But you hold the Church to be a kingdom or polity, do you not ? ”

“ I do.”

“ And as such it has its government, its supreme authority ; for if not, it is no kingdom or polity.”

“ Be it so.”

“ Now, what I ask is, Does this supreme authority, such as it is in the Presbyterian Church, claim to be infallible in all that concerns faith and morals ? ”

“ It does not.”

“ Then your plea of an adverse title amounts to nothing ; the title you allege is not the negative of that claimed by the Church. The title she claims is that of an infallible teacher of God’s word ; the title you set up is that of a fallible teacher, which you may well be without prejudice to her claim ; for you can claim to teach *fallibly* without denying her claim to teach *infallibly*.”

“ But were I to grant this, it would not follow that the claim of Rome must be conceded.”

“ Not from this fact alone ; but as you have conceded that the title was issued, and must vest somewhere, in some one, it follows necessarily that it vests in the Roman Catholic Church, if it vests in no one else. And as she is in possession, you must concede it to her, unless you can produce and establish an adverse title.”

“ The Greek Church has as good a title as the Romish.”

“ That is not to the purpose. The Greek Church has either a valid title, or none at all. It is not enough to say that she has as good a title as the Roman Church ; you must say she has a perfect title, or say nothing.”

“ I say, then, she has a perfect title.”

“ Then she is the Church of God. Why, then, are you not of her communion ? ”

“ That is neither here nor there. You have no right to conclude any thing to her prejudice from my practice. I may be inconsistent. What then ? ”

“ But she condemns you, and has solemnly anathematized every one of your doctrines, with a single exception, in which you depart from the teachings of the Roman Church.”

“ Be it so ; what then ? That may prove that we Protestants are wrong, but not that she is wrong, or you right.”

“ Moreover, she does not even claim to be the One Holy Catholic Church, and to have the supreme central authority over the whole body of the faithful throughout the world. She does not pretend to unchurch the Church of Rome, or even that the Roman Church does or ever did owe subjection to her. She admits, even to this day, the Roman Catholic Church to be truly the Church of Christ in what was originally the patriarchate of the West, that the Pope is the legitimate patriarch of the West, and rightfully exercises patriarchal authority over that patriarchate. She does not claim and never has claimed for herself the title she denies to Rome. She denies the supreme authority over the whole Church claimed and exercised by the Pope, not because she claims the supremacy for herself, but because she denies that any such supremacy was conferred on any one in the original constitution of the Church. She is, then, no adverse claimant, and in all essential respects, except this one, she concedes virtually, if not expressly, the title claimed by Rome, at least so far as it is now in question. So you cannot get an adverse claimant in the Greek Church. Indeed, when you have once conceded that our Lord founded such a church as the Roman claims to be, you must concede that the Roman is that church, for there is no other that even claims to be it.”

“ That is hardly true. The Anglican Church claims to be it.”

“ The Anglican Church, as well as your own, puts on lofty airs, and she now and then tells us gravely that she is Catholic, — not *Roman*, but *Catholic*, — and lets off her double battery of popguns on the one hand against Rome, and on the other against Presbyterians, Baptists, Congregationalists, Methodists, &c. ; but she has not courage enough to claim to be the Catholic Church in its unity and integrity. She claims, at most, to be only a branch of it, which implies that the root and trunk are elsewhere ; and she does not even pretend that the supreme visible central authority she obeys or exercises is the supreme visible central authority of the whole Church of Christ. Moreover, she confesses that she is fallible, that she has heretofore erred grievously in doctrine and manners, and

may err again. Her claim, therefore, is not the same as that of the Roman Church, and her title is not, strictly speaking, an adverse title. So you can succeed no better with her than with the Greek Church, or than with your own."

VIII. "But you told me the other day," replied James, after a short pause, "that the essential character of the Romish Church is, that she claims to have received a divine commission or authority to teach, or to keep and declare the word of God."

"To keep and expound or teach the word of God, I grant; but I conceded this only so far as concerned the special controversy in which we were engaged, as I then told you. Nevertheless, I admit now that the essential claim of the Church is, that she has been divinely commissioned or authorized to teach the word of God."

"Then you must concede that any other church claiming to be divinely commissioned is an adverse claimant."

"Divinely commissioned *to teach*, granted."

"Then it is not true that there is no adverse claimant against Rome, as you so confidently assert; for, in point of fact, the Greek Church, the Presbyterian, and the Anglican each claims for itself to be divinely commissioned."

"The Greek Church claims the commission for herself in no sense in which she does not concede it to Rome, and therefore is not an *adverse* claimant. The Presbyterian and Anglican Churches do not in reality claim it at all; for both deny the fact of a divine commission in denying the infallibility of the Church."

"But to deny the infallibility is not necessarily to deny the divine commission of the teacher; and, therefore, not to claim the infallibility is not to fail to claim the commission."

"The commission in question is the commission to teach, and must be the warrant of infallibility in the teacher, unless God can authorize the teaching of error."

"That proves too much. All the teachers of your Church, you hold, are divinely commissioned; but you cannot hold that each is infallible; for, if you should, you would be obliged to hold that Luther himself did not err, since, as is well known, he was at first a Romish doctor."

"The teachers of the Church are all divinely commissioned to teach in communion with and in subordination to the Sovereign Pontiff, the successor of St. Peter, I admit, and so long

as they so teach, they teach infallibly ; but when they break away from that communion, and assume to be independent teachers, they are fallible ; for then they have no divine commission."

"Is there any of these teachers, taken individually, who may not break from that communion, and assume to be an independent teacher ?"

"No one except the Pope himself."

"What, then, is your warrant that your particular teacher does not err ?"

"The fact that he teaches in communion with and in subordination to the Sovereign Pontiff."

"So the Pope is his voucher ?"

"Communion with the Pope."

"Who vouches for the Pope ?"

"The divine commission, which gives him, as the successor of St. Peter, plenary authority to teach and declare the word of God."

"If the Pope should fail, your whole Church might fall to the ground."

"Not necessarily ; but the Pope cannot fail, because he is divinely commissioned. As the successor of St. Peter, he inherits the authority of St. Peter, and the promise made to him, — 'Upon this rock will I build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.' The Pope, therefore, since he has the promise of God, cannot fail, unless God himself can fail, which is not supposable."

"But your argument, nevertheless, proves too much ; for all legitimate civil governments are divinely commissioned, and yet no man can pretend that they are infallible."

"Commissioned to govern, but not to teach or declare the word of God. There is a difference between the commission to govern and the commission to teach. Teaching has reference to the conscience, to the internal act of the man ; government only to external acts. The teacher is commissioned to teach the truth ; government is commissioned simply to control and direct the external acts for the general good, according to the rules of prudence ; and to attain its end, it is not essential that it should be able to propose measures which are absolutely in all and every respect the wisest and the best ; nor is it necessary, in order to believe it for the general good, and to obey all its commands, that the subject should believe it infallible, or that it can never err in any one of its measures. He

can obey an unwise order, and it may be for the general good that sometimes he should do so. But the end of teaching is the proposition and belief of the truth. All teaching is in order to truth. If the teacher be fallible, the end of teaching is not secured ; for he may propose, and I may believe, on his proposition, what is not true. The commission is authority from God to teach, and a command to those the teacher is commissioned to teach to believe as the truth, and nothing but the truth, what he teaches. If fallible, then, he may propose and I believe, on *divine authority*, what is false ; and then God may authorize the teaching and the believing of falsehood, — which cannot be ; for he is infinitely true, and can neither be deceived nor deceive, which would not be the fact, if he could authorize the teaching or the believing of falsehood. Therefore, the divine commission to teach — and it is only of the commission to teach that I speak — must necessarily be the warrant of infallibility in the teacher.”

“ Though the divinely commissioned teacher be assumed to be infallible, the commission is not itself necessarily and essentially a warrant of his infallibility.”

“ To the full extent of the matter covered by the commission it is, you yourself do and must admit.”

“ I do not admit it. A commission, by the simple fact that it is a commission, does no such thing ; for a government may commission an ambassador, and yet that ambassador may misrepresent its will and intention.”

“ Commissions in general may not, but the divine commission to teach does. Human governments have no power to secure the infallibility of their ministers ; but you cannot say this of God. He can make his ministers infallible.”

“ He can ; but it does not therefore follow that he does.”

“ I have shown that he must, because he cannot authorize either the teaching or the believing of error, without contradicting his own nature, which is infinitely and essentially true ; and that he does, to the full extent of their commission to teach, you yourself do and must hold, or give up all belief in external revelation.”

“ Not at all.

“ Why do you believe our Lord was the Son of God ? ”

“ Because he himself so declared.”

“ Why do you believe his declarations ? ”

“ Because he was the Son of God, and could not lie.”

“ A good reason, after it is proved that he was the Son of God ; none at all before.”

“ I believe him because the miracles he performed proved that he was from God ; for no man could do the miracles he did, unless God were with him.”

“ Was *from God*, that is, sent or commissioned by God as a teacher, but not that he was God.”

“ The miracles proved him to be God. He raised the dead, and none but God can raise the dead.”

“ None but God can raise the dead as *efficient* cause ; but men as *instrumental* cause may raise them, as is shown by the fact that the apostles and many of the saints have raised the dead. How, then, from the miracle alone conclude that our Lord raised the dead, not as instrumental cause, but as *efficient* cause ? ”

“ The efficient cause was the divine power.”

“ Granted. But the divine power inherent in Jesus, as his own proper power, or the divine power merely displayed on the occasion of his saying to the dead, Arise ? Moses smote the rock, and the water gushed out. Was it Moses, or God who stood behind Moses, that caused the water to flow from the rock ? ”

“ God who stood behind him.”

“ So, for aught the miracle itself says, it may have been, not Jesus himself, but God who stood behind him, that caused the dead to live. The miracle does not prove the proper Divinity of our Lord. It only proves that he was sent from God, and that God was with him, and displayed his almighty power at his word.”

“ Very well.”

“ The miracles having proved that our Lord was from God, that God sent him and was with him, you *therefore* believe what he said. He said he was the Son of God, and therefore you believe he was the Son of God, and therefore God himself.”

“ Be it so.”

“ The miracles, then, simply proved his divine commission, that is, accredited him as a teacher sent from God. But how from the fact of his commission conclude the truth of what he said, if the divine commission be not the warrant of infallibility ? If one who is divinely commissioned to teach, notwithstanding his commission, may err, how can you say that our Lord himself did not err, and that you do not err in believing him to be the Son of God ? Indeed, it is only on the ground that the divine commission is the warrant of infallibility, that

your profession of faith in the Bible as the infallible word of God is not ridiculous and absurd."

"The sacred writers were inspired, but the divinely commissioned teachers you speak of are not. Being inspired, they could know the truth of what they affirmed; and being honest and godly men, they would not affirm what they did not know."

"That is nothing to your purpose. The inspiration was nothing more nor less than God simply telling or communicating to them what they were to teach, and they have in this respect no advantage over the Church, in case she be fully instructed as to what she is to propose as the word of God. If instructed, it matters not, as to her ability to teach, whether instructed by immediate inspiration to herself, or only immediately through that of the prophets and apostles. She claims to have been fully instructed, for the commission under which she professes to act was, 'Going, teach all nations; . . . teaching them to observe *all things whatsoever I have commanded you.*' — St. Matt. xxviii. 19. The alleged defect of immediate inspiration in her case, or its presence in the case of the sacred writers, can, therefore, of itself, be no reason for believing one in preference to the other. The real reason for believing the sacred writers is, that God authorized them to teach; and you have the same reason for believing the Church, if you have equal reasons for believing her authorized by God to teach his word. The commission is a warrant of infallibility in her case, as much as it was in theirs."

"But you forget that I gave as my reason for believing the sacred writers, that they were honest and godly men, and would not affirm what they did not know."

"You, then, consider the personal character of the teacher better authority than the divine commission? This is a common Protestant blunder, and hence the worthlessness of the greater part of your treatises on the evidences of Christianity. God's authority for believing is not sufficient till man indorses it! The best men are fallible, and may be deceived. If we had nothing but the personal characters of the sacred writers on which to rely, honest and godly as they certainly were, we should have no sufficient reason for believing what they wrote to be the Word of God. Their personal character may be important when the question turns on their credibility as witnesses to the facts they record, but does not enter into the account when the question is on their authority as teachers of revealed truth.

No man's personal character is a sufficient warrant for believing that any thing he asserts to be a doctrine of revelation is really and truly a doctrine of revelation. If it were, we should be obliged to believe whatever any man, whose character, so far as we know, is honest and irreproachable, chooses to teach as the word of God. How, then, can you maintain that the personal character of the teacher is a surer warrant of infallibility than the divine commission ? ”

“ The simple fact that the sacred writers were honest and godly men may not be alone a sufficient reason for believing them, yet, if they had been bad men, that would alone have been a sufficient reason for *not* believing them. For God does not and will not speak by bad men.”

“ That is not so certain. Balaam, the son of Peor, was a bad man ; yet God spoke by him, and caused him to utter a glorious prophecy. Do you believe his prophecy on his personal character, or because divinely commissioned teachers have told you that it was not he who spoke from himself, but the Lord who spoke by him ? ”

“ I believe the sacred writers because God authorized them to teach his word, and the Holy Ghost was with them to enable them to teach it, and to preserve them from error in teaching it.”

“ Is not the assistance of the Holy Ghost, so far as needed, necessarily implied in the commission or authority to teach ? ”

“ If the commission were the warrant of infallibility, it would be so implied ; but that is precisely what I deny.”

“ No man can teach infallibly without it ? ”

“ No.”

“ But with it any man can teach infallibly ? ”

“ Perhaps so.”

“ No *perhaps* about it. It must be so positively, or you cannot assert the infallibility of the sacred penmen.”

“ God leaves the will free ; any one who has the assistance may teach infallibly, if he chooses ; but it does not therefore follow that he must and will so teach.”

“ In what concerns personal morality, natural or Christian, the will is free ; but in teaching at the command of God, it is not. The individual speaks not as moved by his own will, but as moved by the Holy Ghost. Thus, Balaam was forced against his will to bless Israel, and to utter a prophecy he did not intend, and which he was unwilling to utter ; for it was against his interest, and he loved the wages of iniquity. Thus,

too, the prophet Jonas sought to run away from the Lord, and not to preach as commanded to the Ninevites, but the Lord brought him back by a miracle, and forced him to utter his word. Moreover, if the matter depended on the human will, the teachings of no human teacher, however authorized and assisted by the Holy Ghost, could ever be regarded as infallible ; because no one could ever know whether the teacher spoke as moved by the Holy Ghost, or merely from his own proper motion. In vain, then, would you claim to have in the Bible the *infallible* word of God. Nay, you have yourself just said, the Holy Ghost enables the teachers to teach the word, and *preserves* them from error in teaching it."

"In the case of the sacred writers, not of all men."

"For all men have not the assistance of the Holy Ghost to teach the word of God, nor are all commissioned to teach it ; but if it be what you define it, any one who has it must be able to teach, and be preserved from error in teaching, and therefore must teach the word infallibly."

"Be it so."

"But the divine commission does not necessarily imply this assistance ?"

"No, it does not ; therefore, I admit the infallibility of the sacred writers specially, and not of divinely commissioned teachers in general."

"What is the significance of the divine commission to teach the word of God ?"

"It authorizes the one who receives it to be a teacher of God's word, but does not necessarily enable him to teach it infallibly."

"So one may have authority from God to teach his word, and yet not have the ability to teach it in the only sense in which God can authorize it to be taught ! What, then, means the authority ?"

"Why, it is authority to teach."

"Unquestionably, but what is that ?"

"He who has it is authorized to speak or teach in the name of God."

"That is, to propound the word of God, not in his own name and on his own authority, but in the name and on the authority of God ?"

"Yes, it means that he is empowered to teach with divine authority."

"Can any thing but truth be taught with divine authority ?"

"No."

“ God cannot authorize the teaching of error ? ”

“ No ; for that would be the same as to teach it.”

“ Then no one not able to teach the truth, and not preserved from error in teaching it, can be said to teach by divine authority ? ”

“ So it would seem.”

“ You say that for God to authorize the teaching of error would be the same as for him to teach it ? ”

“ I do.”

“ And on the principle that what is done by another’s authority, it is virtually that other that does it ? Thus, what the agent does by the authority of the principal is held to be done by the principal himself, who is responsible for it. What an ambassador does by the authority of his government is done by his government. Consequently, what one does by the authority of God is done by God himself, and the responsibility rests on him, and not on his agent. So what one teaches by divine authority is taught by God himself, and God is responsible for it. No one can, then, be divinely commissioned to teach what God may not himself teach immediately, and for which he will not hold himself responsible.”

“ I do not deny it.”

“ Can God teach or be responsible for error, or for any thing but truth ? ”

“ He cannot.”

“ Then he can authorize no one to teach any thing but truth ? ”

“ He cannot.”

“ Then he who is divinely commissioned can teach nothing but truth ? ”

“ Apparently so.”

“ He who can teach nothing but truth is infallible, is he not ? ”

“ So it would seem.”

“ Then the divine commission is, as I have said, the warrant of infallibility, and as one cannot be infallible without the assistance of the Holy Ghost, it necessarily implies that assistance. Consequently, the claim to the divine commission to teach the word of God is necessarily and essentially the claim to infallibility in teaching, and therefore to the assistance of the Holy Ghost, so far as needed to enable the teacher to teach the word, and to preserve him from error in teaching it. Is it not so ? ”

“ I have been accustomed to think differently, but let it pass.”

“ Then my position, that the essential claim of the Church

is that she teaches the word infallibly, is not different from the one I assumed the other day, when I declared it to be the claim to the commission to teach, or that she had the word of God and was its legal keeper and expounder ? ”

“ Be it so.”

“ Then you produce no adverse claimant, since you produce none that even pretends to be able to teach the word infallibly.”

“ Very well.”

“ But in pleading an adverse title, you conceded that the title was issued, and vests somewhere ; or, in other words, that there is and must be somewhere such a church as the Roman claims to be. Now, as you do not and cannot produce an adverse claimant, you must concede that she is what she claims to be ; therefore the Church of God ; and therefore that you and all who make war upon her are rebels and traitors to God. Is it in this way you propose to vindicate the Reformers ? ”

Poor James was misled by his Protestant theology, which makes every thing pertaining to religion a sham. Thus, justification is with it, not making one just, but *reputing* him just, — a forensic, not an inward, intrinsic justification. It is no real justification at all, but a mere make-believe justification, — to say nothing of the blasphemy of representing God as accounting or reputing a man just who is intrinsically unjust, — for it leaves the man as foul a sinner as he was before he was justified. So in the matter of the divine commission to teach, this same theology teaches that one may have the commission, be authorized by God to teach, and yet not teach infallibly, as if God could authorize the teaching of a lie ! A queer thing is this Protestant theology ! Well may its authors and adherents boast themselves the lights of the age !

This notion, that the authority does not necessarily imply the ability to teach, is the source of much of that prejudice which exists in the Protestant community against all claims to authority from God to teach his word. There is a general feeling among the great majority of intelligent Protestants, that there can be no divine authority to teach where there is not the ability to teach ; and seeing nowhere among themselves any teacher who has the ability, they very naturally conclude that no one has the authority. It is absurd, say they, to suppose that God authorizes a man like ourselves to teach, a man who knows no more than we do, and is no better able to teach than the rest of us. When the Catholic speaks to them of

the commission of his Church to teach, and that God gives her authority to teach all nations, they turn up their noses, and ask us, if we suppose they are such fools as to believe that God, the common Father of us all, has given to mortals like ourselves authority to teach us, and commanded us to yield up our own reason and judgment to our fellow-men !

Now, probe the matter to the bottom, and you will find that these people object by no means to the idea that God may authorize men to teach his word, but simply to the notion that the authority can exist where the requisite qualifications to teach are wanting. Their real objection is to the doctrine which Mr. James Milwood attempts to maintain, that teachers confessedly fallible as teachers may nevertheless be divinely commissioned to teach. They object, not to the Catholic doctrine of authority, but to the Protestant. To really God-commissioned teachers, that is, teachers who, in their judgment, have the intrinsic ability to teach truly and infallibly the word of God, they do not object, as is evident from their tendency to Hero-worship, and their common remark that he who is able is divinely commissioned. Read Carlyle, Emerson, the Transcendentalists generally, and you will find that it is always to the notion of authority without the intrinsic ability that they object, and that wherever they fancy the ability they are ready to concede the commission. They err in making the ability the warrant of the authority, instead of making the commission the warrant of the ability ; yet they are right against Protestantism, and perceive a great and essential truth which old-fashioned Protestantism denies, namely, that the authority and the intrinsic ability to teach are inseparable, and that any authority separate from the ability cannot be conferred by God, and is therefore a usurpation. To one who is familiar with the Protestant community, and who comprehends its more recent developments of thought, it is evident that Protestants are very generally growing tired and sick of sham and shamming. They are rapidly becoming unable to satisfy themselves with a religion which is no real religion, but a mere make-believe religion. They cry out from the depths of their hearts for something real, for something which *is*, not merely *seems*. They see that the Reformers built on mere *seeming*, and taught and acted a lie, — gave them hollow appearances, and no solid realities, — at best, the mere hull without the kernel, — a symbol symbolizing nothing, — a mere pretence ; and they grow indignant, turn away in disgust, and say, “ Give us

something real, something that is, if it be but the devil ; for any thing that is is better than nothing seeming to be something. If your religion is a mere sham, call it a sham and away with it ; for the oldest gospel is, that a lie is a lie, and no truth. Stop lying, stop seeming, and begin to be." So deep is this feeling of the hollowness of all Protestant pretensions, and so strong is the craving for something real, that it has almost become one of the cants of the day.

It is true, that, knowing no religion but the Protestant, they to whom we refer conclude rashly that Catholicity is also a sham, also a mere hollow pretence, and that no religion is real but that of nature. But in this they draw a conclusion quite too broad for their premises. The Church detests Protestantism as heartily as they do, and, in most cases, for like reasons. She detests it because it is outward, lifeless, empty, and no living reality ; because it contains nothing solid, substantial, has no bottom, but is bottomless, like the pit from which it is an exhalation, and into which, as the religious atmosphere clears up, it subsides. She condemns with all her energy whatever is mere pretence or make-believe. She tolerates no empty forms, no insignificant rites, no vain ceremonies. She will and can approve nothing which is not real, solid, substantial. She teaches the doctrine of the REAL PRESENCE, and always presents the very reality she symbolizes. She can call no man justified who is not intrinsically just, and recognize no teacher as teaching by divine authority who does not teach God's word infallibly. If these people would turn their attention to her, they would soon find the truth and reality for which their hearts cry out ; for, to say the least, grace is not less true and real than nature.

IX. "Unquestionably," at length James replied, "there is no other church which makes the same specific claim as the Romish, and if my plea of an adverse title is to be taken as a concession that God has founded such a church, I of course must concede that she is it, and that the Reformers cannot be justified."

"I have not confined you to her *specific* character ; I have only restricted you to her *generic* character, to what she must absolutely be, if a church at all, with divine authority to teach."

"Well, let that pass. I made the concession, not absolutely, but provisorily ; since, as you well know, I do not and

cannot, as a Presbyterian, admit that our Lord ever founded, specifically or generically, such a church as the Romish claims to be, and which is no church of Christ, but a synagogue of Satan."

"Then you retract your plea of an adverse title, and revoke your concession?"

"I do."

"Very well; as I have no wish to take advantage of your mistakes, you may do so. What do you plead now?"

"The Romish Church is corrupt, and by her corruptions has forfeited her title to be the Church of God."

"That is your original plea, which you withdrew for the sake of pleading that no title was ever issued, or, in other words, that our Lord had founded no such church as she claims to be. You will remember that you cannot plead at one and the same time the forfeiture of title, and that no title ever existed. A title which never existed cannot have been forfeited. The allegation, that the Church has forfeited her title, concedes, then, that the title originally existed, and was hers. Am I to understand you as meaning to concede that our Lord did originally found such a church as the Roman claims to be, and that she was originally that church?"

"Not at all. I do not admit that such a title as she claims ever existed."

"You deny, then, that our Lord ever founded such a church as she claims to be, that is, a church with authority from him to teach."

"I do."

"But she is in possession as such a church, and possession is *primâ facie* evidence of title. If, then, you allege that no such title ever existed, the burden of proof is on you. But you cannot prove that no such title ever existed, as you learned in our conversation the other day. Moreover, you have just alleged forfeiture of title, which concedes that the title originally existed and was vested in the Church of Rome. You cannot now deny that it ever existed."

"I admit a title once existed, and was vested in her, though not such a title as she claims; and when I say that she has forfeited her title, I mean not that she has forfeited such a title as she now claims, but such a title as she originally had."

"That is nothing to the purpose. But what was that title?"

"I have told you already, in declaring that she has forfeited her title to be the CHURCH OF GOD. I do not deny that the

Church of Rome was once a pure church, but I contend that she is now corrupt, and no longer God's Church, or any portion of it."

"But the pure Church, the Church of God, is either such a church as the Roman claims to be, or a different church."

"It is widely different."

"Is the Church of God one, or many?"

"Properly speaking, there is but one church, although the one church may be composed of many particular churches."

"But such must be the character of the particular churches as not to detract from the real unity of the whole?"

"Granted."

"And this one church composed of many particular churches is *the* church and the *only* church our Lord founded?"

"It is."

"And it is widely different from such a church as the Roman claims to be?"

"Certainly it is."

"Then you simply deny that our Lord ever founded such a church as the Roman claims to be, and merely reiterate the plea you have withdrawn."

"I do not care for that; I am not to be tied down by your arbitrary rules of special pleading. The Church of Rome was once pure. She then belonged to the Church of God; she is now corrupt, and has forfeited her title. I do not say her title to be such a church as she pretends to be, but to be an integral part of the Church of God."

"She has degenerated from her original purity, and is now a corrupt church?"

"That is what I allege."

"But she is in possession as the pure and authoritative Church of God, and the burden of proof that she is corrupt is on you."

"I accept it, and am ready to prove her corruption."

"Corruption implies a change from a former or primitive state. You must know that state, or you cannot know that she is corrupt."

"She has corrupted the word of God; she teaches the commandments of men for the pure word; and has so disfigured the original gospel of our Lord, that it can be no longer recognized in her teachings."

"That is for you to prove."

"I am ready to prove it. Indeed, it needs no proof. It

is notorious. The world admits it. She has become a sink of corruption ; is full of all manner of uncleanness and filth."

" Words, brother ; mere words. Pause a moment and take breath, and then proceed to the proof. When you tell me the Catholic Church is corrupt, has degenerated, you assume a primitive state from which she has fallen ; and it is only by comparing her present state with that primitive state, that you can determine that she has fallen from it. What, then, was that primitive state ? "

" I can show what it was from the Scriptures."

" They are not in your possession. You are not their legal keeper, and have no authority to expound their sense. You can therefore make no appeal to them against the Church who is in possession, and has, presumptively, the sole right to interpret them. She interprets them in her favor, and you are bound to presume her interpretations to be correct, till you can prove by a competent authority to the contrary. This competent authority you are not ; for, on any conceivable hypothesis, at the very worst her authority is as good as yours can be at the very best. You must get a commission, or at least a *presumptive* commission, from Almighty God, as the legal keeper and expounder of the Sacred Scriptures, before you can prove any thing from them but your own arrogance and impudence."

" I can prove from the early Fathers that the primitive Church was essentially different from the present Romish Church."

" That is, you can prove it from early tradition ? "

" Yes."

" But the Church is in possession as the keeper and expounder of primitive tradition, as well as of the Sacred Scriptures. She interprets it in her own favor, and from it proves that she conforms perfectly to the primitive model."

" But she misinterprets the Fathers."

" As a matter of fact, it is undeniable that the Fathers may without violence be interpreted as she interprets them, and that she rightly interprets them is to be presumed, till the contrary is shown. Moreover, as her authority as the interpreter of primitive tradition, or of the Fathers, is at the worst equal to yours at the best, you have and can have no sufficient authority for setting her interpretation aside. So the appeal to primitive tradition will avail you no more than the appeal to the Scriptures ; and the fact that you have no authority to declare the sense of either debars you from all right to appeal to either against what she declares to be their sense."

“ But she has corrupted the primitive faith.”

“ You cannot say that, unless you are authorized to say what the primitive faith was. She has presumptively the right to declare that faith, and she declares that it was what she now teaches, and therefore she declares that she has not corrupted it. You are bound to presume that she has not, and must prove that she has, before you can use an argument which *assumes* that she has. But what was the original faith which she has corrupted ? ”

“ There is a great number of doctrines which she has corrupted. It is not necessary to mention all. Take, for instance, the doctrine of justification. The primitive doctrine was, that man is justified by faith alone ; the Romish doctrine is, that man is justified by works.”

“ The Catholic doctrine is, that man is justified by faith and works, meaning thereby works done through grace purchased for us by the merits of our Lord ; but on what authority do you assert that the primitive doctrine was, that man is justified by faith alone ? ”

“ The Holy Scriptures.”

“ On what authority do you assert that the Holy Scriptures teach it ? ”

“ Why, they teach it.”

“ You either have authority for saying so, or you have not. But you have not, as is certain from the fact that you have no authority to keep and expound the Scriptures. Then you say it without authority. An assertion made without any authority is worthless, and not to be entertained. Here is the answer to every instance of corruption of doctrine you do or can allege. In confessing the fallibility of your sect, you have confessed that you have no authority from God to teach his word. Then you have no authority for declaring what was the primitive faith, and then none for saying that the Church has corrupted it.”

“ But the Romish Church has forfeited her title to be considered the Church of God by authorizing superstition and idolatry, for evidently no church that authorizes these can be the Church of God.”

“ That is something to your purpose, and you will be entitled to a judgment, if the evidence sustains you. You take now the only ground from which you can legitimately frame an argument against the Church. Every previous ground you have taken has been untenable, because it required the authority to maintain it which you were contesting, and which you

had not, and were obliged to presume to be in the Church herself. You undertook to prosecute her under the law of grace, and failed for the want of a court of competent jurisdiction. As she is presumptively the supreme court, under the law of grace, you could under that law institute no process against her; for to every allegation you could make she had only to plead want of jurisdiction. The only possible way of prosecuting her is under the law of nature, and it is only by proving her to have violated some precept of that law, that you can obtain judgment against her. The law of nature falls, to some extent, under the jurisdiction of reason, and reason, to that extent, is its legal keeper and judge, and has the right to sit in judgment on its infractions. As the law of nature and that of grace both have the same origin, are enacted by the same sovereign Lawgiver, and as the latter confessedly presupposes the former and confirms it, it can never authorize what the former prohibits, any more than the former can authorize what the latter prohibits, unless we may suppose, what is not supposable, that God may be in contradiction with himself. The law of grace transcends the law of nature, but does not and cannot enjoin what it forbids. As superstition and idolatry are undeniably forbidden by the law of nature, if you prove that they are authorized, or in any sense sanctioned, by the Church, you prove that she is not and cannot be the Church of God. But she does not authorize or sanction them; she strictly forbids them. Thus, in her catechism for children she teaches the child to ask and answer:—

“*What is forbidden by this [the first] commandment?*”

“*To worship false gods or idols; or to give any thing else whatsoever the honor which belongs to God.*”

“*What else is forbidden by this commandment?*”

“*All false religions; all dealings with the devil; and inquiring after things to come, or secret things, by fortune-tellers or superstitious practices.*”

“*What else?*”

“*All charms, spells, and heathenish observation of omens, dreams, and such like fooleries.*”

“*Does this commandment forbid the making of images?*”

“*It forbids making them so as to adore them; that is, it forbids making them our gods.*”

“*Does this commandment forbid all honor and veneration of saints and angels?*”

“*No, we are to honor them as God’s special friends and servants; but not with the honor which belongs to God.*”

“ And is it allowable to honor relics, crucifixes, and holy pictures ?

“ Yes ; with an inferior and relative honor, as they relate to Christ and his saints, and are memorials of them.

“ May we, then, pray to relics and images ?

“ No, by no means ; for they have no life or sense to hear or help us.”

Here is evidence enough that the Church denies your charge. The burden of proof is on you, and you must prove her guilty of superstition and idolatry.”

“ And I am ready to prove it. The Reformers charged her with idolatry, and we have never ceased from their day to reiterate the charge.”

“ But a lie, though a million of times repeated, is none the less a lie. Nobody disputes that Protestants have accused the Church of idolatry, but that is not to the purpose. You must prove your allegation.”

“ Why, you might as well ask me to prove that there is a sun in the heavens. All the world knows that the Church of Rome is sunk in the grossest idolatry and the foulest superstition.”

“ Words, words, brother ; give me the proofs.”

“ Proofs ! you need no proofs. The fact is undeniable, and nothing but the grossest impudence on the part of the Romish Church could ever dream of denying it.”

“ No advance in the argument, brother. Have you yet to learn that the unsupported assertions of a man who admits that he speaks without authority are not proofs ? Here is the Church, on the one hand, teaching her children, in the very first lessons she teaches them, to abhor idols and all superstitious practices ; and here are you, on the other, accusing her of superstition, and that worst and most abominable species of superstition, idolatry, — she in possession and to be presumed to be the Church of God, and you presumptively a rebel against God, and a calumniator, till you make good your charge. Prove, then, the charge, or withdraw it.”

“ The Reformers proved it, the greatest and best of our writers have asserted it ; it is a question settled, *res adjudicata*. Has it not entered into history ? Do you not read it in the very elementary books for children ? Look at the great and enlightened State of Massachusetts ! she prohibits by law all sectarianism in her admirable system of schools, and the introduction into them of any books which show any preference for

one religious denomination over another ; and yet she does not hesitate to permit the introduction of books which teach that Papists are idolaters and image-worshippers. Have we not, in every land where we have had the power, prohibited the Romish worship ? Why have we, the only friends of religious liberty, why have we who have poured out our treasure and our blood to redeem the world from Papal tyranny and superstition, why have *we* done this, but for the reason that we have not dared tolerate superstition and idolatry ? ”

“ Why did the Jews, God’s chosen people, through whom the Messiah was to come, and who were hourly expecting him and praying for his coming, crucify him between two thieves when he did come, but on the pretext that he had a devil and was a blasphemer ? Did the fact that they falsely accused him, and then crucified him on that false accusation, supported by false witnesses, render them the less guilty ? ”

“ Do you mean to say that so many great and good men, so many pure and holy men, the glory of their age, their country, and their religion, have all conspired to bear false witness against the Romish Church ? The thing is incredible.”

“ More so than that the Jewish nation conspired to crucify their God ? I know nothing about your great and good men, your pure and holy men ; but I know that whoever accuses the Church of idolatry, or any species of superstition, utters as foul a lie as did the wicked Jews who told our Lord he had a devil, and that he blasphemed. No doubt, it is an easy matter to prove the Church guilty, if all you have to do is to bring a false accusation, assume your own sanctity, and then conclude it must be well founded or you could not have made it. But your logic would be more respectable, if from the falsity of your accusation you concluded your want of sanctity. If the character of Protestants is a presumption against their conspiracy to bring a false accusation, the character of Catholics is a still stronger presumption against their having conspired to uphold and practise idolatry ; for the great and pure and holy men who have lived and died in the Catholic faith, granting you all you can pretend to, are as a thousand to one to those of Protestant communions. But you forget that I was brought up a Protestant, and that to talk to me of Protestant sanctity is ridiculous. I am acquainted with Protestants, and with what they facetiously call their religion. Our dear mother, too, was brought up a Protestant, a Presbyterian, and yet what did she tell me on her death-bed ? ”

"What did she?"

"No matter now; but she did not die a Presbyterian."

"Did not? What mean you?"

"Some day, I may tell you, but you are not now worthy to hear."

"Did my father know?"

"As much as you, and no more."

"Did any body know, but yourself?"

"Yes."

"Do you mean to insinuate that a Popish priest was smuggled into our house?"

"O my wise brother, you do not know all things. Angels of mercy, messengers of grace, are sometimes sent even where the ministers of Satan fancy they do and can find no admission. All things are possible with God, and nothing is too good for him to do for those who are obedient to his grace."

"Am I to understand that my mother on her death-bed renounced Presbyterianism, and became a Papist?"

"She did not die a Presbyterian. You may recollect, that during the last week of her life she refused to see Mr. Grimface, her old Presbyterian pastor."

"True, and my father and I thought it strange; but as we had no doubt of her being one of the elect, it gave us no great uneasiness. But there was no Romish priest within two hundred miles of us."

"I have no doubt that my mother died in a state of grace; but more I will not tell you, till you prove or withdraw your charge against the Church."

"But why did not our mother tell us all, as well as you, of her apostasy?"

"She knew both your father and you, and that, if she had told you, she would have been denied the last consolations of religion; and after she had received them, there was no opportunity, till she became unable to do so. But your charge, — prove or withdraw it."

"I will prove it, but you must excuse me now. Our conversation has been long, and I am fatigued. But to-morrow, God willing, I will prove that the Romish Church is an idolatrous church."

"Be it so. But remember and prove it, or I shall require you to own that Protestantism —"

"Is of the devil. I accept the alternative. If I fail to establish the charge of idolatry and superstition against the

Romish Church, I will consent that the Reformers be branded as calumniators, and that Protestants are and have been from the first acting under the delusion of Satan."

"See that you keep your word."

The brothers separated for the remainder of the day, and James, though pleading fatigue, betook himself to his library to look up his proofs and prepare for the morrow. He felt that all depended on the issue he had joined, and that, if he failed to justify his charge, he could no longer pretend to uphold the Reformers. Hitherto his brother had kept him discussing the law of the case; but now he thought he saw a chance of entering upon its merits, and of introducing his witnesses. How he succeeded will be related in the next chapter.

ART. II. — 1. *The Jesuits.* From the French of MM. Michelet and Quinet, Professors in the College of France. Edited by C. Edwards Lester. New York: Gates & Stedman. 1845. 12mo. pp. 225.

2. *Des Jesuites par un Jesuite. Première Partie.* EXAMEN DES TEXTES. 2^e Edition, augmentée. Paris. 1844. 18mo. pp. 192.

3. *Des Jesuites par un Jesuite. Seconde Partie.* EXAMEN DES FAITS HISTORIQUES. Paris. 1844. 18mo. pp. 361.

THE first of these works is an English, or American, translation of the infamous lectures of Messrs. Michelet and Quinet, of the College of France, against the Jesuits, delivered in the summer of 1843; the other two works are a formal reply to them by a Jesuit, Father Cahour, written with great mildness, but with much keenness of wit and force of logic. They leave little to be desired by way of refutation of the Lectures, and ought to have accompanied the American edition of them; and would, if the American editor, whose name we are loath to write, had had the least conceivable sense of justice.

The Lectures, owing to the position and reputation of the Professors, and to the state of the public mind, especially in Paris, at the time they were delivered, were not altogether

without effect, and they are even now sometimes referred to by anti-Catholic writers with a certain degree of approbation. A Presbyterian minister of St. Louis, Missouri, who possesses all the zeal, and more than the average sourness of his sect, lately quoted them, in replying to an article of ours against him, as a work of authority ; and such is the deplorable ignorance of Protestants in general concerning Catholicity, especially concerning the religious orders it opposes, that many, we doubt not, may really suppose the work is in fact something better than a mere tissue of sophistry and misrepresentation. It may, therefore, not be amiss to subject these Lectures to a rigid examination, and lay open to the public their false assumptions, misstatements, and calumnies. We intended to do this some time since, and had, over a year ago, collected the necessary materials ; but we have hitherto been prevented from executing our intention by a press of other matters which we were unwilling to postpone. No great harm, however, can have resulted from the delay. The controversy is an old one, and changes not its character by lapse of time. The Society of Jesus remains, and will remain, as it was, and its enemies have long since ceased to be able to assume a new position or to invent a new falsehood against it.

Our readers are already familiar with the character of the Professors from the account we have given of them, when reviewing some of their other works. They are distinguished chiefs of what, in a general way, is called the modern *Movement* party, — a party with which we ourselves were associated in the days of our blindness, and from which we hoped the redemption of man and society, till the grace of God disabused us. This party is variously denominated, and is not easily defined or described. Perhaps its most appropriate name is the *Shadowistic* or *Symbolistic* party ; very nearly what is commonly meant in this country by the Transcendental party. It is not Catholic ; it is not Protestant, in the sense old-fashioned Protestants wish us to understand Protestantism ; nor is it precisely infidel, after the fashion of the last century, or, if so at bottom, it seeks to disguise the fact by dressing up its infidelity in the costume of religion. Its members claim to be religious, even Christian ; but Christian only in their own peculiar sense, because they profess to embrace and seek to realize what they allege was the *idea* entertained by our Lord. All religion, according to them, is a shadow or symbol, never the reality or the substance itself. The idea entertained by our Lord, or

the religion he contemplated, was, they tell us, a religion which completely and exactly symbolizes the whole of human nature, and shadows forth all its permanent and indestructible facts or laws. All religions are to be accepted, for each symbolizes a portion of these ; but no one can be accepted as perfect religion, for no one completely and exactly symbolizes them all. All, so far as they are positive, are true and divine ; and each, so far as exclusive, is false and mischievous. This is the great truth our Lord taught, and in obedience to this truth he sought to select out the positive portions of all religions and mould them into a perfect and self-consistent whole, which should be the adequate expression of all the essential facts of human nature. To this end he labored, suffered, and died. They only are truly his followers, or have the right to call themselves Christian, who, in this respect, imitate his example. To labor for such a religion is *Christian*, because it is to labor for the *Christian idea*, and to be a fellow-laborer with Christ himself is to be Christ — we shudder to write it — in the sense he was Christ ! and is *Catholic*, because it is to accept all religions, and to construct out of the materials they furnish a universal religion.

Moreover, human nature is progressive, continuously progressive, and progressive without term. It is never the same in any two epochs or countries, hardly in any two individuals, or in the same individual at two different periods of his life. The religion which perfectly symbolizes it in one age or nation will not in another. The garments fitted to the child will not fit the full-grown man, and to demand that they be retained and worn without alteration or enlargement is, in effect, to demand that the man remain for ever a child. As man himself advances, as human nature grows, and is continually unfolding more and more of what was concealed in the original germ, so the religious symbol must itself advance, have a power of development or expansion, which enables us to keep it always in harmony with our actual state ; for, if it do not advance with us, we outgrow it, leave it behind us, and are compelled to go on in our eternal career of progress without it.

But the growth, progress, development, or expansion of the symbol is not the work of God as the author of grace, — who may, indeed, *gratiâ inspirationis*, develop his revelations as seemeth to him good, — but the work of man himself. Man himself is intrusted with the work of casting his own shadow, of adapting his symbol to his nature. But to be able to do

this, he must be free to develop his own activity without restraint, and the religious symbol must be subjected to the free action of his own intellect and will, — and, we may add, to passion and caprice. Hence the *conditio sine qua non* of the progressiveness of religion is unrestrained freedom for man to alter, reform, amend, modify it at will, so as to adapt it to his moral and intellectual state ; or, in other words, unrestrained freedom to make his religion at all times and in all places after his own image. Hence, whatever tends to restrict man's control over his religious institutions, to render his religion inflexible, immovable, and immutable, the same always, everywhere, and for all, is hostile to religion itself, antichristian, mischievous to man, and hateful to God.

Such, in brief, is the general theory or doctrine of the *Shadowists*, or, as they are also sometimes called, the *Progressists*, as we can testify of our own knowledge, and as it is easy to collect from these Lectures themselves. It is clear from this statement, that the leading idea of these philosophers, doctors, or poets is the destruction of all antagonism between man and his religion. They find that there is a powerful antagonism between themselves and religion, as presented by its authorized teachers ; this antagonism they, very properly, look upon as wrong, and to be destroyed. But their peculiarity consists in proposing to destroy it by conforming, not man to religion, but religion to man. Hitherto it has been thought, that, whenever there is discrepancy between man and religion, he, not religion, should give way ; but this the theory corrects, and assumes that man is right, and that religion is in fault and in need of reform, — a notable discovery, no doubt.

It is also clear from our statement that the *Shadowists* do not hold religion to be imposed on man by his Maker as the law he is to learn, believe, and obey ; but they hold it to be something developed from man, spun, spider-like, from his own bowels, subjected to his free control, which he is to provide for and keep in constant repair, alter, contract, enlarge, amend, as occasion may require, so as to prevent it from ever offering any opposition to the age, country, or individual. The religious life, accordingly, consists, not in believing the revelation and keeping the commandments of God, but in adapting one's religion to the times. Under the religious point of view, man is a religion-developer, mender, or stretcher, whose chief duty is to make his religion always an exact shadow of himself. The service he may thus render religion is perhaps intelligible ; but

the advantage to be derived from his religion is not very obvious. Somebody has remarked, that the difference between a good physician and a poor one is very great, but between a good one and none at all it is not great. Perhaps our Professors think that by rendering religion flexible, a sort of India-rubber religion, capable of contracting and expanding at will, they make it a good religion, and therefore nearly, if not quite, as good as none.

If we analyze this marvellous theory, we shall find that it proceeds on the assumption, that the falsehood and mischief of a religion are in the restraint it imposes on human activity, and that it is true and wholesome so far as it leaves us free and unimpeded, and permits us to follow the bent of our nature, and live as we list. It assumes the end of man to be, not, as the Catechism teaches, "to know God, to love and serve him in this world, and to be happy with him for ever in the next," but to develop freely and in all directions his inherent activity, or, in other words, to develop and perfect his nature. Our nature, as God left it, is merely inchoate, and we must take it up and complete it; that is, do what the Creator has left undone. If left free, man will always keep his religion in harmony with the times, and prevent it from interposing any obstacle to his self-development and growth. It will cease to be a let or hindrance to his progress, and he may then go on in his career, and attain—— Here the oracle is silent, and no further response can be obtained.

Knowing now the theory and character of the Professors, we can easily understand the ground of their opposition to the Jesuits. They oppose the Jesuits, substantially, because the Jesuits oppose their theory of man and religion, because they deny that religion should be flexible, movable, mutable, and alterable at the will and caprice of each age, country, and individual; because they are exclusive, and will not admit that man can attain to salvation in one religion as well as in another; because they are hostile to the free development of human activity, and seek to subject it to a positive law imposed by authority on man, and not merely developed from him. Here is the ground of their opposition to the Jesuits, and their principal charges against them.

But in these charges they in fact allege no offence. There is no offence where there is no infraction of law; and where no law is alleged as violated, no offence is alleged. The Professors allege no law as violated by what they charge against

the Jesuits. They declare on no law ; but simply on their own theory. That theory is not law ; it is a mere private speculation or opinion, and therefore its infraction is no offence.

Before the Professors can allege the infraction of their theory as an offence, they must assume it to be law. But they cannot assume it to be law without contradicting themselves. The essence of their theory, as is evident to all who comprehend it, or have studied their Lectures, is that there is no law, and that man is perfectly free to exert his own activity as seemeth to himself good. To assume the theory to be law is to deny this, and to assert that man is subject to law, and free to exert his activity only according to law. On no hypothesis, then, can the Professors allege the infraction of their theory as an offence. That theory is either true or it is false. If true, there is no law ; then no offence, for its infraction violates no law ; if false, its infraction can be no offence ; for it can be no offence to violate a false theory. This is a bad beginning for our distinguished Professors, our learned and philosophic Universitarians, who would have us regard them as standing at the apex of modern civilization, and is not likely to exalt our opinion of their legal attainments and logical ability.

But the case for our Professors is worse yet. They not only cannot allege the infraction of their theory as an offence, but, on the assumption of that theory, they can allege no act of the Jesuits or of any body else, whatever it may be, as an offence. According to their theory, human activity is left perfectly free and unrestrained, and subject to no law but its own inherent law, by virtue of which it is human activity ; which inherent law, it is evident of itself, can never be violated, unless it be by not acting. There is no law, then, which restrains or forbids any act whatever. There then can be no offence ; for the offence is necessarily in doing what the law forbids. If there can be no offence, none can be charged against any one, let him do what he will. This is an awkward position for our Professors to assume. They wish to commence and sustain an action against the Jesuits, and as the condition of doing it, begin by denying all law, and therefore the possibility of any actionable matter ! But no man can be arraigned without law, or but by law. Whoever, then, wishes to arraign and condemn a party must in the outset concede the existence of law, and show that the law, on which he declares, forbids the particular acts he sets forth in his declaration. Are the

learned Professors of the College of France, the celebrated Universitarians, under the necessity of being taught this ?

But, unhappily for our Professors, if they should undertake to assert law, and to relieve themselves by an appeal to it, they would be obliged to abandon their theory. If they appeal to law, they recognize a legal order. But the moment they recognize a legal order, they recognize an authority to make and declare the law, and that the right or the wrong of human actions is determinable only by the law. This is as true in moral matters as in civil. Man is a moral being only by being placed under law; and he is moral or immoral in his character, simply as his acts conform or do not conform to the law to which he is subjected. Deny law, and you deny morals. Admit law, and you must admit a sovereign lawgiver, whose will is law. But the will of the lawgiver cannot bind till promulgated, and it cannot be promulgated without authority. Where there is no authority to promulgate and declare the will of the sovereign, there is no law. Law necessarily supposes such authority, and the supposition of such authority necessarily supposes the law to be what, and only what, the authority declares it to be. But if the Professors admit this, as they must, if they appeal to law, they admit the very principle for which they arraign the Jesuits; for the gist of their allegation against the Jesuits is that they assert that man is subject to law, and that the law is determinable only by the authority which promulgates and declares it. They would, then, not only bring no charge against the Jesuits, but they would even condemn themselves. Not the Jesuits, then, would be wrong in opposing, but they in defending, their theory. So much in general; a more particular examination will disclose everywhere this same original vice of the pleadings of the Professors against the Jesuits. They assert universal liberty, and allege against the Jesuits that they deny and oppose it. Be it so. But if all actions are free, it is no more an offence against liberty to deny it than it is to assert it. The Jesuits in denying it only exercise that liberty which you assert, and therefore do only what you assert they are free to do.

Do you reply, that it is self-contradictory to assert universal liberty, and at the same time the universal liberty to violate liberty? If so, that is your affair, not ours. To assert universal liberty is, no doubt, to assert a universal absurdity; but the responsibility is yours, not ours. If you assert it, you can assume no act to be a violation of it; for whatever the

act may be, it is a free act, which no law forbids. But liberty, you say, necessarily excludes all acts which are repugnant to liberty. But no act is repugnant to liberty, if liberty be universal. Let this pass. Liberty can exclude no act repugnant to liberty, unless liberty be erected into law. The law must ordain it, define it, and forbid its violation. But a law ordaining and defining liberty is already a limitation of liberty, and there is only so much liberty as the law ordains, concedes, or forbids to be attacked. But the Professors by their theory deny all law.

There is a great deal of loose declamation in our days about liberty and natural rights; but liberty is really unintelligible without law. Liberty is my right, or it is not liberty. If it is my right, you have no right to encroach on it, and if you attempt it, I have the right to repel you; for a right which there is no right to defend as a right is no right at all. But I can have no right to repel your attack, unless there is some law which forbids it. Hence law always lies necessarily at the foundation of liberty, — the law of God, of nature, of the state, or of nations. The question of liberty, therefore, always involves the question of law, and can never be determined but by determining what the law permits, commands, or forbids. Deny this, you assert, in the name of universal liberty, universal liberty to violate liberty, which is absurd. The assertion of law is essential to the assertion of liberty, and the denial of law is a virtual denial of liberty; for it denies liberty as a right. We wish our modern advocates of liberty, who seek to advance liberty by the destruction of law, would bear this in mind, and remember that liberty without the guaranty of law is even less than an empty name.

This reasoning is as applicable in one sphere of human activity as in another, in the sphere of thought as in that of outward action. The Professors seek to arraign and condemn the Jesuits in the name of liberty of thought; but the liberty of thought cannot be asserted without asserting law, which grants and guaranties it, and therefore only so much liberty of thought can be asserted as the law grants and guaranties. To determine how much this is, the appeal is not to liberty itself, but to the law; and therefore to the authority competent to declare the law. But our Professors deny all such authority, for the gist of their charge against the Jesuits, as we have seen, is that they assert it. They then deprive themselves of the means of determining whether they are entitled to the liberty

they claim, therefore whether they have a law against the Jesuits to which appeal may be made. In order, then, to make the denial of that liberty an offence, they are obliged to assert universal liberty of thought, and then the denial ceases to be an offence ; for it is only an exercise on the part of the Jesuits of the liberty asserted. If all thought be free, I am as free to think against that freedom itself as you are to think in its favor.

But if the Professors find themselves estopped from proceeding in the name of liberty against the Jesuits, and appeal to law, they abandon the liberty for which they contend, and, for aught they allege, the Jesuits are right, and they wrong. They concede, then, that thought itself is subject to law, and is free only where the law leaves it free. The assertion, then, that the law restrains thought, is true and just, and the only ground of controversy is whether the law does or does not forbid the degree of restraint the Jesuits are said to uphold, — clearly a question for the court to decide. As the only recognized court of competent jurisdiction has already decided this question, and decided it in favor of the Jesuits, it is *res adjudicata*, and no longer an open question, unless the Professors can impeach the court itself. The only court of competent jurisdiction recognized by any body is the Catholic Church, and that has decided in favor of the Jesuits. You deny the jurisdiction of that court, or you appeal from its decision. Very well. To what do you appeal ? To the judgment of mankind ? We deny the right of such appeal ; but let it pass. To the judgment of mankind declared by authority or without authority ? If you say by authority, you abandon your cause, for you assert authority. If without authority, then the judgment is of no authority, and cannot overrule that of the Church. To private reason or judgment ? But that appeal is fatal to you ; for, on the ground of private reason or judgment, the Jesuits have the same right to oppose your views that you have theirs. Consequently, neither in the name of liberty, nor in the name of authority or law, can the Professors assert that the Jesuits, in what is alleged against them, violate the freedom of thought.

The Professors present themselves as the champions of freedom of opinion, and arraign the Jesuits as its enemies. On what ground ? On the ground of their denying and opposing the Professors' theory ; certainly on no other. But in doing this they assume to themselves the right to define that freedom, and to declare that to oppose their definition is to oppose the freedom itself. But their definition is only their opinion,

and by what right do they impose their opinion as law, and assume to arraign me for rejecting it? In this very fact, they violate the freedom for which they contend. They assume the principle, that they have the right to impose their opinions on me, and hold me up to public derision and abhorrence, if I have the audacity to disregard them. In this they assert the most perfect dominion over me, and claim me as their slave in both soul and body. He who has the right to impose his opinions on me as law, to compel me to think as he thinks, has the dominion of my soul, and he who has dominion of my soul has of course dominion of my body; for the dominion of the body is in the soul. In the very name of freedom of opinion, these Professors would subject us to our fellow-men, and establish a tyranny which M. Michelet himself admits to be tenfold worse than the worst political tyranny conceivable.

Liberty, rightly defined, is a sacred name, and he is worthy of condemnation who violates it; but who gave Messrs. Michelet and Quinet the right to define it, and impose their definition as the law? We know well enough what they understand by liberty, but we deny that to violate it in that sense is a crime. As that sense is not the sense in possession, they must establish it by competent authority as the legitimate sense, before the declaration that the Jesuits violate it alleges an offence. It is easy to declaim, nay, to grow lyrical, and utter dithyrambs on liberty, and to denounce all who do not chance to understand it as we do; but that does not prove that we are right, or that they are wrong,—that we are its friends, or that they are its enemies. It is not without reason that a Madame Roland, who had herself sacrificed law to liberty, or, more properly speaking, to license, exclaims, when led to the scaffold by partisans still more violent than herself, — “O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name!” It is not seldom that they who scream loudest for liberty are its greatest enemies. Who more clamorous for liberty than Marat, Danton, Robespierre? Who more determined against forcing conscience than the boastful children of the Reformation, who have never yet gained or retained the predominance in a single country without the aid of the civil arm, and by pains and penalties enacted and enforced against all who dared oppose their opinions, as England, Scotland, Holland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and our own country can bear witness? Indeed, it may almost be laid down as a rule, that the man who clamors loudly for liberty, and claims to be its especial friend, is

sure to be a tyrant at heart, and means by liberty only liberty to make others succumb to him.

The Professors accuse the Jesuits of being "the counter Revolution"; that is, of opposing the French Revolution, of seeking to repair its disasters, and to prevent the recurrence of a similar catastrophe. Concede it, what then? When did the French Revolution become a law? When did it become a crime before God, or against the human race, to deny the justice and utility of that Revolution? Has not France had enough of revolution? Bewitched by her sophists and demagogues, she madly exclaimed, — "Go to, let us make a revolution. Let us do away with this old political order, under which for these twelve hundred years we have lived, grown great, renowned, and led the civilization of the world. To the guillotine with the last of our glorious dynasty of kings, and let the PEOPLE REIGN!" She gave the word, and down went altar and throne, temple and palace, church and state, faith and manners, and up went the red cap and the tree of liberty. What gained she? Ask her exiled chivalry, her royal and noble blood flowing in torrents on the Place de Grève; ask the burning sands of Egypt and Syria, the snows of Russia, the field of Waterloo, the Isle of St. Helena, — all France bristling with foreign bayonets, her beautiful capital held by foreign mercenaries, and herself owing her not being blotted out from the roll of nations to the mercy or the policy of her conquerors. Alas! France at a frightful sacrifice has taught us the worth of revolutions and the revolutionary spirit. She, rising from her prostrate condition, and assuming her rank among the nations of the earth, only in proportion as she re-establishes the order she had in her frenzy cast off, proclaims to all the world, that it is no crime to condemn her Revolution, and to arm her children by the precepts of religion against the madness of attempting to continue or to reproduce it. If this is the offence of the Jesuits, it is their glory. In the name of France, of humanity, of all that is sacred, if this is their crime, we say, All hail to the Jesuits! They are the true followers of Jesus; and however much shallow sophists and conceited demagogues may revile and persecute them, great is their reward in heaven.

The Professors say the Jesuits are Ultramontanists; Ultramontanism is opposed to the revolutionary order in France, and therefore they are monsters and to be condemned and expelled.

"The worst thing for it would be to show that its profession of faith is not only different from, but inimical to, the profession of faith of the State. In her institutions founded upon the equality of existing worship, France professes and teaches the unity of Christianity, under the diversity of particular churches. This is her confession, such as it is, written in the sovereign law; all Frenchmen belong legally to the same church under different names: there are, henceforth, here no schismatics or heretics, but those who, denying every church but their own, every authority but their own, wish to impose it upon all others, to reject all others without discussion, and who dare to say, — 'Out of my church there is no salvation,' when the State says precisely the reverse. It has not been from pure caprice, if the law has broken the religion of the State. France could not adopt as her representative the *Ultramontanism* which, from its principle of exclusiveness, is diametrically opposed to the social dogma and the religious community, inscribed upon the constitution as the result, not only of the Revolution, but of all modern history. Whence it follows, that, for things to be otherwise than they are, one of two things must take place: either France must abjure her social and political communion, or Catholicism must become truly universal, by comprehending at last what it is now content to curse." — pp. 88, 89.

Suppose the antecedent, we deny the consequence. Grant there is an antagonism between Ultramontanism, that is, Catholicity, and the order to which the Revolution has given birth in France, it no more follows from this fact that Ultramontanism is wrong than it does that the Revolutionism is wrong. By what authority is that order which has resulted from the Revolution assumed to be the law, which to oppose is necessarily a crime? You must establish the legitimacy of that order, the legality of what you call the sovereign law, before you can assume it to be a crime to disregard or transgress it.

The Revolution, we are told, has established in France, as the sovereign law of the state, a law which Ultramontanism necessarily contravenes. That is, there is a necessary antagonism between the political order and the religious order. Be it so. But if the Church opposes the State, the State opposes the Church. Whence, then, follows it that the Church is wrong? Why is not the fact, that the political order opposes the religious, as good proof, to say the least, that the political order is wrong, as that the religious order is? Which is the more sacred, religion or politics? Where there is antagonism between religion and politics, which must give way? Religion? Since when has the political order been made su-

preme? Since when has the State had rightfully the supreme control in matters of religion? Since when has it received from Almighty God authority to teach his word, and to assume the direction of consciences? The Christian religion was condemned, prohibited by the State, under the pagan emperors of Rome; — was it therefore wrong for the subjects of the emperor to embrace it, and to do all in their power to propagate it? If you assert the supremacy of the State in spirituals, be so obliging as to show us the patent of the Almighty constituting the State the *Ecclesia docens*, and the temporal prince the *pontifex maximus*.

The Professors tell us that the Jesuits are Ultramontanists; Ultramontanism is the supremacy of the Church, and the assertion of the supremacy of the Church is inimical to religious liberty. Hence the Jesuits are opposed to religious liberty, and, for that reason alone, should be suppressed. But why is it more inimical to religious liberty to assert the supremacy of the Church than it is to assert the supremacy of the State? Is religious liberty less interested in the liberty of the Church than in the liberty of the State? If you declare the State supreme, you subject the Church to the State. Is religion free, when it is subjected to the State? Is it to defend religious liberty to assert the right of the State over it, and to oppose it to assert the freedom of the Church? Am I free in my religion, when I am bound to take my religion from the temporal power, and prohibited from embracing a religion the State does not see fit to authorize? Am I the enemy of religious liberty, because I resist the attempt to make the State the director of consciences, and to give the prince absolute authority over the souls, as well as the bodies, of his subjects? Strange advocates of religious liberty are these celebrated Universitarians! Religious liberty with them means freedom from the authority of religion, and absolute subjection, body and soul, to the civil power; that is, the most absolute religious despotism conceivable, — a despotism which was realized in part by Henry the Eighth of England, when he caused himself to be declared supreme head of the Church, — which is still more fully realized by the Autocrat of the Russias, — and which is perfectly realized by the Emperor of China, the mighty brother of the moon! Strange that these men of lofty words do not see that the principle on which they condemn the Jesuits condemns themselves, and that they cannot assert religious liberty for themselves without asserting it also for Ultra-

montanists ! The State destroys religious liberty by prohibiting religion, as much as it does by ordaining a particular religion and forbidding the exercise of any other.

Again ; these Professors, by the principle they contend for, condemn themselves as politicians. They assert the authority of the State against the Jesuits, and hold, that, inasmuch as they are condemned by that authority, they are justly condemned. This asserts the sacredness of the authority of the State, and denies the right of any one to go against it. They then deny the right of revolution, for revolution is the subversion of the authority of the State. They then condemn themselves ; for they assert the legitimacy of revolution. Nay, they are, in principle, themselves the counter revolution, and obnoxious to the very charges they bring against the Jesuits. If they insist on asserting the sacredness of the State, the absolute authority of the State in matters of conscience, they should descend from their stand as accusers, and take their place in the prisoner's box to receive the sentence of the court. How hard it is for iniquity to avoid condemning herself ! how hard it is to forge a weapon against truth and justice which shall not pierce our own hands and heart ! Yet these Professors are great men, lights of their age, and stand, as we have said, at the very apex of modern civilization !

But this is not the worst of it. The facts assumed are not true. There is no such sovereign law in France as is alleged in the passage quoted. What is given as the sovereign law of France is nothing more than the opinion of Messrs. Michelet and Quinet, and their party, and they must remember that their opinion does not happen to be law. The French charter of 1830 declares, that "each one professes his religion with equal liberty, and obtains for his worship the same protection." This is the sovereign law of France. M. Quinet tells us that this article ordains that every one may be saved in his own religion, and asserts the unity of Christianity under the diversity of particular churches. With his leave, it does no such thing. It simply guaranties the freedom of worships, without deciding any thing at all in favor of one or another. It is a simple declaration that the State professes no religion, or that she tolerates and protects the religion of her subjects, be it what it may. To say that this is a profession of faith is nonsense. The State declares in her fundamental law that she makes no profession of faith ; therefore she makes a profession of faith ; and, therefore, whoever makes any profes-

sion of faith contravenes the sovereign law of the State ! The government of this country protects all religions, but professes none. Therefore, it professes a religion. What religion ? No religion. Therefore, to profess a religion is to contravene the profession of the State. This is the way these master-spirits of the nineteenth century, these champions of art, science, intelligence, reason, argue ! The State says it affords equal protection to all worships adopted by its subjects ; therefore it decrees that every one may be saved in his own religion ; and therefore the Catholic, who holds and teaches that out of the Church there is no salvation, contravenes the law, and is placed out of its protection ! Cannot these marvellous philosophers understand that there is a difference between affording equal civil protection to diverse religions, and decreeing that all are equally available for salvation ? In protecting all religions, the State throws the responsibility of his religion on the subject, and assumes that she has nothing to do with his spiritual welfare or future salvation. Moreover, if all religions are equally protected, the Catholic must be protected as well as any other. Then the Catholic has the legal right to believe and to teach that out of the Catholic Church there is no salvation. Then the Jesuits, in so teaching, do not contravene the sovereign law of France ; for that which is legal cannot be against law. Consequently, even if the abominable heresy of the supremacy of the temporal authority in matters of religion were to be asserted, it would still follow that the Professors fail to allege even an offence against the Jesuits.

France, we are told, recognizes " the unity of Christianity under the diversity of particular churches." This is not true ; but suppose it true, what then ? What is it to me what France does or does not recognize ? Is France the Church ? It is amusing to observe the *ado* Frenchmen, even some Frenchmen who are Catholics, make about France. To our Professors France is very nearly what the Church is to the faithful, and it suffices for them to ask, What does France — that is, those who assume to speak in the name of France — teach or tolerate ? and they seem to take it for granted that France is infallible, and that whatever she condemns must needs be damnable. All this may be very patriotic, but we cannot accept it. France is no doubt a very considerable kingdom, Paris a very clever city ; but Paris is not the Holy See, nor France the Church of God. We can pardon much to patriotism, and we expect a French philosopher to hold that France is all the

world, Paris all France, and himself all Paris ; but because he does, it does not follow that we must, or that the Jesuit who does not is therefore guilty of a crime. Religion, truth, justice, virtue, do not depend on national distinctions, are not bounded by geographical lines, and change not in form or substance as we pass from one country to another. They are universally and eternally the same, — the same for Socrates and Theodore Parker, for Confucius and Michelet, the Hottentot and the Frenchman, the Asiatic and the American. What in the world has nationality to do with faith, religion, morality, philosophy ? Talk not to us, then, of what France recognizes, or does not recognize. She might cease to be, and the Church remain, religion remain, and wisdom and virtue remain. Before you bring in France as umpire in religious matters, recollect and produce her credentials, and authenticate to us her divine commission.

But even here, again, the Professors are out as to their facts. France officially recognizes no such doctrine as is pretended. What are the facts ? Simply that she recognizes diverse worships, and supports their ministers from her treasury ; but not that she recognizes them as *Christian*, or as substantially one and the same religion. One of those religions is the Hebrew religion. Does she recognize Judaism as identical with Christianity ? She, for reasons or no reasons satisfactory to herself, pays the expenses of different religions ; but she nowhere professes to believe these religions are all alike true, and available for salvation. That is a question she leaves to her subjects to decide for themselves. For aught she says, she may believe them all false and anti-Christian. As a government, speaking officially, she professes no religion, though in point of fact the Catholic religion is declared by the charter of 1830 to be the religion of the French, and therefore Protestantism and Judaism are merely tolerated.

The Professors gravely tell us that France is more catholic than the Church, because the Church excludes from salvation all not of her communion, and France does not. This might make even a tyro in metaphysics laugh. In the first place, France teaches nothing on the subject ; and if she did, it would amount to nothing. In the second place, catholicity is predicable only of that which is one and identical. To claim to be catholic because you hold that salvation is attainable in diverse communions is absurd. A church embracing diverse communions is syncretic, or eclectic, not catholic. A church is not

catholic because it denies the possibility of salvation out of its bosom, but it cannot be catholic unless it does so. Exclusiveness is essential to catholicity, as every one who knows any thing of metaphysics knows full well. It is not to the credit of the Universitarian philosophers that they do not know this, and that they fall into the absurdity of confounding catholicity with eclecticism or syncretism.

The catholic teacher must teach all truth to be taught pertaining to the order in which he teaches. If there be no one communion or church that does this, there is no catholic teacher. It is not catholic to teach that truth is distributed through all communions, and that, if the separate portions of each were collected together into one whole, you would have all truth. Undoubtedly there is truth in all religions and in all sects ; and no sect could live a single day, were it not for the truth it has. But is there or is there not a communion that has all truth, and therefore truth in its unity and plenitude, all that is distributed through the various sects ? Is there a sect which has a single truth not possessed by that one communion ? If so, there is no catholic church. France, we say, not in order to be more catholic than Rome, but in order to be catholic at all, then, must possess the whole truth, and be able to teach it in its unity and plenitude. Do the Professors claim this for her ? They do not. They simply contend that she professes that there are elements of truth in some communions wanting in others, and that no one has them all. Then it is absurd to talk of her catholicity, for her catholicity consists simply in the denial of catholicity. What admirable metaphysicians and logicians are these renowned Universitarians !

Our Professors allege, also, that the Jesuits are opposed to the glory of France, and *therefore* should be condemned and expelled from her dominions, especially from Paris. But to oppose the glory of France is no offence, unless that glory be the law, or, what is the same thing, unless there be some law which forbids opposing it. In this charge the Professors, then, assume a law, and therefore abandon their theory, which denies all law. But let this pass ; by what right do they declare the glory of France the law, and make an appeal to national vanity and prejudice against the Jesuits ? The Jesuits are a religious order approved by the Church ; they are laboring to spread Catholicity ; and they would, if they could, make all France thoroughly Catholic. This is the worst that can be said of them. The assumption, then, is, that there is antagonism be-

tween Catholicity and the glory of France, that France cannot be Catholic without sacrificing her national glory. Suppose it ; what then ? Is national glory in general, or the national glory of France in particular, to be placed above religion ? Suppose the antagonism ; whence follows it that the fault is on the side of religion ? We had supposed that religion is before politics, that where there is opposition, politics, not religion, must give way, and that no national glory may be consulted at the expense of justice, sanctity, truth.

Religion can never be legitimately opposed on the authority of politics or of national glory. Religion is that which is highest ; what it ordains is ordained by God himself, who is the sovereign Lord and Proprietor, and who has in all things and in all cases the sovereign right to command. It is the *lex suprema*, and overrides all the ordinances of men, all national institutions, and civil enactments ; for these must be tried by it, not it by them. If it sanction them, they are legitimate, and may stand ; if it condemn them, they are by that fact alone illegitimate, and without right or business to be at all. It extends even to the thoughts and intents of the heart, and is the supreme law in both courts, the exterior and the interior. As individuals or nations we are placed under it, bound to conform to it, to obey it in every particular, and are guilty of rebellion against God, our rightful Sovereign, if we do not. If, then, Catholicity be the true religion, you must submit to all her demands, however opposed she may be to your individual or your national pride and vanity. What she opposes God opposes ; what opposes her opposes God, and you must abandon it, or stand condemned as guilty of treason against your rightful Sovereign. If you would oppose Catholicity, you must, then, do it on some other ground than that of national glory or national vanity. You must unchurch her, show that she has not the commission she claims, and then you have a good reason for rejecting her, whether she do or do not oppose national glory. But till then, the fact that this or that is opposed by her is only a proof that this or that is itself to be opposed.

Moreover, the charge is absurd. It does not allege that Catholicity is false, and therefore repugnant to the national glory. But conceding, by implication, its truth, it alleges that the Jesuits are censurable for laboring to spread it, because it is hostile to the glory of France. But there is and can be no national glory in opposition to true religion. The glory of the nation, as of the individual, is in loving and obeying the Lord,

in making his law supreme, and in refraining from every act, however advantageous it may appear to our short-sighted wisdom, which it forbids. Concede the truth of Catholicity, and national glory is in strict fidelity to it ; and it is national sin and shame to go against it. What more absurd, then, than to allege that Catholicity, conceded to be true, is repugnant to national glory ?

But we deny the fact alleged ; put it on any ground you will, we deny that the Jesuits, in laboring to make France Catholic, are warring against the glory of France. In so laboring they are true Frenchmen, and show that they, not the Universitarians, have the true French spirit, and are filled with the true national life of France. The glory of France is identified with the Catholic religion. Her power, greatness, renown, art, civilization, chivalry, glorious deeds, recollections, — all that is a spell upon the heart of the Frenchman, and makes him proud to belong to France, to call himself her son, — is redolent of Catholicity, inseparable from Catholic faith and piety. Divest France of what she owes to Catholicity, and she is a byword and a mockery. Her shame, her disgrace, the foul deeds for which she blushes and all her friends blush, she owes to her forgetfulness of the true source of her glory, to her neglect of Catholic faith and piety, to her Huguenots, Jansenists, and infidel philosophers, and infidel rabble. These have torn her bosom, stripped her of her fair ornaments, cast her out in nakedness and shame, wounded, bleeding, and half dead. The Catholic Church made her a kingdom, gave her her rank among the nations, her noble sentiments, her lofty and refined civilization ; inspired her chivalry and heroism ; covered her soil with the monuments of art and charity ; sent forth her armies of missionaries and martyrs, more glorious in their conquests than those led on by her unrivalled military heroes. O, base and degenerate is the Frenchman who would rob her of this her true glory, who would sever her from the Church, bid her spurn the Catholic religion and seek to be glorious by denying her whole past, and becoming a feeble infant of yesterday, without recollections, without ancestors, without parents, — a mere foundling, to be nursed by the tender charities of an infidel and blaspheming world ! O gentlemen, are you mad ? In the name of patriotism, as well as of religion, if you love your beautiful country, if you would not sink her so low that there shall be none so poor as to do her reverence, labor day

and night with all your zeal and power to bind her, soul and body, to Rome. Link her fortunes to the Eternal City, her glory to the Holy See, and long as the world stands shall she flourish, be loved, be honored, and revered. Separate her, and she is gone; France of the past, France of the Middle Ages, France of Chivalry, France the leader of modern civilization, France the great, the renowned, to whom even the foreigner is compelled to do homage, is no more, and her place in history is henceforth a blank for ever.

Yet we deny not that there is adroitness in this appeal. It is the common resort of all who would oppose the Church of God, from the loud-bellowing Luther down to the low-piping Ronge. All seek their *point d'appui* in the national spirit, and trust for success to the appeal to national prejudice. Thus, Luther appealed to the old Germanic spirit against the Church, and evoked the shade of the defunct Herman, the old pagan, to renew the fight against Rome. Rome is a foreign power, anti-national, the hereditary enemy of the Germanic people. Shall we, whose fathers so often met her legions in battle, who never succumbed to her power, who defeated her armies, invaded her territories, and blotted her old empire out from the list of nations, — shall we tamely yield to the mandates of a shaven priest, who impudently pretends to the throne of the Cæsars? Shall our serene and high-mighty princes submit to be ruled by his creatures, to hold his stirrup, to kiss his toe, and do his bidding? Where is the old Germanic spirit? Rouse ye, brothers, rouse ye from your baseness; wake the old Teutonic thunder; shake the seven-hilled city beneath him, and let him know that Germans are men, free men, and never were and never will be in subjection to a foreign power!

Thus, too, in England appealed the enemies of the Church to the national spirit, and alleged that it was a disgrace, that it derogated from the national dignity and independence, that his Majesty Henry the Eighth should not be supreme in his own realms over all things spiritual and temporal, and that when he wanted to put away one wife and take another he must send to Rome for permission, and — be denied. Should not a king be supreme? Should he not, when his wife no longer suffices for his lust, have the right to behead her and take another? Fine time of day, when his sacred Majesty cannot do his will without humbly craving leave of an Italian despot! It is an outrage upon the nation. Shall free-born Englishmen submit to it? Submit to it! No.

Are you Englishmen? Speak out, then, and let that Italian usurper know that you despise him, and that not a minion of his shall set his foot on English soil, without meeting a dungeon, a scaffold, or a gibbet.

Thus too is it with anti-Catholic writers and lecturers in our own country, our Beechers, Bushnells, and Kirks, with their foreign associates, Sperry, Leahy, and Hogan. They appeal to the national spirit, to *American* vanity and prejudice, to check the growth of the Church amongst us. They are, all at once, marvellously patriotic. What! free Americans, will you suffer a foreign power to steal into your free territories and establish his dominion over you? Can ye surrender the independence so gloriously won by your patriot sires? Have ye so soon forgotten Bunker's Hill, Saratoga, Yorktown, Washington, Adams, Franklin, Jefferson, and Henry? Where is your national spirit? Are ye already prepared to bow your necks tamely to the yoke of the foreigner? Know you not that the Pope is the head of the Church, that all Catholics are his subjects, his slaves, sworn to do his bidding, that he is a foreigner, an Italian despot, and that, if you become Catholics, you must become the subjects of a foreign master, must lose your national independence, lose your rights as free-men, your inalienable rights as men, and sink into mere slaves? Ay, free Americans! become Catholics, and you lose all your rights; you cease to be men; you become slaves, soul and body, to the will of an old man seated on the seven hills of Rome. Are you prepared for this? Has national independence no longer a charm for you? Is freedom not worth possessing? Are your free institutions not worth struggling for, dying for? Rouse ye, then, before it is too late. Insidiously the enemy is stealing upon you. He is establishing his posts and fortifying himself throughout the whole length and breadth of your land, consecrated to freedom by the labors, privations, prayers, tears, and blood of your fathers, and ere you dream of it, you will find yourselves in his power and obliged to surrender at discretion. Then farewell to the hopes of freemen, of sages, of philanthropists, the mighty dead and the mighty living, that at length there might be one country in which man should be free to live under laws of his own making and a religion of his own choosing. Americans! free Americans! by all your national spirit, by all your recollections, and by all your anticipations, be warned in season; awake from your fatal security, and make one bold,

manly effort, before it is for ever too late, for your country, your political institutions, your homes and firesides. — Such is their appeal.

Yet, ingenious and successful as is this appeal, may be it is nothing but a gross absurdity. What is it in principle, but setting up nationality as the law of religion, as if religion were not free, sovereign, and catholic, but dependent on national distinctions and geographical lines? Prove the Catholic religion false, prove that the Church is not the Church of God, if you can, and oppose her on the ground that she has no authority from God to promulgate and declare his law; but do not so stultify yourselves as to oppose her on the ground that she is anti-national; for, if religion as religion is admitted at all, she must be admitted as superior to the nation itself. None but such as deny all religion, regular atheists, can, if they know what they do, condemn any religion for reasons drawn from any national spirit or political order. Religion is higher than politics, and gives the law to the nation, instead of taking the law from it. You must conform your nationality to your religion, not your religion to your nationality, and subordinate your politics to its precepts, unless you would maintain the infamous maxim that “all is fair in politics,” — a maxim first openly proclaimed, we believe, by a modern Jew in New York, — a fit representative of those who crucified their God between two thieves.

It is lawful to object to the authority of the Pope, if a good and solid reason can be found for doing so; but to object to it *because* the Pope is an Italian, not an American, an Englishman, an Irishman, a Frenchman, a German, or a Dutchman, is as absurd as to refuse to acknowledge the authority of our Lord, because, according to the flesh, he was a Jew. The Pope, if he has any authority at all, has it, not by virtue of the fact that he is a foreigner, an Italian, or an Italian prince, but by virtue of the fact that he is the successor of St. Peter, the Visible Head of the Church, which is catholic, of no nation, but over all nations and in all. If he have the authority he claims, it is no national authority, but the authority delegated to him by Him who has all power in heaven and in earth, and to resist it is to rebel against God. And is there any who dares maintain that it is lawful to rebel against God?

“But we deny the authority of the Pope; we do not admit that the authority Catholics claim for him was ever delegated to him.” Then say so; prove what you assert, and oppose

him for that reason ; but not because he is, perchance, an Italian, and resides at Rome, instead of Geneva, London, Paris, or Washington. Do not oppose him on the ground of his nationality, when he claims and exercises no authority on that ground. If he has no authority, that fact alone is reason enough for not submitting to him ; if he has the authority he claims, there is no good reason conceivable for not obeying him. If he is not God's Vicegerent, nobody asks you to obey him ; if he is, nobody can deny that he ought to be obeyed by all, of whatever nation they may be. This is all we will deign to reply to the objections drawn from nationality and politics. We could easily refute them by denying the supposition on which they rest, and showing that there is nothing in the constitution of the ecclesiastical or Papal power that contravenes any national independence, national spirit, or political order, not morally wrong in itself ; but we will not do religion the foul dishonor of compelling or suffering her to plead at the tribunal of politics or nationality. We agree with our Puritan fathers, that the Church is free and sovereign, and can never be compelled to answer at the bar of the State. She is supreme. In relation to each other, all states and nations are by right free and independent ; before God, or before his Church, if it be his Church, no one is free or independent, save in obedience ; for in respect of nations as of individuals, it is the law that God is to be obeyed rather than men.

This is the Christian doctrine ; it is the doctrine of common sense ; it is, moreover, the American doctrine. It was the denial of the supremacy of the State over religion, and the assertion of the supremacy of the Church over the State, — the freedom and sovereignty of religion, and the subjection of the State to the law of God, promulgated and declared by *his* ministers, — that induced our fathers to leave their homes, that sustained them amid the privations of the wilderness, and enabled them to found the American state. America was rescued from its savage state and made the abode of civilization in obedience to the great principle of the freedom and sovereignty of the Church of God. Especially was this true of Puritan New England. Our fathers had their faults and their errors ; but while their blood courses in our veins, we will not rob or consent to see them robbed of their only glory, their only solid claim on the gratitude of their posterity. They only are true to their memory, and really entitled to call themselves in any deep and significant sense Americans, who are true to this

great and everlasting principle, the denial of which is the assertion of the subjection of religion to the State, and God to man. If our Puritan fathers had been the Church of God, as they falsely assumed they were, they would have been right, and no descendant of theirs would have had cause to blush for their principles or general conduct. Their major was sound ; only their minor was false. Even as American citizens, as descendants of the Puritans, we are bound to assert the principle of the supremacy of the Church, and to refuse to make religion justify herself before the temporal authority. But be this as it may, religion is, as we have said, the *lex suprema*, the law of laws, and the right of the Church to teach and to govern all nations is established the moment she is established to be God's Church. Deny that she is his Church, give a respectable reason for your denial, and we will meet you and discuss her claims ; but never will we discuss with you, whether she is favorable to one political order or another, the national spirit and the national majesty, or against them.

These very scientific and logical Professors, these attorney-generals of the human race, the rejuvenescence of the famous Baron Anacharsis Clootz of the French Convention, also cry out against the Jesuits and demand their condemnation in the name of humanity. But here again they forget their theory, and assert law, which their theory repudiates, — refute themselves by assuming authority which has the right to control human activity, — the very thing they charge against the Jesuits. But waive this. Consistency is rarely a striking quality in the enemies of truth. They speak in the name of humanity, — a respectable name, we do not deny ; but there is a higher name, a name which is above every name, which every tongue must confess, and at which every knee must bend, whether in heaven, on the earth, or in hell. The Jesuits profess to speak in this higher name, and to promulgate the law humanity is bound to obey, not to take their law from humanity. Humanity is no lawgiver. It is the creature ; is itself under law ; and all its glory is in obedience to the law imposed upon it by its sovereign, and by which it is to be judged. To undertake to impeach the Jesuits in the name of humanity, prior to impeaching them in the name of God, is to make man the law, the sovereign, to substitute him for God, and to fall into idolatry, forbidden even by the law of nature. You stand, then, in your own wrong, and cannot be entitled to judgment against the Jesuits.

The Professors contend that the Jesuits are opposed to human progress, and are therefore the enemies of God ; but it is only progress in their sense that they allege the Jesuits oppose. But they are not entitled to assume their sense as the true sense, and to oppose the Jesuits because they do not accept it. The progress of mankind in the knowledge and love of God, in faith, and hope, and charity, in all, they being judges, which constitutes the true good and real glory of man, nobody can allege the Jesuits oppose ; for this is an end which they avow, and for which they labor with a zeal and a perseverance which even their enemies applaud. The question between them and the Professors, then, is, whether the one or the other takes the right view of progress, — evidently a question for the court to decide.

But the view of progress taken by the Professors is only a recent and a crude speculation, is entertained only by the Professors and their party, and in their works is assumed without proof, or any attempt at proof. It is, then, without authority ; and to seek to condemn the Jesuits because they disregard it is to seek to condemn them without any authority for condemning them, — rank injustice, tyranny, oppression. In the very name of humanity, then, in which they affect to speak, they are themselves condemned ; for there is nothing more repugnant to humanity than oppression, tyranny, injustice. Humanity demands justice ; justice is inconceivable without law, and law, without the Sovereign Lawgiver. Justice, by the force of the word itself, means conformable to law. Deny law, the *jus*, and there is no *justice*. Hence, the Professors, in denying law, in denying all authority to declare the law, and in arraigning the Jesuits for adhering to law, and maintaining that it is what the sovereign ordains, are themselves guilty of that enmity to man which they charge upon the Jesuits ; for in this they deny justice, and leave man no appeal from the tyranny and oppression of his brother.

So it always is. They who break from the Church, who seek some other rule of life, whether they do it in the name of liberty, or progress, or philanthropy, are always sure to defeat the end they profess to have in view. In every country, the ruin of the constitution, and the loss of the liberty of the subject, and finally of the state, have invariably been due to measures introduced by the partisans of liberty. If any one doubts it, let him read the histories of Greece and Rome. The liberal party always are the party that overthrow liberty.

It has been so in France ; it has been so in England ; it is rapidly becoming so in this country. Every step the party whose battle-cry is liberty takes in advance, here and everywhere, is the loss of some guaranty of freedom. Their shout of victory is always over some edifice thrown down ; never over some one erected. It is when demolishing palace and cottage, and making the abodes of peace, elegance, and safety a heap of ruins, that the frantic shouts of the mob make the welkin ring, and honest people feel that hell is broken loose.

It has been the same in regard to religion. The Reformers would have religious freedom, and they have gained by their sacrilegious attacks on the Church, in most countries where they have succeeded, the complete subjection of religion to the State, and in others, religious anarchy, even worse than religious despotism. For the last hundred years the world has scouted the holy name of charity, and taken up the sentimental name of philanthropy. The great men would not hear of God ; they were all for man, for fraternity, peace on earth, and good-will ; and hardly since the world began have vice and crime more prevailed, the poor been more neglected, the lower orders more trampled on, or doomed to suffer greater privation and distress ; tyranny and arbitrary power made more rapid strides, or established themselves more securely in their thrones of oppression. Truth, justice, mercy, all that man needs, all that is honorable to human nature, is sacrificed to "the almighty dollar." The money-god is worshipped everywhere, and daily are whole hecatombs of human hearts sacrificed at each of his ten thousand shrines. Yet all is done in the name of liberty, brotherhood, universal love, and good-will ! O, the terrible madness which seizes men, the moment they leave God to follow the devices of their own hearts ! The devil then has full power over them, and whirls and tosses them hither and thither, and sports with them at his leisure ; and they, poor souls, fancy it is all freedom, and joy, and peace, and love, and quiet and easy journeying to heaven. But there is no way but God's way, and the only way of securing a hundred-fold in this life is to give up all for the life to come. Man never suffices for himself, and whenever he attempts, in his own way, by his own wisdom and strength, to effect even a good end, and labors for it with all zeal and diligence, with constancy and perseverance, shrinking from no difficulty and danger, and pressing on even to the sacrifice of life, he only

finds himself the farther from its accomplishment, and that he has only aggravated the disease he sought to cure.

Let who will examine the actual results of all the extra-Catholic movements in modern times for the melioration of man's moral, religious, or social condition, and he will be struck with the truth of what we assert. Let one go farther, and examine with some care, with some philosophical insight and logical acumen, the theoretic plans according to which these movements take place, and he will see, with equal clearness, that these results ought in all cases to be precisely what they have been. We are not disposed to deny, even to our French Professors, a certain kind of humanity, and though, like all reformers and philanthropists out of the Church, they act on the principle that the end sanctifies the means, we have no doubt but they wish a better order of things than they seem to themselves to see, and really persuade themselves, that, if they could once realize their theory in actual life, the condition of the individual and of society would be greatly ameliorated ; yet there is not a single good their theory proposes which is not, on that theory, impracticable. Their theory is hostile to the end they wish. The good they crave for society, may be, is possible ; but whoever knows the nature of man knows that it does not consist in the elements they suppose, and whoever knows the ordinary laws of cause and effect knows equally well that it is not attainable by the means they would have us adopt. Let actual living men, men not in the closet, but out in the world, with all their natural dispositions and passions, sympathies and antipathies, hurtling one against another, adopt that theory and attempt to act upon it, and its authors would themselves be among the first to condemn the result.* Nothing of that which they promise them-

* In confirmation of what is asserted in the text, we may remark that the original movers of all great social or religious revolutions are always found, as the revolution proceeds, seeking to arrest its progress, and to prevent it from going too far. Luther soon found himself obliged to struggle against the legitimate development of the movement he commenced, and we see him during the last years of his life battling with a broken heart against the practical workings of his own theories. The men who made the French Revolution in 1789 nearly all turned their arms against it, sought to arrest its progress, and most of them perished in the attempt. What a sad spectacle does Lafayette present, seeking to persuade his army to leave the frontier, and march upon Paris to suppress the Convention which he himself had helped create ! In no instance we have ever read or heard of have the men who have sought to remodel the Church

selves would be realized, and all of that which even they most dread would be multiplied a thousand fold. Men are not mere machines, and their conduct is governed by moral and not mechanical laws. They are living, and it is the property of life to suspend the action of many of the natural laws. We know the action of chemical laws upon the dead body, but these laws are held in abeyance during life. Another and a subtler agent is at work, on the laws or modes of whose activity chemistry can throw no light. These are taught us only by another science, and one of which they who sneer at the *scientia divina* and study only the *scientia humana* are and must be ignorant. Hence they miscalculate their forces, mistake their operation, and construct in their theories only monuments to their own rashness and folly. The explanation of man is not in man himself, but in his Maker alone. Man attains to a knowledge of himself only in proportion as he attains to knowledge of God. Ever are we riddles to ourselves, till we find in God the solution. We must be adequate to the design of a work of art, before we can comprehend the whole design of the artist from the contemplation of the work itself. Man must be equal to the creation of man, before from man himself he can comprehend the full meaning of man. But only he who comprehends the full meaning of man can determine his end, or disclose the means of attaining it. Hence all those human theories fail of their purpose, and must fail; and for both the knowledge of our end and the means of gaining it, as well as for the ability to will it, and to use the means, we must depend on the bounty of Him who has made us, and alone knows what we are, what is our true good, and how it is to be attained. If he has not furnished us with the means of instruction and of grace, it is idle to seek for the melioration of society; and if he has, it is worse than idle to seek the end by any other means than those which he furnishes.

But enough of moralizing for the present. In what we have thus far said, we have aimed merely to show the folly and ab-

or the State after their own theories been satisfied with the result of their efforts. They almost always abandon their work in disgust, and, if carried on at all, it is by another generation, who succeed them, and who in their turn are disappointed and disgusted and give or are compelled to give way to another and a madder generation. Calvinism sinks to Socinianism, Socinianism to Transcendentalism; constitutional monarchy descends to democracy, democracy to ochlocracy, and ochlocracy yields only to military despotism.

surdity of the Professors Michelet and Quinet in attempting to sustain an action against the Jesuits on their theory, and the grave errors in which the attempt involves them. They assume scarcely a position, let the conduct of the Jesuits be what it may, that is tenable. They have nothing solid of their own, no law or authority to urge against any body or any thing. They have theory, speculation, dithyrambics, hate, and prejudice ; but these are of no weight, and will never authorize an accusation. Before we can successfully condemn others, we must have something certain of our own. This is a fact the enemies of the Church forget. They forget that they can no more condemn without law, than we can demand their submission without law ; and that they cannot deny without reason, at random, any more than we can affirm without reason ; because every denial is itself an affirmation. We have, therefore, wished to show that the Professors have no ground on which to attack the Jesuits ; for they have no ground on which to stand themselves. This we think we have done.

But in doing this we have not done all. We have thus far, if we may so speak, considered only the account which the Professors have given of themselves. There remains to be considered the account they give of the Jesuits. Thus far we have simply demurred to their declaration, and labored to show that they allege no offence, since they allege no law. But in condescension to what we presume to be their wish, we will waive the demurrer, and join issue with them on the facts in the case. We will endeavour to show that the Jesuits of their Lectures, so far as there can be pretended to be any thing exceptionable in their conduct, are mere *entia rationis*, or creatures of the imagination, and especially will we show that the charges against the Jesuits' system of education are either unfounded, or commendations. But we have no space to do this in our present paper, and must reserve it to a future occasion. The furious attacks made upon the Jesuits, the fear and consternation with which their very name strikes the enemies of God, and the distinguished services they have rendered the cause of truth, piety, science, art, and literature, render the subject interesting and important, and warrant us in devoting very considerable space to the discussion of the questions raised by Messrs. Michelet and Quinet. We are not afraid of drawing too largely upon the attention or patience of our readers ; and it is well to let our unbelieving countrymen know something of the value of the oft-repeated accusations

against an order which has done so much for Catholicity, and which has received so many and so signal tokens of the divine approbation and protection. We hope to be able to resume the subject in our next Review.

ART. III. — *Speech of the HON. R. B. RHETT, of South Carolina, on the Oregon Territory Bill, excluding Slavery from that Territory, — the Missouri Compromise being proposed and rejected.* Delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, January 14, 1847. 8vo. pp. 14.

WE always read Mr. Rhett's speeches with interest, and rarely without instruction. He ranks high among the most eminent of South Carolina's gifted sons, is high-minded and honorable, one of the few — alas ! very few — of our public men who act always from principle. He may sometimes be unsound in his views, but he always aims at truth and justice, and acknowledges that in politics, as in every thing else, a man should always act under a deep and abiding sense of moral obligation.

The speech before us is earnest, able, and eloquent, — the production of the statesman and the constitutional lawyer. It is on a subject of great and almost fearful interest, which is every day forcing itself more and more directly upon the attention of the American people. It is confined, indeed, principally to the inquiry, Where vests the political sovereignty, under our system of government ? but it raises this inquiry only in its bearing on the great and absorbing question of Slavery. The question of slavery is becoming for us, through the influence of causes no longer controllable, the question of questions, which can henceforth be blinked with safety by no section of the Union, but which must be met and in some way disposed of, or it will dispose of the Union itself. How it is to be met and disposed of it is not easy to say, and not for us to attempt to say.

As conductor, some years since, of the *Boston Quarterly Review*, we took frequent occasion to express our views of the Abolitionists ; and though many, many changes have come over us, and we can hardly be recognized by our readers as

the same man that we were then, our estimation of them remains unaltered, except that, if possible, we now hold them in still greater detestation. They are the worst enemies of their country, and the worst enemies, too, of the slave. They are a band of mad fanatics, and we have no language strong enough to express our abhorrence of their principles and proceedings. But we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that they have the sympathy of a large portion of the people of the Free States, and that in several of the Northern States they are already powerful enough to make it an object for demagogues to bid for their suffrages. Both political parties pander to them. Even the administration seems to court them ; for it has appointed from this Commonwealth scarcely an individual to a prominent office in its gift, not selected from the Abolition section of its friends, — certainly, no one distinguished for his bold and resolute opposition to Abolition movements. In the Whig party the tendency to Abolitionism, or to court the Abolitionists, is, perhaps, still more decided than in the Democratic party. In Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, the party, at least just before elections, is almost avowedly Abolitionist, and would be in this State, were it not for a few distinguished leaders, whose influence we are sorry to see daily declining. Young Whigdom in all the Free States, composed of young men and boys, not to say young misses, who are soon to be the Whig party itself, is virtually an Abolition party, and its leaders are nearly as far gone as Garrison, Phillips, Leavitt, and Abby Foster.

All the sects, if we except, perhaps, High Church Episcopalians, are either already carried away by the Abolition fanaticism, or rapidly yielding to it. The great body of Unitarian ministers in New England, once a respectable and conservative body of men, exerting, indeed, a bad influence on religion, yet highly commendable for political and social virtues, are almost to a man now mad and fanatical Socialists and Abolitionists. If some few yet hold out, they are timid, and without influence on the general action of the body of which they are members. Nearly all the young men from Protestant theological seminaries come out infected, and, wherever settled as ministers, seek to enlist their congregations in the movement. Only the Church, which can be surprised by no new moral or social question, which has nothing to learn from experience, and whose doctrines on all subjects are long ago determined and fixed, remains unaffected by the fanaticism around her, and pays no attention to the decisions of modern casuists.

Add to this the new aspect the question assumes through the anticipated extension of American territory by conquests from Mexico, and the bravest must admit that there is serious cause for alarm. The Slaveholding States contend that the territories of the United States not yet erected into States belong to all the States in common, and must be as open to their citizens to settle and occupy with their property, as to the citizens of the Free States; and there is a very general determination on the part even of the most moderate of the citizens of the Free States to resist the further extension of the slave system. The majority of them will not seek to disturb it where it now legally exists, but they feel, that, for the sake of humanity and the honor of the American States, they ought resolutely to oppose all efforts to open new territory to it. If any new territory shall be acquired by the Union, a conflict is likely to come, whose shock may shiver the Union, and reduce it to its primitive elements.

For ourselves, we adopt no extreme views on the question of slavery. We have no sympathy with the Abolitionists; we entertain not for a moment even one of their fundamental principles. Man, we are ready to maintain, may have property in man, a valid right to the services of his slave, — though no dominion over his soul; slavery is not *malum in se*, and in no case justifiable: there is nothing in slavery that necessarily prevents the slaveholder from being a true and pious Christian; and where the master is a true Christian, and takes care that his people are instructed and brought up in the true Christian faith and worship, slavery is tolerable, and for negroes, perhaps, even more than tolerable. Many of the laws of the Slaveholding States on slavery are unnecessary, unjust, cruel, and disgraceful; a large body of the slaveholders are deeply censurable for neglecting to recognize and respect marriage among their people, and for bringing them up in heathenism or heresy; but we have no sympathy with those who denounce them *because* they are slaveholders, and we have no reason to suppose that they cannot, in the moral, social, and religious virtues, compare favorably with their brethren of the North; and, whatever repugnance we may feel, personally, to the slave system, we are fully convinced that the greatest disservice they could do to their slaves would be to grant them immediate emancipation; which would be as cruel as for a father to turn his children out upon the world, at a tender age, to take care of themselves.

But the great body of the people of the Free States are in principle opposed to the whole system of involuntary servitude. All their feelings and convictions are against it. They may not, the majority of them, as we have said, seek to disturb it where it now has a legal existence ; but they shrink from its further extension within the bounds of the Union. They regard it as inconsistent with their professions of liberty and equality, and they feel acutely the hypocritical taunts of foreigners. They cannot endure the thought of consenting to pour out their blood and treasure to extend its area, and sooner than do so they are not unlikely to join in the enterprise to overthrow it where it is now established. If we have not mistaken the feeling in the Free States, the determination is fixed, even in the minds of the warmest and least hesitating friends of the South, that there shall be no further extension of the slave territory of the Union, and no more Slave States admitted into the Union. Whatever we may think of such a determination itself, we regard it as madness to deny its existence, and idle to attempt to withstand it.

But here arises a serious difficulty. The territories of the United States not yet erected into States belong to all the States in common, and must, in justice, be open alike to the citizens of each, who may wish to occupy them. Congress can make no discrimination between the States, in prescribing the conditions on which the territories may be settled and occupied. If the citizens of Non-slaveholding States are left free to settle and occupy them with their property, the citizens of the Slaveholding States must also be left free to settle and occupy them with theirs. The fact, that the latter recognize property in slaves, while the former do not, cannot be taken into the account. Congress has no authority to define property, to say what shall or shall not be property, but is bound to respect as property, for the citizens of each State, what their State defines to be property. One State cannot define it for another ; for, in relation to the others, each State is an independent sovereign, and its definition of property within its own limits must be respected by all the others, as well as by the Union. Hence, in the territories which belong to no State in particular, but of which all are tenants in common, no State can have any right to make its system of property prevail over that of any of the others ; and Congress, being bound to respect the system of each for the citizens of each, cannot prefer the system of one to the exclusion of the system of another. Then Congress

can make no law which would prohibit the citizens of Slaveholding States from emigrating to the territories and occupying them with their property in slaves, any more than it can prohibit the citizens of the Non-slaveholding States from occupying them with their property in horses and mules, sheep and cattle. The famous Wilnot Proviso was, therefore, unconstitutional, and could not have been passed without a usurpation of power.

But it is contended, on the other hand, that the general government is the sovereign of the territories belonging to the United States, and therefore may prohibit slavery in them, if it chooses. This position would seem to be supported by the Ordinance erecting the old Northwest Territory, by the Missouri Compromise, as it is called, and the exercise by the general government of sovereign powers in the erection of territorial governments. But the erection of territorial governments does not imply plenary sovereignty, and may be defended on the ground of a sovereignty within the limits of the constitution; and the precedents established by the *Ordinance* and the *Compromise*, if unconstitutional, cannot be pleaded.

Mr. Rhett, in the speech before us, denies that the general government holds the sovereignty of the territories in question, and he does it on the ground, that the general sovereignty exercised by the Union vests, not in the Union itself, but in the States severally which have created the Union. But this, though conceded, would not of itself be decisive of the case. It matters not, so far as the exercise of sovereignty by the Union is concerned, whether that sovereignty vests originally in it, or be only delegated to it. If the States have delegated to it the sovereignty in full of the territories, it can exercise all the sovereignty over them it could, if it were sovereign in its own right. But there is, as we shall by and by show, no express delegation of such sovereignty, and the sovereignty in its full sense over them must vest where, and only where, under our system, the plenary sovereignty in general is vested. If it is in the Union, then the Union is sovereign over the territories by its own right, and can exercise plenary sovereignty over them, unless the constitution ordains to the contrary, without any express grant of power. But if it vests in the States severally, then the Union has no sovereignty but what is expressly delegated to it, and its power over the territories is limited to the express grant, and what is necessarily incident to it. Since, then, there is no express grant of plenary sovereignty over the territories in the constitution, it becomes

necessary, in order to ascertain whether the general government possesses it or not, to ascertain whether, under our system, the general sovereignty vests originally in the Union, or elsewhere.

For ourselves, we agree perfectly with Mr Rhett in his position, that the political sovereignty with us vests originally, not in the Union, but in the States severally which have made the Union, and from which the Union derives its existence and all its powers. Nevertheless, he must pardon us, if we say we cannot, in all cases, accept the reasoning by which he sustains this position, and are unable to adopt his view of the State governments. He maintains that the general government is not sovereign, not only on the ground that it is the creature of the States, but also on the broader ground, that under the American system no government is sovereign, not even the State governments themselves. If government in general, if the State government itself, is a mere agency, deriving all its powers from an authority antecedent to government, then, *a fortiori*, the Federal government in particular. He says,—

“Sir, it is a truth, vital to all free popular governments, that sovereignty can never be in government. The fundamental doctrine, on which all our free institutions rest, is that government is nothing of itself, but is simply the agent of the people. Make government sovereign, and the people are subject. They are ruled, and do not rule themselves. To attempt to alter, change, or abolish the forms of government over them will, then, not be a right in the people, but treason to the existing government, for which they may rightfully be gibbeted or put to the sword. I repeat the position, that sovereignty, in free, popular governments, can never be in government. It is, under our system of government, neither in the general nor in the State governments. Both are but agencies.”—p. 5.

Understand by *people*, the *States*, and restrict the doctrine asserted to the Federal government, this may pass ; but understand by *people*, not the state, but population, and extend the doctrine to the State governments, it is inadmissible. The Federal government, it is historically certain, is the creature of the States, and, saving the faith they have pledged to each other, the States have the same right to alter, change, or abolish it, that the principal has to alter, change, or revoke the powers he has given to his agent. But we cannot say as much of the State governments. They are governments, not agencies ; for there is and can be in the States no authority antecedent to them to create them. The people as population have never made them, and therefore cannot unmake them.

The people as the state, the legally constituted people, are inconceivable without the government. are the government itself in fact, as well as in principle, and for them to abolish it would be to commit political suicide.

But "make the government sovereign, and the people are subject." Unquestionably. Sovereign and subject are correlatives, and one necessarily implies the other. Where there is no subject, there is no sovereign; for nothing can be *over*, where there is nothing *under*. If you assert sovereignty, you must concede subjection. Then the people "are ruled, and do not rule themselves." Granted. But what is government for, if not to rule the people? and is that government which neither rules them, nor has the right to rule them? Does government operate on *things* only, subject things only, never persons? Are not the people, every man, woman, and child of them, subject to the laws? And is it not the boast of our institutions, that no one is above the laws? How can you say that the people are subject to the laws, and yet not subject to the government? and if governed by the laws, that they are not ruled? You must either deny all government of *persons*, and exempt from the dominion of the law all except *things*, or else you must concede that the people are subject to government and ruled by it.

But, if they are ruled, they do not rule; and the fundamental principle of our institutions is that people rule. Rule as the government, conceded; as population taken distributively, denied. The confusion arises from the ambiguity of the word *people*, which, in this country, is taken in two senses, very distinguishable one from the other. The term *people* means, 1. Population, the whole number of persons inhabiting the territory or country; 2. The state, commonwealth, or political sovereignty. In the latter sense, as the state, the people are sovereign, and rule; in the former sense, they are not sovereign, but subject, and are ruled. Numerically considered, the people in the one sense may or may not be commensurate with the people in the other sense; but in no actual case are they so. The people, as population, are the whole population, men, women, and children, freemen and slaves; as the state, they may include only a small number, in some countries more, in others fewer. They are some two hundred thousand out of thirty-five millions in France, and with us they never exceed, in fact never equal, the whole number of free male citizens twenty-one years of age and over; and in most

cases never include more than the free *white* male citizens of the same age and over ; and these in South Carolina, for instance, do not exceed one in ten, and in no State one in five, of the whole population.

But these free male citizens, the electors, are themselves, save in the simple act of voting, subject to the laws, and ruled in the same manner as the rest of the inhabitants. Moreover, the elective franchise, which they possess and exercise, they possess only by virtue of law, and can exercise only according to the law. They may alter, change, or abolish the existing *form* of government, it is true ; but by virtue of law, and only in the way, and by the means, the existing form authorizes ; and the attempt to do it in any other way, or by any other means, would be treason, and punishable as such, by the laws of every State in the Union. To abolish the government is, under our system, no more the right of the people, than it is under any other system, as Mr. Dorr and his partisans in Rhode Island discovered to their cost.

The insane doctrine of but too many of our politicians on this subject arises from the ambiguity we have pointed out in the word *people*. From the fact that the political sovereignty with us is unquestionably vested in the people *as the state*, they sophistically conclude that it vests in the people *as population* ; that is, in the people out of, or antecedent to, the state. But where there is no state, no *πόλις*, no political entity, there is and can be no political sovereignty. Out of the state and antecedent to it, if you may make the supposition, the people are not a state, have no political existence, and therefore are not sovereign, and have no sovereignty. It is absurd to assume that the sovereignty vests in them ; and if it does not in this sense vest in them, they of course cannot delegate it to the state, nor can the state derive it from them. The States could delegate sovereignty to the Union, for they were antecedent to it, and were, prior to it, sovereign states, and possessed the powers they delegated. But the people could delegate no sovereignty to the State or State government ; for, antecedently to the State government, they were no political entity, and therefore had no sovereignty to delegate.

Here is the refutation of the prevalent fallacy of the popular *origin* of government. The administration of government may be popular, and is so with us ; but its origin is never popular. The people cannot make the constitution ; for to make the constitution is itself an act, and the most sovereign act, of

the political sovereign ; and antecedently to the constitution the people are not sovereign, since antecedently to it, as we have seen, they have no political existence. What is not cannot act. Where there is no sovereign, there can be no act of sovereignty. To assume that the people make the constitution is, then, to assume them capable of performing an act of sovereignty before they exist as a sovereignty, which is absurd. It would be to assume that sovereignty is self-created, — an impossible supposition. Nothing can be self-created, for the very solid reason, that nothing can act before it is. The constitution must always be *octroyée*, — granted or imposed by authority, — or it has and can have no legal force or vitality. But if we suppose as already existing an authority competent to grant or impose a constitution, we suppose the state to be already constituted, and the sovereign authority to exist. When the state already exists, with its sovereign authority, the people owe it allegiance, are subject to it, and have neither the right nor the occasion to make the constitution.

In denying the popular origin of government, we neither deny the legitimacy nor mistake the character of our American system of government. The doctrine of the popular origin of government — that is, that government is instituted by, and derives its powers from, the people, antecedently, logically or chronologically considered, to the state — is no American doctrine, and implied in no American institution. It is an exotic, brought hither from the gardens of foreign theorists, and should be rooted up and rejected by every American who loves his country, and would be able to distinguish between the state and the mob.

Not one of our State governments has had a strictly popular origin ; for there has never been with us a moment when the people were unconstituted or without government, and free, without regard to existing authority, to institute government for themselves. We are not so rash as to pretend that the people here have never been guilty of any irregularity, or that all their proceedings are defensible in strict law ; but we do say, and are ready to maintain against all challengers, that what with us is called *making the constitution*, with one or two apparent, but not real, exceptions, has been nothing but a modification of a previous constitution, and a modification effected, not by the people as population antecedent to the state, but, if by the people at all, the people as the state, by virtue of pre-

viously existing political authority. The conventions which have modified the old constitutions and formed our present constitutions have all been called, or held to be called, by an already constituted public authority, by virtue of public law, and according to law. Their whole authority as conventions has been derived from the government which authorized them, and there has never been a moment when to call conventions without the authorization of the existing government, and to attempt to enforce their acts against it, was not treason, and as such punishable by existing law.

The colonists on arriving here were, as before leaving home, subject to the laws of the mother country; and the colonial governments were constituted governments by the authority of that mother country, and derived from it all their powers. Our present governments are only the mediate or immediate continuations of the colonial governments, by whose authority they have from colonial become State governments. In no instance has the change been effected but by their authority. Mr. Dorr and his friends attempted, in the case of Rhode Island, to effect a change by popular, instead of legal authority, and failed. This is strictly true of all the old thirteen Colonies, as nobody can pretend to deny. With regard to the other States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the Federal constitution, nearly all have formed their constitutions by authorization of the general government through their territorial governments. Vermont and Michigan, perhaps Kentucky and Tennessee, though of these we cannot speak positively, formed their constitutions in the first instance in conventions called without legal authority; but the defect of legality was subsequently supplied by the acknowledgment of the governments in contravention of whose authority they formed them. Maine became a State by the consent of Massachusetts, on whom she depended, and the authority of Congress. Texas was erected into a State by the act of Mexico, originally illegitimate, but made legal by the subsequent acknowledgment of Mexican independence by Spain, the mother country, and she became an independent State by the revolution which subverted the Mexican union or federal government. All our governments may, then, plead a legal, in distinction from a popular origin.

Against us, some may allege the American Revolution, the Declaration of Independence, and the prevalent theories and speculations of American statesmen and politicians. The

theories and speculations of many of our statesmen and politicians assert the popular origin of government, we grant ; but these theories and speculations are precisely what we are controverting, and their authors cannot assert them as American, on the authority of our institutions, unless necessary to explain and justify their existence. The existence of these institutions does not require them for their explanation or justification, as we have shown, in showing that they are explicable and justifiable on legal principles.

The Declaration of Independence, in the preamble, asserts the popular origin of government, it is true ; but that document is of no legal force or value, forms no part of the public law of either the States or the Union. The act of the Congress which drew it up, declaring the Colonies absolved from their allegiance to the crown of Great Britain, has entered into the modifications our institutions have received ; but the principles of government they asserted, and the reasonings by which they justified it, enter for nothing. Moreover, the Congress which drew up the document had received from the States whose agent they were no authority to promulgate a theory of government, or a political code, and in doing so exceeded their powers. Consequently the political doctrines they published are to be treated simply as the private opinion or speculation of the individual delegates. Furthermore, the assertion of the popular origin of government was a mere *obiter dictum*. The essential issue between the Colonies and Great Britain was, not whether the people have or have not the right to institute government for themselves, but whether the crown of Great Britain had or had not committed illegal and unconstitutional acts, and if it had, whether it had forfeited its rights over the Colonies. The Colonies decided that it had, that the king had proved himself a tyrant, and having so proved himself, they were absolved — by his act, not by theirs — from their allegiance. The real assumption of the Colonies was, not the right of the people to originate government, but that the tyranny of the prince absolves the subject. If it had been otherwise, there would have been no necessity for attempting, as they do in the document in question, by a recital of his acts, to prove that George the Third was a tyrant.

What is called the American Revolution, properly speaking, was no revolution at all, and no man, in order to maintain the legitimacy of our institutions, is obliged to assert the right of revolution, and therefore the popular origin of government ;

because it was not the act of the people as population, out of or antecedent to the State, but of the people acting in subjection to the colonial governments, — the constituted authorities ; because all our institutions originally or by legal derivation date from beyond it, and not one of them can be said to have originated in it ; because the authority of the mother country was not resisted, till it had forfeited its rights, and ceased to be a legal authority ; and because, whatever illegality there may have been in the Declaration and War of Independence, the stain was wiped off, and the whole legitimated, by the subsequent acknowledgment of the independence of the United States by Great Britain. A just appreciation of what we improperly call the American Revolution would show that in it the American people were far from intending to declare themselves revolutionists on principle. The whole controversy which preceded the struggle for independence proves that they held themselves bound to obey legitimate authority, and that they did not resist the British government till they had convinced themselves — rightly or wrongly is nothing to our present purpose — that it had ceased to be legitimate, and by its own acts absolved them from their allegiance. But in resisting the crown of Great Britain, they did not resist their own governments ; at least, never asserted their right to subvert them, which they must have done in order to have asserted the sacred right of insurrection as it is called, and the strictly popular origin of government.

That there is much confused thinking on this subject among our countrymen at present, and that men with fanciful theories and lawless passions, for which they wished to obtain free scope, have seized upon the American Revolution, and tortured it entirely out of its original shape, we do not deny. That there were at the time individuals — perhaps prominent individuals — affected by the mischievous theories of their times, and carried away by the Utopian dreams of liberty, equality, the perfectibility of human nature, and the realization of a paradise on earth, then so common, and the bitter fruits of which France and all Europe were soon to reap, and that they sought, in season and out of season, to introduce their insane imaginings, and to make it appear to all the world that they had the sanction of the American people, and that individuals of this description, of whom the author of *Common Sense*, subsequently, of the *Age of Reason*, was an associate and a sample, were able to direct and color too many of the proceedings of the

time, is but too true ; but instead of regarding what they said and did as the rule, we should, as true Americans, regard it as exceptional, to be forgotten, not continued, and exaggerated. The less we have of Jean Jacques Rousseau and his school, Thomas Paine and his protectors and followers, and the more we have of the strong old Anglo-Saxon sense, and old Anglo-Saxon loyalty, the better. Massachusetts was foremost in the struggle for independence, and it, perhaps, is some proof that the patriots did not intend to be revolutionists, that she has always been foremost among the States in contending for the supremacy of the law,—though she may not have always maintained it, or been as faithful as we could wish to her principles.

Our readers, of course, will understand that in denying the popular *origin* of the American governments, we do not deny, or wish to deny, their popular administration. We merely assert the legal order against the revolutionary order, and maintain, that, notwithstanding the popular forms of our government, the broad popular basis of their administration, the state is as sovereign with us as it is elsewhere, and that loyalty to the state is as much a virtue here, and made as obligatory upon the people by our institutions, as it is under any other form of government. We recognize all the freedom in the people, as the state acting according to law, that the most zealous radical amongst us contends for ; but in the people, regarded as population, in their capacity, not of sovereign, but of subjects, no other freedom than the law grants and guaranties to them. In the ordinary routine of government, in all its ordinary functions, there is no perceptible difference in the practical working or results of our governments, whether we suppose their origin to be legal or to be popular. But there is an immense practical difference, when it comes to the interpretation of their powers, and the allegiance of the subject. If the theory of their popular origin is adopted, they can be assumed to have no powers not granted in the constitution, and the obedience of the subject can never be lawfully enforced. Nay, they have no right of self-preservation ; and the people, without reference to law, may abolish them at will, and set up any government or no government in their place, as they please.

Mr. Dorr's movement in Rhode Island, sincere and philanthropic on his part, and undertaken, we have reason to believe, in a pure, disinterested spirit, shows clearly the danger of the theory we denounce. He adopted the theory of the popular origin of government, and held that an instrument drawn

up and proposed by a body of men assembled without authority of law, if sanctioned by the votes of a majority of the people, would be the fundamental law of the state, and might be lawfully enforced as such by sword and bayonet against the regularly constituted authorities. He reasoned, it is true, fallaciously ; for he was obliged to assume the legality of the existing government in order to determine who were the people of Rhode Island, which was necessary to enable him to determine how many votes he must have in order to have a majority ; and when he had assumed the legality of that government, he had conceded his obligation to obey it, and therefore denied to himself all right to resist it, at least so long as it continued in the legal discharge of its legal functions ; that is, unless it ceased, by its own act, to be legitimate. But, waiving this consideration, his conclusion was logical, if the popular origin of government was conceded, as it was, for the most part, by his opponents. He certainly had the advantage in the argument of the chief justice of Rhode Island, and of the learned president of Brown University. Yet there was no sober, thinking man, who reflected on his movement, that did not see that it was wholly subversive of all legitimate rule, of the essential principle of government itself. It is unquestionably true, that the legal people, legally convened, have the right to alter or amend the constitution, and equally true, that the new or amended constitution, in most cases, though not in all, will not go lawfully into operation unless sanctioned by a majority of the voters voting on it ; but not because the constitution derives its authority from the people antecedent to government, but because the *law* so ordains. The law could, if the sovereign so willed, dispense with the popular vote, and also with the convention ; nay, deny the right altogether, under any circumstances, by any methods whatever, to alter the fundamental law ; and experience will yet prove that the facilities provided by law for altering or amending the constitution are incompatible with the safety and stability of our political institutions, if indeed it has not done so already.

We have dwelt at length on the legal origin of our State governments, in opposition to the popular fallacy that they derive from the people as population, because we wish to present our institutions in their true character, and guard, as far as possible, against the false and dangerous theories afloat concerning them. The danger with us is not likely to come from the side of law ; but it will come through the corrupting the-

ories of the enemies of all legal order. We have an abundance of politicians, — demagogues, more properly, — but, unhappily, a great dearth of statesmen, and no good school of politics. The ambition of our politicians is, not to serve the country, consolidate and perpetuate our institutions, and secure the practical enjoyment of the blessings they promise, but to rise to place and power; and only that which best enables them easily and speedily to rise are they very likely to study. As to rise, one must secure the votes of the electors, as these are with us a numerous body, the easiest and speediest way is to make constant appeals to the popular element, to flatter the people, to exalt their majesty, and exaggerate their sovereignty, their wisdom, intelligence, and virtue. Hence the tendency is to undervalue and neglect law, and to prize and consult only *popularity*. We have seen, during the last twenty years, this tendency growing stronger and stronger, till the bulk of our fledgling politicians have become hardly able to recognize any real distinction between the convention and the caucus, the state and the mob, republicanism and ochlocracy. The man who contends for law and order, by a singular misnomer, is termed an *Algerine*, and he who declaims lustily for the people, sneers at all legal distinctions and legal forms as dry and barren technicalities, unworthy a freeman, is regarded as magnanimous and noble, eloquent and profound, wise and sagacious, the true friend of his country, the man of his times, worthy of universal honor, and the highest offices in the gift of a free people. What will be the end it is not difficult to experienced wisdom to foresee.

It has been from no love of theorizing that we have gone thus largely into the principles of our State governments. The question we have raised is no merely speculative question, but a question of vital practical importance. If our State governments are mere agencies, not governments in the proper sense of the term, we have no governments at all, no legal order, and there is and can be no disloyalty, no treason, and therefore no right to coerce obedience. The government so called is at the mercy of the mob, and Judge Lynch has as valid a commission, and his court as legal an existence, as any judge or court in the land. Moreover, the rule of interpretation is altogether different, on the view we present, from what it is on the one we oppose. If our State governments are governments, they are the *STATE*, and have all powers, under God, not denied them by the constitution; if they are mere

agencies, they have no powers but such as are specially granted in the constitution. In the former case, the constitution is nothing but a limitation of powers ; in the latter, it is a grant of powers. In the one case, the practical statesman has only to ask what is forbidden ; but in the other, he must ask what is granted. The difference is obvious and important. If the latter view prevail, there will be a constant usurpation of power ; for no grant of specific powers which human wisdom can devise will ever be adequate to all the exigencies of the state ; and then, either the public weal must be sacrificed through the inefficiency of the government, or the constitution be nullified, and all legal order overthrown, by the exercise of unconstitutional powers.

While, then, we cheerfully concede to Mr. Rhett, Mr. Calhoun, and the South Carolina school of politicians generally, that the Federal government is a simple agency created by the States, we cannot concede it on the ground, that, under our system, even the State governments themselves are only agencies. The general government and the State governments are in no sense analogous ; they rest on totally distinct foundations, and can never be rightfully interpreted on the same general principles. The people do not make the State government in the sense in which the States make the general government, and the relation between the people and the State government bears no analogy to the relation between the States and the general government. The relation in the latter case is that of principal and agent ; in the former, it is that of sovereign and subject. The Federal constitution is a grant of powers, the State constitution a limitation of powers ; the Union has no powers not specified in the grant, the State all powers not specifically denied in the constitution. The Union must prove its power before it can act ; the State can act unless its power is disproved. The presumption is in favor of the State, but it is against the Union. It is necessary to bear this difference in mind, lest, applying to the Union the principles proper to the State governments, we run into consolidationism, — or to the State governments the principles proper to the Federal government, we run into no-governmentism, and confound the state with the mob.

Some of our statesmen, and statesmen, too, whose views are entitled to the respect always due to superior talents, distinguished rank, and eminent service, reject the doctrine of State sovereignty which, after Mr. Calhoun, we have set forth,

and contend that the sovereignty vests, not in the States, but in the Union ; that is, that the American people are one sovereign people or state, and that the Federal government has all the sovereign powers, substantive or incidental, of government in general, not denied it in the constitution. Foremost among these is Mr. John Quincy Adams, ex-President of the United States, really one of our most scientific, though at times one of our most erratic, statesmen. He, if we understand him, asserts the sovereignty of the Union on the ground that we were one people from the beginning, and that the division into colonies was only for the purposes of administration. He alleges in proof of this, that the Colonists had a common origin, a common language, common habits and sentiments ; and that the Colonies had the Common Law, derived all their authority from the same imperial government, and were subject to one and the same prince. For the purposes of administration they were distinct departments, each with its own local authority, but they retained their unity by being all subordinated to the same supreme government from which emanated all their legal authority. Consequently, we remain one people, notwithstanding the government of the Union was formed by the States acting in their capacity as distinct states ; for it was the only way, prior to the establishment of the Union, in which the sovereign people could legally express its will.

This theory is plausible, but not sound. The common origin, language, sentiments, habits, &c., prove nothing to the purpose, because they exist still between us and Great Britain, in all their essentials, as much as they did between the Colonies themselves prior to the Revolution, and yet we and Great Britain are not one legal people. The possession of the Common Law, for the same reason, proves nothing. We have it still in common with England. The greater part of the Continental states of Europe possess the Civil Law, which binds in their courts, and yet they are none the less independent states. Subjection to one and the same prince proves just as little. England, Scotland, and Ireland continued — if they do not still continue — to be separate kingdoms long after their union under the same prince, and the acts of the British Parliament would not operate in either of the latter unless specially named. Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Lombardy, &c., are all subject to the same prince, the Emperor of Austria, and yet in relation to each other are independent states. The great vassals of the crown of France, in feudal times, were none

the less sovereign in relation to each other, because they held from the same suzerain or lord paramount. The Colonies derived all their legal authority from the same source, it is true ; but to have been one colonial people for that reason, they must have been subordinated, not to the authority of the mother country only, but to one paramount colonial authority. But there was no paramount colonial authority between them and the mother country. They each held immediately from the crown, and each, under the crown, contained in itself all the legal authority it recognized, or to which it was subjected. Consequently, they were not so many departments or divisions of one colonial people, but so many distinct, and, in relation to each other, independent colonies. Consequently, again, when the authority of the mother country to which they were subordinated, and which was their only bond of legal unity, was thrown off, they necessarily became independent sovereign states, not one sovereign state or people. The proofs, then, on which Mr. Adams relies do not sustain him, and his theory, however consistent it may be with itself, cannot be asserted, because it is contradicted by the historical and legal facts of the case.

Mr. Webster, regarded by a large portion of his countrymen as the ablest expounder of the constitution we have had, and sustained in his views, we are inclined to believe, by the convictions and intentions of many of the men who aided in framing the constitution, concedes that prior to the adoption of the Federal constitution the States were independent sovereignties, but contends that by its adoption their sovereignty was merged in that of the Union, and that therefore the Union is now sovereign. But this is inadmissible, for the reasons we have assigned when denying the popular origin of government. The constitution is the act of the sovereign authority, and therefore does not and cannot create that authority. There can be in the constitution no sovereignty but that which makes, imposes, or grants it. The sovereignty which made or granted it vested, it is conceded, in the States severally. Therefore the sovereignty in the constitution vests in the States severally, — not in the Union, which is their creature. Moreover, the whole vitality and force of the constitution are in the sovereignty which makes it, and are lost the moment that sovereignty ceases to exist. To suppose, then, that the State sovereignty, which made or granted the constitution, ceased to exist the moment the constitution was adopted, is to suppose that

the constitution the moment it was adopted became a nullity, and had no legal force or vitality. If the States were sovereign before its adoption, they must be after its adoption ; since it can be a constitution only by virtue of their sovereignty. Their sovereignty must survive its adoption, then, as much as the authority of the principal survives the instructions by which he constitutes his agent. Then the sovereignty vests, not in the Union, but in the States severally ; and then the Union has no powers but those the States have severally delegated to it.

Mr. Jefferson and his peculiar school do not adopt precisely either Mr. Webster's theory, or the one we have set forth ; but appear to adopt one somewhere about midway between the two ; that is, that we are one sovereign people in all our foreign relations, and several independent, sovereign states in all our internal relations. This, if intended merely to state the practical fact, that under the constitution the foreign relations of the country are subjected to the Union, and the internal, with some rather important exceptions, to the State governments, is true enough, and nobody disputes it ; but if intended to point out the seat of sovereignty under our system, is open to all the objections we have urged against the theory of Mr. Adams and that of Mr. Webster, and to all those which the consolidationists allege against State sovereignty, besides being an absurdity in itself. Sovereignty is necessarily one and indivisible. A divided sovereignty is inconceivable. The sovereignty must be in the States, and the exercise of it, within certain limits, delegated to the Union ; or it must be in the Union, and the exercise, within certain limits, delegated to the States. If you say the former, you have the doctrine we contend for ; if the latter, you have the theory either of Mr. Adams or of Mr. Webster. Moreover, if we were not one people in what regards our foreign relations before the adoption of the constitution, as, in refuting Mr. Adams, we have shown we were not, we could not be made one people in reference to those relations any more than in reference to our internal relations, for the reasons we have assigned against Mr. Webster. Both Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Webster appear to us to have been misled by their assumption, that the government derives its authority from the people, not as the state, but as antecedent to the state, — the doctrine of the atheistical Hobbes, and the sentimental and licentious Jean Jacques Rousseau, — and by their overlooking the fact, that it is the political sovereign that makes or grants the constitution, not the constitution or fundamental law that

creates the sovereign ; and this has happened to them, we presume, in consequence of their having been more concerned with the practical mode to be adopted for administering government, than with inquiries into the origin and nature of government itself. Most of us, however logical we may be in our capacities and tendencies, are apt to take for our premises the assumptions of our particular school, or of the community in which we are brought up, and rarely, if ever, question them till we find them leading us into consequences from which our good sense or right feeling recoils. The error of these great men is easily accounted for, without detracting from their eminent talents, or the solid worth of their characters.

The four views we have considered are all that have been or can be suggested on the constitution of the United States. No other than one of these is possible, and the last three we have seen, though supported by high authority, are inadmissible. Nothing remains, then, but the first, Mr. Calhoun's view, — namely, the sovereignty, under our system, still vests in the States, and the Union has only a delegated sovereignty, and can rightfully exercise only such powers as are specially delegated to it.*

Practically, there is no difference in the mode of operation or in the legality of the acts of the Union, whether we assume the Union to be sovereign in its own right or only by the dele-

* Our readers must not understand us, in adopting Mr. Calhoun's theory of State sovereignty, to adopt also his doctrine of nullification. We heretofore gave in our adhesion to it, but a more thorough investigation of the subject than we had formerly made of it has led us to doubt both its theoretical soundness and its practical efficacy. If the sovereignty still vests in the States severally, a State must have, saving her faith, the right to absolve her subjects, if she chooses, from their obligation to obey the Union, since she alone has created that obligation. But she can nullify no act of the Union in the passage of which she has participated, either for or against, without breaking her faith ; and as she is, by her own agreement in consenting to the Union, rightfully held to participate in every act of the Union while she remains in it, whether she actively participates or not, she cannot nullify an act of the Union without seceding from it. She must secede, as the condition of nullifying without breach of faith. The abstract right of a State to secede we are not disposed to question ; but as no State has or can have the right to break its faith, we confess we can hardly conceive a case in which the State can practically exercise this abstract right, for it is hard to conceive a case in which the engagements the State has already entered into do not bind her to remain in the Union. But, as the subject has no necessary connection with our present discussion, we reserve its full consideration to some future occasion, should such occasion occur.

gation of the States, so long as it keeps within its clear and unquestionable powers. The difference arises only the moment when it concerns doubtful powers. If the power is doubtful, the Union cannot exercise it ; for the doubt must always be interpreted in favor of the States, against the Union. The Union can claim none of the incidental powers of sovereignty, unless they are expressly granted, and the only incidental powers it has are such as are incidental or necessary to the exercise of its express substantive powers.

There are, then, only two grounds on which plenary sovereignty over the territories of the United States can be claimed for the Union ; that is, it must be itself expressly granted, or it must be necessary to the exercise of some substantive power expressly granted. It evidently is not expressly granted. The only express grant of power over the territories is, that "the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territories and other property belonging to the United States." This is no grant of plenary sovereignty ; and nobody pretends or can pretend that the exercise of plenary sovereignty over the territories is necessary to the exercise of any other power granted in the constitution. Congress has simply power to *dispose of* and to make all *needful* rules and regulations respecting the territories belonging to the United States. Beyond this it cannot go without a usurpation of power. But *needful* to what ? Evidently to the end of preserving to the States the property and sovereignty of the territories, and to provide, perhaps, for their settlement, erection into States, and final admission into the Union. The most liberal construction can force nothing more than this from the language of the constitution. Then the power of Congress over the territories is restricted to this end, and it is only on the ground that it is necessary to this end that Congress has the power even to erect provisional territorial governments.

The question whether Congress has authority to exclude slavery from the territories is now easily disposed of. If the exclusion of slavery is needful or necessary to the exercise of the power granted, or to secure the end for which it was granted, Congress unquestionably has the power ; but if it is not, it has not the power. Since the power is not expressly granted, and can be exercised, if at all, only as an incident of some power expressly granted, it can be claimed as the incident of no power expressly granted but the one in question. But the

exclusion of slavery is not needful to the exercise of this, as is evident from past experience, and indeed of itself ; it follows, therefore, necessarily, that Congress has no constitutional power to exclude slavery from the territories of the United States.

But it is contended that Congress may exclude it indirectly, by refusing to admit into the Union any new State whose constitution permits slavery. The constitution says new States *may* be admitted, but does not say they *shall* be. It leaves the admission or non-admission to the discretion of Congress, and prescribes no conditions for admission or refusal. If Congress has discretionary power to admit or not to admit, it may refuse to admit a Slave State, if it chooses. This seems plausible enough.

But the Congress is the agent of the States ; the agent is bound to exercise his discretionary powers according to the general scope and design of his instructions, and can never so construe his discretion as to make it override a specific instruction, or to make it the grant of full powers over matters on which he has received specific instructions, and in them only limited powers. To do so, if not absolutely a usurpation of power, would be an abuse of power, which the law would not tolerate. Congress, by the fact that it is the agent and not the principal, is bound to subordinate its discretionary powers to the ends contemplated in the powers expressly granted in its instructions. As the power to exclude slavery from the territories is denied it by not being granted in the specific instructions which it has received respecting them, it cannot acquire it by any construction of its discretionary powers. Hence, Congress cannot exclude slavery from the territories by refusing to admit into the Union a State which authorizes it, nor can it refuse to admit the new State itself, on the ground that its constitution does not prohibit it, — certainly not without a dangerous abuse, if not absolutely a usurpation, of power. The Union is bound, by its general character of agent of the States, and its instructions as such, to treat the territories as nearly like the States as their exceptional character will allow. Consequently, as it is acknowledged on all hands to have no power over slavery in the States, it can have none over it in the territories, unless necessary to the exercise of its legitimate power over them. It is not necessary to this, and therefore it has and can have no power over it in the territories ; and then none to exclude a State from the Union for the sake of excluding slavery from the territory.

Moreover, the refusal of Congress to admit a new Slaveholding State into the Union would have little practical effect. New States, when once admitted, stand, and must stand, on an equal footing with the old States, and Congress can bind the new State after its admission no further than it can one of the old States. Every State now in the Union has the right, so far as the Union is concerned, to hold slaves. Massachusetts may reëstablish slavery to-morrow in her dominions, if she chooses, and the Union has nothing to say to her. The new State, after her admission, would have the same right. All a State wishing to hold slaves has to do, then, is simply to prohibit slavery in her constitution for the sake of admission, and as soon as admitted call a convention, and strike out the prohibition. She will then have the right to hold slaves in defiance of Congress; and if bent upon holding slaves, this would be her course, if she could gain admission on no other conditions.

It is clear, from what we have now established, that there is no constitutional means of preventing the extension of the area of slavery, if there should be an extension of the territory of the Union. What, then, are they who are resolved to confine it within its present limits to do?

There are boys and girls and some men amongst us who will answer, Humanity is prior and paramount to constitutions, and has the right to prevail over all human conventions and legal enactments. This is very easy to say, and sounds very fine; but it is true only on condition that it is humanity truly interpreted, instead of humanity as each fanatic may choose to interpret it for himself. The maintenance of legal order is the primary interest of mankind, because there is no interest of mankind that can be protected or promoted without it. They war upon humanity herself, who war, though professedly in her name, upon legal order, and trample on the constitutions of states. Humanity always requires us to show our philanthropy in subordination to the legal order of our country, and forbids us ever to do it in defiance of that order. Of two evils, we are allowed, nay, commanded, in morals, to choose that which is least; and there is no prudent man who can for a single moment doubt that the continuance and even extension of negro slavery is a less evil than the destruction of the whole legal order of the country. Such destruction would bring no liberty to the slave; for it would be the destruction of all the conditions and guaranties of liberty, and the reduction of the whole population of the country to anarchy, which is worse than slavery.

There is no greater evil possible to humanity than is threatened by these Abolition and other associations which swarm over the land, and seek to expound to us the laws of God and of humanity ; and it is the duty of every one, who loves his God, his race, or his country, to oppose to them the firmest and the most persevering resistance. They are self-created, irresponsible, and without any authority to decide on any moral or political question, except what they arrogate to themselves. Whatever their avowed objects, they are engines destructives of all true liberty. They are formed for and against every thing, and usurp control over both the private and the public conscience. Already have they become in the so-called Free States nearly intolerable. They are everywhere ; they annoy us in our downsitting and uprising, in our eating and drinking, in our sleeping and waking. They overawe juries, they make the judge hesitate in his charge, and render the impartial administration of justice nearly impracticable. The magistrate fears to encounter them, and must obtain their permission, before venturing to discharge his duties. If we yield to them on one point, we must on another, — take the law from their dictation on one occasion, we must on all occasions, and hold our property, our liberty, and our consciences only at their mercy. Let us break up to-day the legal order of the country in reference to slavery at their bidding, and to-morrow we must do it in reference to some other question, next day to still another. All security then is gone. We are at the mercy of a wild, insatuated, and fickle multitude. The evils of negro slavery are but the dust in the balance with the evils we should then experience. No, never trample on law and constitutions in obedience to the mandates of self-constituted and irresponsible associations, which no well-ordered state can safely tolerate. A thousand times better is it to be the slave of the most brutal master, than to come under their lawless and fanatical sway.

Others, hardly less mad, seek to obviate the difficulty by dissolving the Union. But the dissolution of the Union would be the dissolution of American society itself. Remove the pressure of the Union, and the States would fall to pieces. Their strength, as well-ordered states, is in the Union. Let them resume the exercise of all their powers as independent sovereignties, and war, revolution, and anarchy would almost instantly follow. They would soon become hostile to each other, and bitter and savage in their hostility in proportion to the intimacy of their former mutual relations. The larger

States would soon reduce the smaller to the condition of conquered provinces, and oppression and misrule would become universal.

The external evils would be incalculable ; but the internal evils, those which would spring up in the bosom of the state itself, would almost infinitely exceed them. Not a single one of our State constitutions, especially in the Northern, Middle, and Western States, would stand. The insubordination, the love of change, the passion for experimenting of our people are so great, that nothing would remain permanent and fixed, but change itself. The tendency to ochlocracy is already fearfully strong. The reverence for law has nearly disappeared ; loyalty is a word of bad meaning ; fixed and permanent institutions are held to be derogatory to the majesty and sovereignty of the people, and there is a wide and active determination to sweep away every thing which may impose even a momentary check upon popular passion and popular caprice. The magistrate trembles before the multitude of the irresponsible and fanatical associations to which we have alluded, and the government in the Free States is already passing into their hands. And what are these associations themselves but mobs, — their influence but the influence of the mob, and their rule but the rule of the mob, — unknown as they are to the state, and to all laws, human and divine ? Antirentism, agrarianism, forming the principle of one of two leading parties in the great State of New York, the independence of the judiciary already gone, and the judges converted into demagogues by being made elective by the people, for a short term of years, and re-eligible, — a senseless Socialism spreading like wildfire from one end of the Union to the other, inflaming all ardent temperaments, maddening the young and inexperienced with delusive dreams and fallacious hopes, and undermining the very foundations of society itself, — tell but too plainly the dangerous elements at work in the heart of the American population, and the terrible evils which would fall upon us, if the Union were dissolved, and all the restlessness, ambition, intrigue, cunning, energy in each State, now absorbed by the general government, were turned loose to prey at will upon the bosom of the State itself. Society would be broken up, anarchy in its most hideous forms would reign, and we should be sunk so low as to hail as a liberator the military despot who should succeed in restoring something like order by subjecting us to absolute dependence on his arbitrary will and iron rule. No ; talk not of

the dissolution of the Union. Palsied be the tongue that would propose it ; palsied the arm that would attempt it. Let the day be cursed in which the wretch was born who dare wish it ; let him be driven out from the habitations of men, and his memory perish for ever.

What, we ask again, is, then, to be done ? The question, as we intimated in the beginning, is practically important only on the supposition of the extension of the territory of the Union by new acquisitions from Mexico. So far as concerns our present territory, the question is merely speculative. Oregon is not likely to become a Slave State, and if slavery should be introduced there, it would soon die out, for the same reason that it has died out in the Northern and Central States of the Union, — because it would be found to be bad economy. The whole importance of the question, as a practical question, is occasioned by the present war with Mexico, and the probability of our insisting on a cession to us of a portion of her territory, adapted to a slave population. This gives a fearful interest to that war, and imposes a terrible responsibility on the government which has involved us in it, if it could with honor have avoided it.

We have heretofore observed silence on the Mexican war, for we do not like the idea of declaiming against a war in which our country is actually engaged, especially if we have only our private judgment on which to question its justice or necessity. We hold loyalty to be a virtue indispensable in the citizen, and that, even in a free country, no man has the right to offer a factious opposition to the administration, and no opposition at all beyond what is demanded by the clear and unquestionable calls of duty, either to his religion or to his country. Especially do we hold this to be the case when our country is engaged in war, and needs the cordial union and support of all her citizens. This consideration has prevented us heretofore from expressing our own views of the real character of the Mexican war, and would keep us silent even now, if there were a single solid reason for prosecuting that war any farther. But no such reason can be pretended. The success of our arms has secured to us already all the legitimate objects which the war could have had, and which could justify its further continuance. We are, therefore, no longer bound to silence ; but we and all good citizens are now at liberty to speak out freely, according to our mature and honest convictions, without subjecting ourselves to a charge of want of patriotism, or of offering a factious opposition.

For ourselves, we have regarded the Mexican war from the first as uncalled for, impolitic, and unjust. We have examined the documents published by order of the government; we have read the official defence of the war in the last annual Message of the President to Congress, and with every disposition to find our own government in the right; but we are bound to say, that our original impressions have been strengthened rather than weakened. The President, undoubtedly, makes it clear that we had many just causes of complaint against Mexico, which at the time of their occurrence might have justified reprisals, perhaps even war, — but he cannot plead these in justification of the present war; for they were not the ground on which we professed to engage in it. The official announcement of the President to Congress was that war already existed between the two republics, *by the act of Mexico herself*; and whatever use we may make of old grievances in adjusting the terms of peace, we can make no use of them in defending the war. We can plead in its defence only the fact on which we grounded it, namely, war exists by the act of Mexico herself. But unhappily, at the time of the official announcement, war *did not exist* between the two republics at all, for neither republic had declared war against the other. There had been a collision of their forces, but this was not war, as the President would probably have conceded, had he known or recollected the distinction between war and hostilities. By placing the war on the ground that it existed by the act of Mexico, and that ground being false, he has left it wholly indefensible, whatever the old grievances we may have to allege against Mexico.

The act of Mexico in crossing the Rio Grande, and engaging our troops on territory which she had possessed and still claimed as hers, but which we asserted had, by a recent act against which she had protested, become ours, — the act which the President chose to inform Congress and the world was war, — may or may not have been a just cause for declaring war against her, but it assuredly was not war itself. We have no intention to justify Mexico. She may have been decidedly in the wrong; she may have had no valid title to the territory of which the President had just taken military occupation; that territory may have been rightfully ours, and it may even have been the duty of the President to occupy and defend it; — but it cannot be denied that she had once possessed it; that it was still a part of one of her states or provinces; that she

still claimed it, and had continued to exercise jurisdiction over it, till driven from it by our army of occupation ; that she invaded it with an armed force, if invasion it can be called, not as territory belonging to us, but as territory belonging to her ; and that she attacked our troops, not for the reason that they were ours, but for the reason, as she held, — and she had as good a right to be judge in her own case as we had in ours, — that they were intruders, trespassers on her soil. The motive of her act was not war against the United States, but the expulsion of intruders from her own territory. No sophistry can make her act war, — certainly not without conceding that our act in taking military possession of that territory was also war ; and if that was war, then the war, if it existed at all, existed by our act and not by hers, for her act was consequent upon ours. The most that the President was at liberty to say, without condemning his own government, was, that there had been a collision of the forces of the two republics on a territory claimed by each ; but this collision he had no right to term war, for every body knows that it takes something more than a collision of their respective forces on a disputed territory to constitute war between two civilized nations. In no possible point of view was the announcement of the President that war existed between the two republics, and existed by the act of Mexico, correct. It did not exist at all ; or if it did, it existed not by act of Mexico, but by our act. In either case, the official announcement was false, and cannot be defended.

The President may have been governed by patriotic motives ; he may have felt that prompt and energetic action was required ; he may have believed that in great emergencies the chief magistrate of a powerful republic, having to deal with a weak and distracted state, should rise superior to mere technical forms, and the niceties of truth and honor ; but it strikes us that he would have done better, proved himself even more patriotic, and sufficiently prompt and energetic, if he had confined himself to the ordinary rules of morality, and the well-defined principles of international law. By aspiring to rise above these, and to appear original, he has placed his country in a false position, and debarred himself, whatever the just causes of war Mexico may have given us, from pleading one of them in justification of the actual war. We must be permitted to regret that he did not reflect beforehand, that, if he placed the defence of the war on the ground that it already existed, and existed by the act of Mexico herself, and on that ground de-

manded of Congress the means of prosecuting it, he would, in case that ground proved to be untenable, as he must have known it would, have nothing whatever to allege in its or his own justification. He should have been lawyer enough to have known that he could not plead anew, after having failed on his first issue. It is often hazardous in our pleadings to plead what is not true, and in doing so in the present case, the President has not only offended morality, which he may regard as a small matter, but has even committed a blunder.

The course the President should have pursued is plain and obvious. On learning the state of things on the frontier, the critical condition of our army of occupation, he should have demanded of Congress the reinforcements and supplies necessary to relieve it and secure the purpose for which it was avowedly sent to the Rio Grande; and, if he believed it proper or necessary, to have in addition laid before Congress a full and truthful statement of our relations with Mexico, including all the unadjusted complaints, past and present, we had against her, accompanied by the recommendation of a declaration of war. He would then have kept within the limits of his duty, proved himself a plain constitutional President, and left the responsibility of war or no war to Congress, the only war-making power known to our laws. Congress, after mature deliberation, might, or might not, have declared war, — most likely would not; but whether so or not, the responsibility would have rested with it, and no blame would have attached to the President.

Unhappily, this course did not occur to the President, or was too plain and simple to meet his approbation. As if fearful, if Congress deliberated, it might refuse to declare war, and as if determined to have war at any rate, he presented to Congress, not the true issue, whether war should or should not be declared, — but the false issue, whether Congress would grant him the means of prosecuting a war, waged against us by a foreign power. In the true issue, Congress might have hesitated; in the one actually presented, there was no room to hesitate, if the official announcement of the President was to be credited, and hesitation would have been criminal. By declaring that the war already existed, and by the act of Mexico herself, the President relieved Congress of the responsibility of the war, by throwing it all on Mexico. But since he cannot fasten it on Mexico, — for war did not already exist, or if so, by our act, and not hers, — it necessarily recoils upon himself,

and he must bear the responsibility of doing what the constitution forbids him to do, — of making war without the intervention of Congress. In effect, therefore, he has trampled the constitution under his feet, set a dangerous precedent, and, by the official publication of a palpable falsehood, sullied the national honor. It is with no pleasure that we speak thus of the chief magistrate of the Union, for whose elevation to his high and responsible office we ourselves voted. But whatever may be our attachment to party, or the respect we hold to be due from all good citizens to the civil magistrate, we cannot see the constitution violated, and the national honor sacrificed, whether by friend or foe, from good motives or bad, without entering, feeble though it be, our stern and indignant protest. The humiliation is deep and painful, and would be insupportable, were it not for the earnest patriotism of the people which the war has called forth, and the brilliant achievements of our brave troops in Mexico. These relieve the gloom, and make us still proud to call ourselves an American citizen.*

* We are far from regarding Congress, in echoing the false statement of the President, as free from blame. It ought to have seen and corrected the executive — mistake. Yet it is not surprising that it took the President at his word. The late Congress had some able members, and it adopted some judicious measures; but we express only the common sentiment of all parties, when we say it was far from covering itself with glory, and that it is to be hoped another Congress like it will not meet again very soon. Various motives, no doubt, governed the members. Many, no doubt, ignorant of the distinction between war and hostilities, really believed the President, and therefore regarded the suggestion that war did not exist, and exist by the act of Mexico, as proceeding either from a want of patriotism, or from a factious opposition to the administration. Some, perhaps, felt that they were bound by their party obligations to support executive measures, whether right or wrong; others felt that the declaration of the President, whether true or false, would shield them; others still, perhaps, acquiesced, lest their patriotism should be questioned, and their opposition be set down to faction; and, finally, a number, very likely, believing war to be inevitable, and not undesirable, held that it mattered little on what pretence it was made, providing it was made and prosecuted with vigor. These could see no good likely to result from the deliberations of Congress. The issue presented, the actual state of the army, were adapted to mislead many, and left no time to deliberate, to take a calm survey of the momentous question, and correct first impressions. All was hurry and confusion. The danger was imminent, and permitted no delay. The administration and its confidential friends would suffer no division of the question, and through the influence of committees forced members either to vote the war or bear the odium of refusing to vote the reinforcements and supplies necessary to the safety of the army. Those who had scruples could obtain no division and no delay, and the greater part of the members of both Houses yielded to the executive. It

But passing over this, we have yet to be convinced, whatever were the just causes of complaint we had against Mexico, that the war was called for. We are willing to admit that we had suffered grievous wrongs from Mexico, and that we had shown exemplary forbearance, and treated her with great generosity; but she had shown a willingness to treat with us, and the greater part, if not all, of the old offences we had had to complain of she had acknowledged, and they had been settled in a convention of the two republics. True, she had not, in all cases, fulfilled her engagements; but she had manifested no unwillingness to fulfil them, and no one doubts that she would have fulfilled them, had it not been for her unsettled and distracted internal state. The more recent difficulties growing out of the affair of Texas demanded great delicacy and forbearance on our part. She felt herself wronged and humbled by the annexation of Texas to the Union, and, however blameworthy we may choose to regard her conduct, we are sure, if the cases had been reversed, we should have behaved at least no better than she did. She protested, as was her undoubted right, against the annexation of Texas; but she committed no act of violence against us, so long as we confined our army of occupation to territory over which Texas had actually exercised jurisdiction. We might well have forborne to press our claims further, and it would have been no derogation of our national dignity to have refrained from pushing our claims at once to their farthest limits against a weak, humbled, and distracted, albeit gasconading, neighbour. It would have been wise and just to give her time to cool, — time for her wounds to begin to heal, and to reconcile herself to her humiliating loss. — especially since she had been stripped of the province of Texas through her misfortune, not her fault.

The necessity of sending our troops from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande, to occupy a position within territory claimed indeed by Texas, but which it is well known continued to be subject to Mexican laws, and to form a portion of one of the undoubted states or provinces of the Mexican republic, was not at all urgent. That the position taken up by General Taylor, under orders of the President, was in terri-

is to be regretted they did; but, however censurable they were, their wrong does not relieve the President, nor can their votes under protest be pleaded by his friends in mitigation of his conduct; because it was by his act that they were led, almost compelled, to do what they did.

tory which had never been in the actual possession of Texas, and which had continued since as before Texan independence subject to Mexican authority, it is worse than idle to question. Whether we had a right to claim under Texas beyond what Texas held in actual subjection to her laws may be disputed ; but even admitting that we had a valid title to all of Mexico to which Texas saw proper to set up a claim, there can be no doubt that a little patience would have enabled us to adjust peaceably the question of boundary between the two republics. But if worst had come to worst, we might at any time have fixed upon the boundary we intended to maintain, and confined ourselves simply to its defence. The real cause of the war, disguise it as we may, was the act of the President in ordering the troops under General Taylor to the Rio Grande, an act done on his sole responsibility, while Congress was in session, and without necessity or reason of state ; for, so long as we were the stronger party, there was no danger of our losing our title by delaying to vindicate it, and there was no other conceivable reason for urging its immediate vindication. The vindication could have been safely, prudently delayed. The act, therefore, which brought on the war was an unnecessary act, and therefore the war itself was uncalled for.*

* It is contended, in opposition to us, that the removal of our troops to the territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande was not the immediate cause of the war, — 1. Because Mexico has never made that act a special ground of complaint ; and, 2. Because that territory was as much a part of the State of Texas as that to the east of the Nueces. These replies are both disingenuous. That the actual jurisdiction in some instances and to some extent crossed the Nueces, we believe to be true ; for Corpus Christi itself, on the map we have consulted, is to the west of that river ; but that it extended to the Rio Grande, or even far to the west of the Nueces, is not true. Texas may have declared that the whole of the territory between the two rivers was included within one of her Congressional districts, for that was easy enough to do ; but there is no one bold enough to say that she opened her polls and received votes for her Congressmen from the citizens of Tamaulipas, in the vicinity of what is now Fort Brown, or even in the vicinity of Point Isabel. The laws of Texas were never acknowledged or regularly enforced in that section. That Texas set up a claim to the Rio Grande, we concede ; but that she actually exercised jurisdiction to the Rio Grande, or far to the west of the Nueces, is what we deny, and the government, so far as we have seen, has offered no evidence to the contrary.

The second reply is more disingenuous still. Mexico sets up a claim to the whole of Texas to the Sabine, and that claim she refuses to relinquish. While she continues her claim to the whole, she can make no distinction as to a part. She could not plead our occupation of the territory in ques-

The war, furthermore, was impolitic. If unsuccessful, it could not fail to disgrace us ; if successful, it could hardly fail to weaken Mexico, already too weak for our interest. The true policy of this country is, not to destroy, absorb, or weaken Mexico, but to preserve her nationality and independence, and to strengthen her. It is a great evil to a nation to have only weak neighbours, and worse than madness for us to seek to be the only power on the North American continent. Solitude is no more the normal state for a nation than for an individual, and in the case of either, without special grace, is hurtful. If the nation has only weak neighbours, it will be constantly tempted to the practice of injustice ; and if no neighbours, it will be torn by intestine divisions, and sink into anarchy or despotism.

But especially was this war impolitic in consequence of the slave question, already threatening the Union, and with difficulty restrained within constitutional limits. The war, if successful, can hardly fail in extorting from Mexico a portion of her territory, and that territory to some extent not unsuitable to a slave population. Its annexation to the Union must bring on, in all its fierceness, the contest between the Free States and the Slave States, — a contest in which both have much to lose, and neither any thing to gain. The Free States are resolved not to pour out their blood and treasure to extend what they regard as a detestable system, and, if new territory is acquired, they cannot, as we have seen, avoid doing so, without trampling on the constitution, which we are afraid, if forced to the alternative, they will not hesitate to do. The administration should have foreseen this, and avoided the war, if possible, for

tion as a special grievance, without making a distinction between it and that east of it, and, in fact, not without abandoning her claim to all the rest of Texas. This reply by some of the defenders of the President may answer to throw dust in the eyes of the people, but it is really unworthy of an American citizen. Nothing would have pleased our government more than to have found Mexico complaining of that invasion as a special grievance. No doubt, it was the very blunder they hoped to provoke her to commit ; and if she had committed it, we can believe our troops would have been speedily ordered back to the Nueces ; for it would have virtually yielded to us all the territory Texas actually possessed, and with that the President would probably have been satisfied. It is idle, then, to draw any inference from the silence of Mexico as to the act which we say was the immediate cause of the war. That it was the immediate cause of the war we may infer from the fact, that, till it was done, Mexico made no effort to disturb our possession of Texas ; and there can be little doubt, that, but for it, she would silently have abandoned her claim to all of Texas east of the Nueces.

this reason, if for no other ; for, if the Antislavery party find it self strong enough to prevent the extension of slavery in defiance of the constitution, it will not stop there. It will no longer respect constitutional barriers ; but will take up the question of slavery in the States, and immediate emancipation or civil war will be the alternative, — both bad, and one hardly more to be deprecated than the other. If no foreign element be introduced to give additional force to the excitement already so fearful, the friends of the constitution may be able, at least for a time, to keep it from any direct interference with slavery where it is ; but introduce such an element, let there be a colorable pretext for asserting that the Free States are called upon, not merely to let slavery alone, but to aid in extending it, and there is no longer among us any power to control the consequences. The present administration should have considered this, and have studiously avoided every occasion of fanning the excitement. It has, we are sorry to say, not done so. It has gained no friends by its policy at the North, and it has done its best to ruin the South.

In the present posture of affairs, and in view of the probable results of the war, there is only one constitutional course to be pursued, and that is for both the friends and the enemies of the slave system to unite in resisting the further extension of the territory of the Union. This is politic and constitutional. Mexico must not be dismembered, nor a foot of her territory permanently annexed to the Union. Let this be the settled policy of both parties. Let not the South think of converting the North to her views of slavery, nor the North attempt to check the progress of slavery by trampling on the constitution. It is too late in the day to attempt the former, and it is always out of season to dream of the latter. But both may unite in resisting any extension of the present territory of the Union, and, in doing so, remove all additional pretext for excitement. The territory of the Union is large enough, and he is as poor a patriot as he is a statesman who would seek to extend its bounds. The insane rage of a portion of our people for annexation, and the influence demagogues acquire for nefarious purposes by appealing to it, must be checked, or our national honor is gone, our national sense of justice obliterated, and our free institutions become our reproach. A firm and successful resistance of the attempt likely to be made to extend the territory of the Union, by cessions extorted from Mexico, will have this salutary effect, and we trust it will be made.

ART. IV. — *L' America un tempo Spagnuola riguardata sotto l' Aspetto religioso dall' Epoca del suo Discuoprimento sino al 1843*, di MONSIGNORE GAETANO BALUFFI. Ancona. 1844, 1845.

THE author of this interesting work is at present the successor of our popular Pontiff in the see of Imola, and a member of the College of Cardinals. For several years he fulfilled, with great advantage to religion, the high functions of representative of the Holy See in the republic of Granada, where he procured the recall of the Jesuits to resume their labors in that region, formerly cultivated with great success by the fathers of this illustrious society. Availing himself of such opportunities of research as were afforded him by his position, he indulged his literary taste by reviewing the history of the discovery and settlement of the Spanish possessions, and considering the influence of religion in inspiring the enterprise and remedying the evils caused by the passions of the adventurers. Since his return to the Pontifical court, he has given to the world the fruits of his studies and meditations in the two admirable volumes which, in successive years, have issued from the press of Ancona, and which are creditable to Italy, as well on account of the mechanical execution, as for the spirit and elegance of the composition. In several places he makes favorable mention of our social institutions and ecclesiastical councils, and eulogizes several of the members of our hierarchy, whose acquaintance he formed during a short visit to the States on his way to Europe.

The acts of some Popes, who stripped monarchs of their diadems, have been plausibly interpreted as declarations of a forfeiture incurred by the violation of the social compact; but those which, in high-sounding phraseology, gave to the sovereigns of Portugal and Spain power and dominion over the regions previously unknown, which had been discovered by the adventurous genius of their subjects, or which might afterwards be discovered, have been long regarded as direct and positive assumptions of temporal dominion. Such a conclusion, however, is not necessary to be drawn. A different and perhaps a juster view of them was presented by the celebrated Count Le Maistre, who considered them as no more than authoritative declarations of right, and solemn sanctions interposed at the solicitation of the party interested, with a view to preserve

peace between Christian princes, and to prevent conflicting enterprises. Cardinal Baluffi adopts this view, and tacitly vindicates them, whilst he states the end to which the Papal acts were directed. "The Roman Pontiffs, as universal fathers, not because they imagined themselves lords of the material world, but in order to prevent the effusion of Christian blood, found themselves, at the epoch of the discovery of America, in circumstances which rendered it desirable that they should divide the countries, and mark mutual limits to the conquests of the nations that took arms against unknown nations. By their command, ministers of peace were despatched at the same time, not only to proclaim the faith, but to aid and direct the people in the path of duty, so as to establish order and promote the public welfare, the great objects which the Popes always had in view."

Alexander the Sixth, whose personal character was not likely to add weight to his official acts, was not the first Pontiff who exercised his authority in determining the rights of sovereigns grounded on discovery, and fixing limits to their ambition. About the year 1438, Eugene the Fourth granted to the Portuguese an exclusive right to all the countries which they might discover from Cape Non to the continent of India; and the validity of the grant was universally recognized, so that, as Robertson testifies, "all Christian princes were deterred from intruding into those countries which the Portuguese had discovered, or from interrupting the progress of their navigation and conquest." * Edward the Sixth of England, on the remonstrance of John the Second of Portugal, prohibited English merchants from opening a trade with the coast of Guinea, because it would be against the terms of the Papal concession. Whatever may now be thought of such acts, it is clear that they were supported by what was then the public law of Christian nations, and had, at least, all the force that can be derived from general consent. Wheaton, our own distinguished writer on international law, observes, — "As between the Christians themselves, the sovereign Pontiff was the supreme arbiter of conflicting claims. Hence the famous bull issued by Pope Alexander the Sixth in 1493." † Even Prescott remarks: — "This bold stretch of Papal authority, so often ridiculed as chimerical and absurd, was in a measure justified by the

* *History of America*, Book I.

† *Elements of International Law*, Part II. c. IV. p. 210.

event, since it did, in fact, determine the principles on which the vast extent of unappropriated empire in the Eastern and Western hemispheres was ultimately divided between two petty states of Europe."* Mr. Adams himself, in a very singular speech which he delivered in Congress on the Oregon question, admitted the validity of the Papal grant, as supported by general consent and law at that period ; but we must regret that the ex-President did not treat the subject with the gravity that became his age and character. In judging of such documents, we must not consider, in the abstract, what powers were divinely communicated to the fisherman of Galilee ; but we should attend to the social position of his successors, which brought with it an immense accession of temporal influence. An exercise of authority which was sought for by princes, and submitted to by their rivals, must have been widely different from usurpation. Its foundation must have been in right and justice ; and we can see no incongruity in the choice made of the Pontiff as the interpreter of right and umpire in controversy.

The lawfulness of the enterprise of Christian adventurers, who sought to discover unknown countries and subject them to the sovereigns under whose sanction their enterprise was undertaken, may be doubted of ; but where the nations discovered are in a barbarous or savage state, it is, we believe, generally conceded by writers on the laws of nations that it is lawful to reduce them, even by force of arms, with a view to put an end to unnatural atrocities, and to introduce civilization. The Gospel is not to be promoted by the aid of the sword, teaching and preaching being the means pointed out by Christ for spreading it throughout the world ; yet, if the enterprise of the Spaniards was justifiable in the common interests of humanity, it did not cease to be so from the circumstance that ministers of religion accompanied the adventurers with a view to communicate its saving truths to the conquered nations, and lay the foundations of true civilization, by inculcating its pure and chastening principles. There is, then, nothing in the celebrated bull of Alexander the Sixth which may not be justified by the jurisprudence of his age, and, in the main, by principles still acknowledged. It was designed to convey, in language the most expressive, the fullest title which could be granted, and it was substantially a solemn declaration of rights

* *Ferdinand and Isabella*, Vol. II. Chap. XVIII.

founded on actual discovery, and an authoritative sanction to future enterprise, given with a view to the peace of Christian nations.

We should, however, mistake the spirit of the fifteenth century, were we to suppose that abstract reasoning on principles of jurisprudence, or ambition of discovery, or desire of empire, gave the primary impulse to the great adventure of Columbus. Whatever may have been the weaknesses and vices of men at that time, zeal — sometimes, it may be, not sufficiently temperate — was generally felt for the advancement of religion, and genius and power were enlisted in her service. The idea of discovering unknown regions and nations enkindled the ambition of Columbus, principally because he hoped to introduce to them the preachers of the Gospel, and thus shed the light of Christianity on those who sat in darkness and in the shades of death. The captivating idea of extending the dominion of Christ beyond the waste of waters, to nations who previously had not heard the sweet sound of his saving name, interested many in the project who would otherwise have smiled at it as the dream of fancy. Father Diego Deza, of the order of Friars Preachers, Father John Perez de Marchena, Guardian of the Franciscan Convent of La Rabida in Andalusia, Father Thomas de Torquemada, Inquisitor-General and confessor of Ferdinand, lent their powerful influence to its support, — not from a full conviction of the likelihood of success, but from a feeling that it was worth a trial, where the result might be to communicate to millions the blessings of religion. “With Isabella,” as Robertson acknowledges, “zeal for propagating the Christian faith, together with the desire of communicating the knowledge of truth and the consolations of religion to people destitute of spiritual light, were more than ostensible motives for encouraging Columbus to attempt his discoveries.”* The religious spirit of the chief adventurer was manifested in the name of the vessel in which he sailed, in placing himself under the protection of the Virgin-Mother, in the erection of the cross on the ground on which he first landed, and in the name *San Salvador*, given to the island. He may be said to have taken possession of the newly discovered regions in the name of the King of kings, ere he thought of performing those formal acts which, according to the usage of nations, were necessary to establish the rights of the Spanish

* *History of America*, Book VIII.

sovereign. The hymn of praise which was entoned on this occasion was beautifully expressive of the sovereign dominion of the Deity, as proclaimed by the Church throughout the entire world : — “ Te æternum Patrem omnis terra veneratur. . . . Te per orbem terrarum sancta confitetur ecclesia.”

On the return of Columbus from his first voyage, writing to Raphael Sanzio, the royal treasurer, he gave to God all praise for his success, and dwelt with delight on the glory that would redound to Christ from the union in his worship of so many nations hitherto unknown. Isabella likewise “endeavoured to fulfil her pious purpose, and manifested the most tender concern to secure not only religious instruction, but mild treatment, to that inoffensive race of men.”* At the foot of a crucifix she hung the first gold presented to her from the New World, making it a votive offering to Him who gave himself a victim of propitiation for the whole world. Ferdinand gave the edifying example of standing sponsor for some of the Indians whom Columbus presented at the sacred font, and the nobles imitated the condescension of their sovereign. From all these facts, it is manifest that the discovery of the New World, although justly regarded as one of the most splendid fruits of the inspirations of genius, was still more eminently the result of religious zeal.

The condition of nearly all the Indian tribes discovered by Columbus and subsequent adventurers was most degraded ; and even those that exhibited some appearance of civilization, such as the Mexicans and Peruvians, offered human sacrifices, and practised cannibalism. The flesh of a slave, immolated for the occasion, was dressed up for their religious banquets ; and to feast on the mangled remains of an enemy was necessary for the consummation of the victory gained in the bloody strife. Modesty was necessarily unknown among the naked wanderers, and if the amorous passion did not appear active, it arose from insensibility of character, rather than from any sense of moral propriety. Where marriage was recognized, polygamy prevailed, especially with the chiefs, whose prowess was rewarded by the number of their concubines. So destitute did they appear of moral sense and of spiritual ideas, that Robertson affirms that many of them had no idea of a Supreme Being, although he admits that they all believed in the immortality of the soul. Baluffi shows the mistake of the his-

* Robertson, *ubi supra*.

torian in ascribing his singular opinion to a Jesuit father, and in affirming that the Peruvians had not even a term to express creator ; and points to the name of their favorite deity, *Pachacamac*, as identical with Creator of the world. In some places usages and traditions prevailed that have given rise to the conjecture that Christianity was not unknown to the remote ancestors of the tribes. The memory of a deluge which generally prevailed had, among the Aztecs, a striking affinity to the Scriptural narrative. We cannot fail to recognize our mother Eve in *Cioacoatl*, a Mexican goddess, near whom a serpent was depicted, and through whom sin is said to have come into the world. The story of David and Uriah is easily discovered under other names in their annals. Even vestiges of some distinctive Christian usages may be perceived among them. The Aztecs touched with water the head and lips of the infant, named it on that occasion, and invoked their favorite goddess to cleanse it and give it a new birth. The cross was venerated in the temples of *Anahuac*. The conquerors "met with it in various places, and the image of a cross may be seen at this day sculptured in bas-relief on the walls of one of the buildings of *Palenque*."* These facts, we admit, are insufficient to warrant any certain inference ; but they are sufficiently remarkable to be noticed. They did not, however, in any way facilitate the conversion of the aborigines to Christianity, who were somewhat disposed to receive its teachers by a tradition preserved among them, and said to be derived from their great father, who, on leaving them, foretold that a superior race would come from the east.

The transition of millions of Indians to Christianity within a few years is a fact attested by the most prejudiced historians, who represent it as a mere external change, the result of terror or of caprice, without the corresponding change of sentiment, and without moral improvement. *Baluffi* admits that the incongruous union of Spanish dominion and Christian faith, in the invitation made by the adventurers to the various tribes, was calculated to injure Christianity by identifying it with the interests of the Spanish monarchy, and presenting it in alliance with the crown, combined, as it were, to strip the nations of their independence. "The military and political powers, acting in a manner diametrically opposed to the maxims of the Gospel, made war, in effect, on the word of salvation and

* Prescott's *Conquest of Mexico*, Vol. III., Appendix, Part I.

peace which was preached, and, by presenting a sanguinary religion, sought to make God himself an accomplice in their crimes."

"Never before was the law of Christ promulgated in such a way. In all parts of the world where this divine Gospel was preached, men were not called by the sound of the drum to enter into the Christian brotherhood; the independence of empires was not attacked; the people were not slaughtered; families were not plundered; treasures were not seized; individual liberty was not taken away. Unfortunately, in America an utter disregard was manifested for the rights of nature and of nations, whilst the ecclesiastics, as meek lambs, taught the pure faith of Jesus. Vulgar prejudice, — an indiscreet zeal, not conformable to the spirit of the Church, — at that time esteemed it a great and heroic undertaking to make war on infidels, and plunder them, however inoffensive. The Spaniards seemed to fancy themselves, like the Hebrews of old, divinely commissioned to combat the Amorrheans, Jebuseans, and other nations accursed of God, and to exterminate them from the land of promise." This very severe censure may admit of mitigation, if it be considered that the violence offered by the Spaniards was not generally, at least, directed to enforce the doctrines of Christianity, but rather to abolish the unnatural and horrible custom of sacrificing human victims. When Cortès urged the Cacique of Cempoalla (or Zempoalla) and his subjects to embrace the faith, the chief indignantly rejected the proposition, and threatened the vengeance of the gods on the Christians, should they interfere with their worship. "The zeal of the Christians," observes Prescott, "had mounted too high to be cooled by remonstrance or menace. During their residence in the land, they had witnessed more than once the barbarous rites of the natives, their cruel sacrifices of human victims, and their disgusting cannibal repasts. Their souls sickened at these abominations, and they agreed with one voice to stand by their general, when he told them that Heaven would never smile on their enterprise if they countenanced such atrocities, and that, for his own part, he was resolved the Indian idols should be demolished that very hour, if it cost him his life. . . . Fifty soldiers, at a signal from their general, sprang up the great stairway of the temple, entered the building on the summit, the walls of which were black with human gore, tore the huge wooden idols from their foundations, and dragged them to the edge of the terrace. . . . With great alacrity they rolled the colossal monsters

down the steps of the pyramid, amidst the triumphant shouts of their own companions, and the groans and lamentations of the natives. They then consummated the whole by burning them in the presence of the assembled multitude.”* The consequent conversion of the natives cannot be regarded as the effect of fear, but rather as resulting from the evidence presented to them that their idols were powerless. “The same effect,” says the historian, “followed as in Cozumel. The Totonacs, finding their deities incapable of preventing or even punishing this profanation of their shrines, conceived a mean opinion of their power.” He goes on to relate, that some of the Totonac priests joined in the procession which was formed, when, after some days, the temple became a Christian sanctuary, and that, according to the Spanish chronicle, Indians as well as Spaniards were melted into tears and audible sobs by the impressive ceremonies of the Catholic worship, and the touching eloquence of the pious Father Olmedo. In accounting for this extraordinary demonstration, he compares the different modes adopted by Catholic and Protestant missionaries, and pays an involuntary homage to the power of the Catholic ritual over the feelings. The Protestant, he says, presents the pale light of reason to his hearers; “the bolder Catholic, kindling the spirit by the splendor of the spectacle, and by the glowing portrait of an agonized Redeemer, sweeps along his hearers in a tempest of passion.”† The historian would have spoken more correctly, had he observed that the Catholic studies to convince the understanding, but does not neglect to interest the feelings and imagination by the imposing influences of a sublime ceremonial.

From the high character given of Father Olmedo by Prescott, Robertson, and all historians, we may be assured that he, at least, did not suffer any to be coerced into a profession of Christianity. Many centuries before, a council of Toledo, whose decrees could not have been unknown to him, forbade violence to be used to induce the reception of baptism, or profession of the faith, since the grace of God is to be given to those only who are willing to receive it. Robertson has paid due homage to his sacerdotal courage and prudent toleration, when describing his opposition to the coercive measures which Cortés proposed to adopt at Tlascala: — “Cortés, astonished and enraged at their obstinacy, proposed to execute by force

* *Conquest of Mexico*, Book II., Chap. VIII.† *Ibid*

what he could not accomplish by persuasion, and was going to overturn their altars and cast down their idols with the same violent hand as at Zempoalla, if Father Bartholomew de Olmedo, chaplain to the expedition, had not checked his inconsiderate impetuosity. He represented the imprudence of such an attempt in a large city newly reconciled, and filled with people no less superstitious than warlike; he declared that the proceeding at Zempoalla had always appeared to him precipitate and unjust; that religion was not to be propagated by the sword, or infidels to be converted by violence; that other weapons were to be employed in this ministry; patient instruction must enlighten the understanding, and pious example captivate the heart, before men could be induced to abandon error and embrace the truth." The historian cannot suppress his surprise at hearing such language from a Catholic priest at that period; yet it was by no means peculiar to Olmedo. "One is astonished to find a Spanish monk of the sixteenth century among the first advocates against persecution, and in behalf of religious liberty. The remonstrances of an ecclesiastic no less respectable for wisdom than virtue had their proper weight with Cortés. He left the Tlascalans in the undisturbed exercise of their own rites, requiring only that they should desist from their horrid practice of offering human sacrifices." *

It is clear that even Cortés, although eager to see the Indians converted to Christianity, limited his coercive measures to the destruction of the idols; and, by the persuasion of Olmedo, was content with putting an end to the unnatural practices which made of the temple a human slaughter-house. From Montezuma he obtained the conversion of a *teocalli*, or temple, into a Christian sanctuary, and, having displaced the stone of sacrifice, so often stained with human blood, to make room for the representation of the Victim of Calvary, and placed on high the image of the Virgin "mild and chaste," he had the consolation of seeing assembled around him many of the idolaters, who were struck with admiration at the mysterious simplicity of the Christian worship. "As the beautiful *Te Deum* rose towards heaven, Cortés and his soldiers, kneeling on the ground, with tears streaming from their eyes, poured forth their gratitude to the Almighty for this glorious triumph of the cross. It was a striking spectacle, — that of these rude warriors lifting up their orisons on the summit of this mountain temple, in the very

* *History of America*, Book V.

capital of heathendom, on the spot especially dedicated to its unhallowed mysteries. Side by side, the Spaniard and the Aztec knelt down in prayer, and the Christian hymn mingled its sweet tones of love and mercy with the wild chant raised by the Indian priest." *

An affecting tribute was paid by the converted Indians to the humanity and paternal affection of Olmedo at his death, when they refused all food or drink, even water, until his remains were interred. Such was their deep affliction for his loss! That he did not stand alone in the practice of the sublime virtues of his ministry, Prescott is forced to acknowledge. "Olmedo belonged to that class of missionaries — of whom the Roman Catholic Church, to its credit, has furnished many examples — who rely on spiritual weapons for the great work, inculcating those doctrines of love and mercy which can best touch the sensibilities and win the affections of their rude audience. These, indeed, are the true weapons of the Church, the weapons employed in the primitive ages, by which it has spread its peaceful banners over the farthest region of the globe."† To Toribio, a Franciscan friar, the historian bears a like honorable testimony. "Toribio employed himself zealously with his brethren in the great object of their mission. He travelled on foot over various parts of Mexico, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Wherever he went, he spared no pains to wean the natives from their dark idolatry, and to pour into their minds the light of revelation. He showed even a tender regard for their temporal as well as spiritual wants, and Bernal Diaz testifies that he has known him to give away his own robe to clothe a destitute and suffering Indian."‡ Twelve other Franciscans, sent as missionaries to New Spain, in 1524, have merited a no less favorable eulogium. "They were men of unblemished purity of life, nourished with the learning of the cloister, and, like many others whom the Romish [!] Church has sent forth on such apostolic missions, counted all personal sacrifices as little in the sacred cause to which they were devoted."§ The historian cannot dissemble that the virtues of the early missionaries — especially their tender charity — exercised a most powerful influence over the Indians, and won to the faith

* *Conquest of Mexico*, Book IV., Ch. V.

† *Ibid.*, Book III., Ch. I.

‡ *Ibid.*, Book III., Ch. IX., *note*.

§ *Ibid.*, Book VII., Ch. II.

many who had resisted the arms of the adventurers. The celebrated Bartholomew de Las Casas "preached the gospel among the natives of Nicaragua and Guatemala ; and succeeded in converting and reducing to obedience some wild tribes in the latter province who had defied the arms of his countrymen." *

With this evidence before us of the character of the missionaries, we cannot assent to the assertion of Robertson, that the converts were admitted without due instruction in the Christian doctrines, or a cordial abandonment of their superstitious practices. Regard was doubtless had to the weakness of their intellect, and their very limited capacity ; but sincere conviction of the truth and divine origin of Christianity was exacted, and they were specially instructed in its great mysteries. The chief ground for regarding their transition to the Christian worship as merely nominal is the rapidity of the conversions ; which, with more apparent reason, might be objected to the three thousand and five thousand converts that marked the first promulgation of the Gospel. Should not the believers in revealed truth feel happy in seeing parallel cases to those just mentioned, in the numbers of Indians who embraced the faith on the preaching of the missionaries of the sixteenth century ? " A single clergyman," says Robertson, " baptized in one day above five thousand Mexicans, and did not desist until he was so exhausted by fatigue, that he was unable to lift his hands. In the course of a few years after the reduction of the Mexican empire, the sacrament of baptism was administered to more than four millions." To deny that conversions so numerous could be solid and sincere is not the best means of rendering credible the facts recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. What Robertson asserts may be true of some of the new Christians, that they occasionally relapsed into superstitious practices ; but the perseverance of the immense multitude is beyond question. Prescott attests that the labors of the missionaries rendered finally effectual even the indiscreet efforts of the conquerors to bring the Indians to the profession of Christianity. " The seeds thus recklessly scattered must have perished but for the missionaries of their own nation, who, in later times, worked over the same ground, living among the Indians as brethren, and by long and patient culture enabling the germs of truth to take root and fructify in their hearts." †

* Ibid., Book II., Ch. VIII., *note*.

† Ibid., Book III., Ch. I.

Who has not heard of the atrocities of the Spanish adventurers, — the cruelty with which they sometimes set blood-hounds to tear in pieces the naked Indians, — the perfidy with which they invited them to friendly interviews, and then massacred them? God forbid that we should say a word to mitigate the horror which such crimes excite! Balussi is unsparing in denouncing them, and we join from our hearts in the strong language which he employs. Yet truth and justice require us to observe, that cruelty and perfidy did not ordinarily mark the career of Spanish discovery. If it be lawful to use force to put a stop to unnatural enormities, — such as human sacrifices and cannibalism, — most of the horrific scenes exhibited in the discovery of America must be classed among the incidents of just warfare. Robertson and Prescott agree that Cortés had certain information of a plot formed by the inhabitants of Cholula for the destruction of the Spaniards, before he resolved on anticipating the attack by their massacre. Rumors of a plot formed by the Aztec nobles led Alvarado to fall upon them when assembled for a religious festival. Of the conquerors of Mexico Prescott testifies, — “ Their swords were rarely stained with blood, unless it was indispensable to the success of their enterprise.” If this did not wholly justify it, it affords some extenuation, since the desperate condition of men engaged in a perilous undertaking for a just end may prompt them to measures from which they would otherwise shrink with horror.

Unhappily, the annals of our country present instances of cruelty and perfidy towards the aborigines, which should make us speak less severely of the Spanish adventurers. Robertson states that the Indians made an attempt to massacre all the English settlers in Virginia, and actually murdered a considerable number, which naturally provoked retaliation, but marked with ferocity and perfidy the most execrable. “ They hunted the Indians like wild beasts, rather than enemies; and as the pursuit of them to their places of retreat in the woods, which covered their country, was both difficult and dangerous, they endeavoured to allure them from their inaccessible fastnesses by offers of peace and promises of oblivion, made with such an artful appearance of sincerity as deceived their crafty leader, and induced them to return to their former settlements, and resume their usual peaceful occupations. . . . The English, with perfidious craft, were preparing to imitate savages in their revenge and cruelty. On the approach of harvest, when they knew an hostile attack would be most formidable and fatal, they

fell suddenly upon all the Indian plantations, murdered every person on whom they could lay hold, and drove the rest to the woods, where so many perished with hunger, that some of the tribes nearest to the English were totally extirpated.” *

The religious settlers of the more northern provinces, who would not proceed to battle until they had cast out from among them the unclean, “ who were under a covenant of works,” are not free from the like reproach. As they advanced against the Indians on one occasion, “ setting fire to the huts which were covered with reeds, many of the women and children perished in the flames ; and the warriors, in endeavouring to escape, were either slain by the English, or, falling into the hands of their Indian allies, were reserved for a more cruel fate.” All this may be put to the account of lawful warfare ; but the historian proceeds to inform us, that, “ after the junction of the troops from Massachusetts, the English resolved to pursue their victory ; and hunting the Indians from one place of retreat to another, some subsequent encounters were hardly less fatal to them than the action on the Mistick. In less than three months the tribe of Pequods was extirpated. Instead of treating the Pequods as an independent people, who made a gallant effort to defend the property, the rights, and the freedom of their nation, they retaliated upon them all the barbarities of American war. Some they massacred in cold blood ; others they gave up to be tortured by their Indian allies ; a considerable number they sold as slaves in Bermudas ; the rest were reduced to servitude among themselves.” † Under one pretext or another, the Indians residing near the English settlements were extirpated ; or if spared, they had to part with the hunting-grounds of their fathers for a nominal consideration. The almost total extinction of the Northern tribes has been the result of the English policy ; whilst, notwithstanding the many that fell in the struggle against the Spanish invaders, and the greater number that were worked to death in the mines, the Indian tribes of the Southern portion of our continent have been preserved, and have been allowed to commingle with their conquerors, and to rise in some places to an equality of power. The proud Spaniard did not disdain connubial alliance with the daughter of the red man, which the haughty Briton spurned as calculated to deteriorate the Anglo-Saxon race. Travellers

* *History of America*, Book IX.

† *Ibid.*, Book X.

who see the great varieties of men in Southern countries, the result of the mixture of the races, may superciliously despise the motley populations ; but they should reflect that the liberty of marriage left to all by the Spanish crown was more consonant with the dictates of reason and rights of humanity, than the exclusive principle which elsewhere has preserved the purity of European blood. The *mestizo* fruit of these mixed nuptials may be fairly regarded as elevated above the mere Indian as far at least as he is below the Spaniard.

The kind partiality with which the aborigines were viewed by the Spanish ecclesiastics is testified by Prescott and Robertson. The latter expressly refutes those " who have accused them of animating their countrymen to the slaughter of that innocent people, as idolaters," and attests that " they uniformly exerted their influence to protect the Indians, and to moderate the ferocity of their countrymen."* A solitary exception to this general eulogium is pointed out by him in the person of Father Vincent de Valverde, who is represented as urging the Spaniards to fall on the Peruvians, and make havoc of them, because they would not at once yield to his invitation to submit to the Pope and to the king of Spain, the Inca having, as is alleged, answered the summons by casting indignantly to the ground the breviary of the friar. This highly improbable story did not receive full credit from the historian, who utterly denies that Valverde continued to encourage the soldiers as they proceeded in the work of blood. It originated with the friends of Pizarro, who sought to veil the perfidy by which an unsuspecting chief and his people were assailed and massacred at the conference to which they had been invited. Garcilasso de la Vega, a descendant by his mother from the Inca, and who derived his information from Spaniards present on the occasion, expressly contradicts the charge, and lays the blame where it should lie. The court of Spain, which was probably deceived for a time, afterwards did justice to the pious missionary, who was promoted to the bishopric of Cuzco, a post for which a sanguinary fanatic was not likely to be selected. Baluffi triumphantly vindicates him.

There were among the adventurers some who deemed the Indians incapable of mental culture, and unfit to enjoy personal liberty or Christian privileges ; whilst others, and especially

* Book VI., Note XV.

“all the ecclesiastics,” as Robertson admits, maintained, that, “though rude and ignorant, they were gentle, affectionate, docile, and, by proper instructions and regulations, might be formed gradually into good Christians and useful citizens.” Some, indeed, were slow to admit them to the Eucharistic banquet, from which even an ecclesiastical assembly (not a council), held in Lima in 1552, directed them to be withheld, unless they should manifest a clear perception of its mysterious character; but their admissibility was fully recognized in a solemn council held in the same city in 1567. Pope Paul the Third had already, thirty years before, declared them entitled to all the privileges of Christians. The Cardinal, by reference to these facts, reduces the statement of the historian within its just limits.

The servitude to which the Indians were reduced, and the labor to which they were consequently subjected, involve the adventurers in severe censure, but serve only to present in increased lustre the claims of the missionaries to our admiration. We shall leave the Scottish historian to speak their praise. “The missionaries, in conformity to the mild spirit of that religion which they were employed to publish, early remonstrated against the maxims of the planters with respect to the Americans, and condemned the *repartimientos*, or distributions by which they were given up as slaves to their conquerors, as no less contrary to natural justice and the precepts of Christianity than to sound policy. The Dominicans, to whom the instruction of the Americans was originally committed, were most vehement in testifying against the *repartimientos*. In the year 1511, Montesinos, one of their most eminent preachers, inveighed against this practice, in the great church at St. Domingo, with all the impetuosity of popular eloquence. Don Diego Columbus, the principal officers of the colony, and all the laymen who had been his hearers, complained of the monk to his superiors; but they, instead of condemning, applauded his doctrine, as equally pious and seasonable. The Dominicans, regardless of political and interested considerations, would not relax in any degree the rigor of their sentiments, and even refused to absolve or admit to the Sacrament such of their countrymen as continued to hold the natives in servitude.”*

We have already had occasion to name Bartholomew de las Casas as a successful missionary; we must now present him as the uncompromising and persevering advocate of the Indians.

* Book III.

He first gave the example of humanity and justice by setting free the Indian slaves whom he had inherited from his father, and then raised his voice in behalf of the oppressed, for whom he crossed the ocean several times, to plead their cause before the throne. The great Ximenes was moved by his eloquence to appoint Hieronymite monks as commissioners to repair to the spot, investigate the facts, and grant relief; and Charles the Fifth yielded much to his appeals. The lustre of his renown has been somewhat dimmed by his proposal to substitute African labor for that of the Indians, which, in the judgment of the acute regent of Spain, involved inconsistency. It was, at least, humane to subject to labor those whose constitution qualified them to bear it, rather than the weak aborigines, who were sure to sink beneath a burden beyond their natural strength. He is falsely said to have been the first to introduce African slaves into America, since from the beginning of the century they had been imported. If he appear inconsistent, let it be remembered that he was led to make the suggestion, in order to take from rapacity its plea, by showing the adventurers that they could be humane towards the Indian, without foregoing the prospects of gain from their new possessions. Besides, he had the manliness to avow and deplore the counsel.*

Baluffi draws a parallel between the Indians' advocate and Ireland's liberator. "In this bishop, the true friend of man, the energy, dissimulation, avarice, and ferocity of the oppressors found an effectual check, whilst afflicted India venerated him as her most energetic advocate, her first writer, and her liberator. If in some points the genius of Bartholomew and O'Connell appear similar, the ancient advocate of humanity has the advantage over the modern. In intellect, eloquence, disposition, resolution, perseverance, enthusiastic devotion to the relief of the oppressed, they are equal; but the tribune of the Irish people is favored and borne forward by the spirit of the age, whilst the advocate of America had to struggle against the ferocity of the age in which he lived. The former demands freedom for a neighbouring and powerful people, whose very silence is alarming to their oppressors; the latter sought it for degraded, inert, and distant nations, whose complaints or efforts could create no apprehension in the breast of the sovereign of Castile. The philanthropy of the one is great; the

* *Conquest of Mexico*, Book II., Ch. VIII., Note.

most pure charity of the Gospel, in an heroic degree, was possessed by the other. Both are indefatigable and undaunted in dangers ; the labors and disasters of the Spaniard are incomparably greater. Both won the gratitude of the oppressed ; but the ecclesiastic has no other reward than affection."

His Eminence may indulge our partiality with leave to observe, that Ireland's advocate is not a mere philanthropist, but one who feeds his lamp with the oil of the sanctuary ; and if he accept tokens of the gratitude of his country, it is because he has sacrificed great pecuniary interests to her cause, and could not, unaided, devote himself wholly to her advocacy. We have no wish, however, to raise a controversy on the comparative merits of two men so illustrious, and we heartily applaud the apostleship of Las Casas, whilst we pay the meed of praise to the labors of O'Connell.

Lest we should weary our readers, we hasten to close, for the present, our observations on this interesting work, which shows how much the newly discovered continent and its inhabitants owed to religion and her peaceful ministers. The Scottish historian had preceded his Eminence in testifying to these benefits. "From the accounts," says Robertson, "which I have given of the humane and persevering zeal of the Spanish missionaries in protecting the helpless flock committed to their charge, they appear in a light which reflects lustre upon their function. They were ministers of peace, who endeavoured to wrest the rod from the hands of oppressors."

We may hereafter call attention to some other points in which the eminent author, whose work we have perused with so much pleasure, is borne out by the acknowledgments of Protestant historians.

ART. V. — *The Literary World. A Gazette for Authors, Readers, and Publishers.* CHARLES F. HOFFMAN, Editor. New York : Osgood & Co. 1847. Weekly. Nos. 1 — 15.

THIS is the title of a literary journal and advertiser recently commenced under the auspices of two or three very respectable publishing houses in New York, and which has thus far been conducted with a spirit, talent, and good-sense worthy of very

general commendation. We do not always accept its literary or other doctrines, but we have found in it a much higher order of criticism, more just literary appreciation, and more freedom and independence in the expression of its judgments, than we have been accustomed to look for in journals of its class. There may possibly be some danger of its yielding too much to the tastes or interests of the houses which established it ; but if it preserve the independence with regard to their publications which it has thus far shown in its reviews of those of other establishments, and if sustained in doing so, it will go far towards supplying a want many have felt, and prove itself not unserviceable to the cause of American letters.

We perceive, by the announcement in the fifteenth number, that the journal has passed into the hands of a new editor, Mr. Charles F. Hoffman, of New York. We know little ourselves of Mr. Hoffman, having never to our knowledge read any of his writings, his works not coming particularly within our department ; but he holds a very respectable rank among our popular authors, and we hear him spoken of as a man of ability, learning, and fine literary taste. We have no reason to suppose the journal will not gain rather than lose in spirit, interest, and usefulness by its change of editors, although Mr. Hoffman's predecessor was an editor whose place is not easily made good.

The distinctive character of the *Literary World* is real or affected Americanism. It devotes its chief attention to American literature, and its aim seems to be to induce the public to give a decided preference to American authors, and to encourage especially the production and growth of a sound and healthy American literature. It therefore naturally suggests for our consideration the somewhat hackneyed subject of American literature, — a subject on which our readers must permit us to offer a few comments of our own.

Much is said and written about American literature. Some make extravagant boasts of the excellence to which it has already attained ; others make loud and long laments that it does not as yet even exist ; others again are busy in devising ways and means of creating it, forcing its growth, or bringing it to maturity ; and a very voluminous, if not a very respectable, national literature is growing up among us, about the literature we are assumed to have or not to have, and the means of obtaining or perfecting national literature. All this is very well ; the American people are a very enlightened people, and their

authors far in advance of those of any other nation, as it is patriotic to believe ; but it seems to us, that on this subject of national literature, as on literature in general, there is much loose thinking, if thinking it can be called, and no little want of clear and well-defined views. It is hard to say what is the precise meaning our countrymen attach to the word *literature*, in what they suppose its desirableness to consist, what ends it serves or ought to serve, or wherein it contributes to the glory of nations or of the race. These are important points, and on these, we are sorry to say, our authors leave us in the dark. We have consulted the best literary authorities of the country, but no light dawns to relieve our darkness, no clear, distinct, definite answers are obtained. This is bad, and makes us suspect that with us very few who talk of literature have any real meaning. It is easy to indulge in vague and general declamation ; it is easy to seize upon a few loose and indefinite terms, and to have the appearance of talking largely, eloquently, wisely, profoundly, when in fact we are saying nothing at all. Before any thing more is said, it would be a real service to many persons, and to ourselves in particular, if our authors would define their terms, tell us precisely what they understand by literature, and for what it is necessary, useful, or desirable.

For ourselves, there are a few things we understand. We understand that human existence has a purpose, a high and solemn purpose ; that man is placed here by his Maker to gain an end, and is morally bound to seek that end at every moment, in all things, and in every act of his life, however great, however little. We understand, also, that it is necessary that we know this end, that we be placed on our guard against every thing that would divert us from it, and exhorted, stimulated, aided to gain it ; and, furthermore, that whatever serves this purpose, whether oral teachings and admonitions, or books, essays, scientific treatises, poetic chants, scenic representations, music, architecture, pictures, statues, are for that reason valuable, desirable. But beyond this we see nothing useful, nothing not undesirable, vain, or hurtful, the offspring of the world, the flesh, or the devil.

Now, we apprehend that letters, only in so far as they serve, and for the simple reason that they serve, this purpose, are not what our people generally mean, or fancy they mean, by literature. Letters in this sense are moral, religious, social, political, refer to man's duties in some one or all of the relations in which he is placed by his Maker, and tend by all their in-

fluence to render all particular duties subordinate, and their discharge subservient to the one great and all-absorbing duty of loving God above all things, with the whole heart and soul, and our neighbours as ourselves, in him and for him. But, if we are not much mistaken, what the world means, or fancies it means, by literature is something which is independent of all moral, religious, or social doctrines, and may be read with equal pleasure and profit by all men, whatever their religion, their ethical code, or their political system. It is something which inculcates no doctrine, instructs man in no particular truth, and urges to the performance of no particular duty. Back and independent of all that relates to man's belief and duties as a moral, religious, and social being, it is assumed that there is a broad and rich field for the man of letters, and the culture of that broad and rich field yields literature proper. But our difficulty in understanding what is meant by this arises from the fact that this supposed field is purely imaginary, an "airy nothing," to which even the poet, with "his eye in a fine frenzy rolling," cannot give "a local habitation and a name." A general literature, which teaches nothing special, is as unreal as man without men, the race without individuals. The *genus*, for us human beings at least, is real only in the *species*; what has no specific meaning has for us no meaning at all, and is as if it were not.

Books which mean nothing are nothing, and are to be treated as nothing. But books which do mean something necessarily mean something specifically related to man as a moral, religious, or social being; and to mean any thing valuable, their meaning must either throw some light on man's duties under some one or all of these relations, or exhort, stimulate, or aid him to perform them. Turn the matter over, disguise it, as you will, use all the big words in the language, be as profound, as eloquent, as poetical as you can, and this is the simple, sober truth. Man is a being whose existence has a purpose, whose life has duties, and his whole business is to learn the former and fulfil the latter. He has no time, no strength, no right to consult any thing else, and whatever is not related to the one or the other has and can have no significance for him.

Grant this, — and we envy no man who will deny it, — and literature can be looked upon only as a subordinate affair. It is not a question of primary importance, and there may be circumstances in which it is of no importance at all. In itself considered, literature is not necessarily a good or an evil; but

is the one or the other only according to its quality, and the purpose it is made to serve. For its own sake, it is no more commendable or desirable than any other worldly possession. The common notions on this head, which revived with the Revival of Letters, as it is called, in the fifteenth century, are pure heathenism ; and these notions, we are sorry to say, are not confined to the Protestant world, which may claim them by right of inheritance. Even some Catholics, without reflection, give in to them, and we have been not a little scandalized by M. Audin's *History of Luther*, and especially by some extracts we have seen from his *Life of Leo the Tenth*. No Protestant could surpass him in his depreciation of the Middle Ages, or in his ecstasies over the *Renaissance*. We doubt not the purity of his motives, or the sincerity of his zeal ; but to undertake to gain a momentary triumph to Catholicity by a principle of defence which was disapproved yesterday, and must be abandoned to-morrow, is as unwise as it is sad. The Church speaks through all ages in the same severe and inflexible language, and never turns aside from her direct course, either at the opposition of enemies or the solicitations of friends. The "classical" infatuation of even Churchmen in the fifteenth century, and the first half of the sixteenth, is excusable, for they had in spite of it splendid attainments, noble qualities, and solid virtues ; but to make that infatuation itself a virtue, and to set it forth as one of the glories of the Church as the Spouse of God and Mother of the faithful, is to suffer one's self to be overpowered by the spirit of our times, and to forget for a moment that faith and piety are not to be measured by their relation to literature and art.

To the old heathen philosophers, — men who had cast off their national superstitions, but who had only a feeble belief even in the existence of God, and no abiding hope of an hereafter, weary of the world, disgusted with its vanities, and too wise to be seduced by its honors and distinctions, — literature, what they termed philosophy, was, no doubt, useful as a relief from the burdens of existence, as a retreat and a solace. One easily feels, while reading, Cicero's eloquent discoursing in praise of philosophy. The great object with these old philosophers, whatever the school to which they belonged, was to devise the means of making life as tolerable as it could be. Life was empty. It came, no one could say whence or wherefore, and its issue was into night and eternal silence. It was the part of wisdom to seize the present moment, and to

make the most of it. Of all the sources of consolation open to them, especially in old age, the most respectable and efficacious was the tranquil pursuit of letters. This removed them from the cares and vexations of the world, the turmoils of the camp, and the intrigues and rivalries of the court, soothed their passions, protected them from perturbation, and secured them a measure of repose, of serenity, and peace. To men in our day whose want of faith and hope is the same as theirs, letters are, no doubt, the readiest and safest resort. We can easily understand that men who have no faith in God as the author of grace, who have lost all hope of a future life, in the Christian sense, who have come to regard heaven and hell as mere fables which served to amuse the infancy of the race, and to whom life appears once more what it did to the old pagan philosopher, should feel existence a burden, and the need of something to fill up the vacancy in their hearts, to absorb the activity of their minds, to tranquillize their passions, and relieve, in some degree, the gloom which to them necessarily settles over man and the universe. To them, as to the saint, though for a different reason, the world with all its interests is vanity, yea, less than vanity and nothing. Darkness is behind them; darkness is before them. There is nothing to live for. Existence has no end or aim, and, if relief is not obtained from some source, it becomes too literally intolerable, and men with their own hands, to a fearful extent, cut its thread. Some plunge into the dissipation of the senses; others into that of the sentiments, and annoy us with their Utopian dreams of moral or social meliorations; and others, perhaps the least foolish, betake themselves to the quiet and tranquilizing pursuits of literature.

It is as a relief, as a solace, that literature is mainly recommended by the moderns, as well as the ancients, and it is to wants like these we have indicated that what is reckoned as literature, from the pagan classics down to the last new novel, addresses itself. It takes and studies to adapt itself to the old heathen view of life. This undeniable fact is not unworthy of being meditated, and if meditated might help us to form a tolerably correct estimate of what the world calls literature, and of the importance of devoting ourselves to its cultivation. Are we required to reproduce heathenism, and to provide for the old pagan views of life, the old pagan state and temper of individuals and society? Are we, like the old pagan philosopher, to think only of a solace for the cares and burdens of exist-

ence, and to confine ourselves to those resources only which were open to him? Has not the Gospel brought life and immortality to light, thrown a new coloring over all things, dissipated the darkness behind us and the darkness before us, and opened to us resources from the burdens of existence, the vanities of the world, the vacancy of thought, the listlessness of effort, the perturbations of the passions, and the solicitations of the senses, of which he knew nothing, and which for his blindness, unbelief, and despair had no existence?

We live under the Gospel, and we insist upon our right to try all things by the Christian standard. Under the Gospel, no man has the need or the right to resort even to letters as a relief from the burdens of existence, a solace for the troubles and afflictions of life, or as a means of personal enjoyment. The pleasures of intellect, of taste, and imagination may be less hurtful than those of the senses, but there is no more virtue in seeking the one than there is in seeking the other; and though he who seeks the one may make a better calculation than he who devotes himself to the other, neither can claim to have risen to the lowest degree of Christian morality. Hence, literature, either in author or reader, can never be sought by a Christian for its own sake, nor for the sake of the pleasures of wit, taste, and imagination it may bring. No Christian man can esteem it or cultivate it for the old heathenish reasons still too often urged, and a literature for those reasons, and adapted to meet them, he not only does not desire, but looks upon as a positive evil. Such literature, and he includes within it the most admired productions of ancient and modern genius, however highly he may appreciate them under the relation of form, he believes to be incapable of contributing any thing good, in the Christian sense, either to individuals or to the world at large; he even believes it likely to do great harm, for it takes a false view of life, and in all cases springs from man's forgetfulness of his real relations to his Maker, of the real purpose of his being, or from a revolt against the law imposed on him by his Sovereign for his governance, and the desire to find a resource independent of that appointed, in his infinite wisdom, by our good Father, and which it is against our true interest we should find or resort to.

Nevertheless, though in the popular sense, if sense it be, we have and can have no respect for mere literature, there is a sense—a sense we began by hinting—in which we prize letters, and can go as far as any of our countrymen in

praising or cultivating them. We are by no means among those who hold that a man, unable to read, is necessarily deprived of all good ; nor are we in the habit of estimating the intelligence and virtue of a community by the number of its members who have or who have not mastered the spelling-book. There are blockheads who can read, write, and even cipher ; and of the amount of intelligence actually possessed by the great majority of those who have graduated at our common schools, we should perhaps be surprised, were we to inquire, to find how little has been acquired by their own reading. The proportion of those having a good common education, who are able to read with profit a serious book on any important subject, is much smaller than is commonly imagined. There is, unhappily, amongst us no little senseless cant on the subject of education, which we owe in no small degree to certain English, Scotch, and French unbelievers, who were kind enough some years since to visit us for the benevolent purpose of enlightening the natives, or, as George Combe, Esq., of Edinburgh, expressed it, in his opening lecture in this city on his favorite humbug, Phrenology, to "sow" among us "the seeds of civilization." The principal of these were Frances Wright, Owen, father and son, R. L. Jennings, and William Phiquepal. These felt sure, that, if they could once get a system of universal education established throughout the country, which should pass over religion in silence, and teach knowledge, they would soon be able to convert all our churches and meeting-houses into Halls of Science, and our people generally into Free Inquirers. In furtherance of their plan, they organized among us a secret association, very much on the plan of the Carbonari in Europe. How far the organization extended, and whether it yet subsists or not, we are unable to say, for our personal connection with it was short, and has long since ceased altogether ; but it might be not uninteresting to inquire how much of the cant about education and the irreligious direction education has received of late, and which so scandalizes the Christian, are due to its influence. However this may be, and however little we are disposed to give in to the nonsense which is constantly babbled about education, we still prize education, rightly understood, as highly as do any of our countrymen. The question with us is of the quality before the quantity. A bad education is worse than none, as error is always worse than simple ignorance. But let the education be of the right sort, be that which instructs, prepares,

and strengthens the pupil for the prompt and faithful discharge of all the duties which pertain to his state in life, and the more we have of it the better.

So of literature. Literature, in our sense of the term, is composed of works which instruct us in that which it is necessary for us to know in order to discharge, or the better to discharge, our duties as moral, religious, and social beings. Works which tend to divert us from these, which weaken the sense of their obligation, or give us false views of them, or false reasons for performing them, are bad, worse than none, though written with the genius of Byron, Moore, Goethe, Milton, Dante, or Shakspeare. Genius is respectable only when she plumes her wing at the cross, and her light dazzles to blind or to bewilder when not borrowed from the Source of light itself. No man, whose soul is not filled, whose whole being is not permeated, with the spirit of the Christian religion, can write even a spelling-book fit or safe to be used by a Christian people. But works written in exposition of the Christian faith, or of some one or all of our duties in any or all of our relations in life, and breathing the true Christian spirit; or works which tend to enlist our sensibilities, taste, imagination, and affections in the cause of truth and duty, though not in all cases, under all circumstances absolutely indispensable, are yet desirable, useful, and compose a literature honorable to the individuals or the nation creating, cultivating, or appreciating it.

Such a literature is, unquestionably, religious in its spirit, in its principles and tendencies; but this is its recommendation; for religion is not only the primary interest of mankind, but the sole interest, and includes in itself all subordinate interests, and what it does not include and identify with itself is no interest at all. Who says religion says every thing not sin or vanity. Yet this need frighten no one. A religious literature is no doubt grave and solemn, working the deep mines of thought, or plodding through piles of erudition; but it is also light and cheerful, tender and joyous, giving full play to wit and fancy, taste and imagination, feeling and affection. It ranges through heaven and earth, and gathers from every region flowers to adorn its song or gladden its music. It demands, indeed, the solemn purpose, the pure intention, the manly thought, and strong sense; but it delights in smiles, eschews the dark and gloomy, the sour and morose, and decks even the tomb with garlands of fresh-blown roses.

But such a literature is not produced with "malice pre-

pense." It is never produced when it is sought as the end, and we never show our wisdom in saying, — Go to, now, let us create a literature. On this point we must be permitted to quote a passage from an article on American Literature, which we wrote in 1838, as more likely to weigh with our countrymen generally than any thing we could write now.

"Moreover, we doubt whether we show our wisdom in making direct and conscious efforts to create an American literature. Literature cannot come before its time. We cannot obtain the oracle before the Pythoness feels the god. Men must see and feel the truth before they can utter it. There must be a necessity upon them before they will speak or write, at least before they will speak or write any thing worth remembering. Literature is never to be sought as an end. We cannot conceive any thing more ridiculous, than for the leading minds of a nation to set out consciously, gravely, deliberately, to produce a national literature. A real national literature is always the spontaneous expression of the national life. As is the nation, so will be its literature. Men, indeed, create it; not as an end, but as a means. It is never the direct object of their exertions, but a mere incident. Before they create it, they must feel a craving to do something to the accomplishment of which speaking and writing, poetry and eloquence, logic and philosophy, are necessary as means. Their souls must be swelling with great thoughts struggling for utterance, — haunted by visions of beauty they are burning to realize; their hearts must be wedded to a great and noble cause they are ambitious to make prevail, a far-reaching truth they would set forth, a new moral, religious, or social principle they would bring out and make the basis of actual life, and to the success of which speech, the essay, the treatise, the song, are indispensably necessary, before they can create a national literature.

"We feel a deep and absorbing interest in this matter of American literature; we would see American scholars in the highest and best sense of the term; and we shall see them, for it is in the destiny of this country to produce them; but they will come not because we seek them, and they will be produced not in consequence of any specific discipline we may prescribe. They will come when there is a work for them to do, and in consequence of the fact that the people are everywhere struggling to perform that work. How eloquently that man speaks! His words are fully chosen; his periods are well balanced; his metaphors are appropriate and striking; his tones are sweet and kindling; for he is speaking on a subject in which his soul is absorbed; he has a cause he pleads, an idea he would communicate, a truth he would make men feel, an end he would carry. He is speaking out for truth,

for justice, for liberty, for country, for God, for eternity ; and Humanity opens wide her ears, and her mighty heart listens. So must it be with all men who aspire to contribute to a national literature.

"The scholar must have an end, to which his scholarship serves as a means. Mr. Emerson and his friends seem to us to forget this. Forgetfulness of this is the reigning vice of Goethe and Carlyle. They bid the scholar make all things subsidiary to himself. He must be an artist, his sole end is to produce a work of art. He must scorn to create for a purpose, to compel his genius to serve, to work for an end beyond the work itself. All this which is designed to dignify art is false, and tends to render art impossible. Did Phidias create but for the purpose of creating a statue ? Was he not haunted by a vision of beauty which his soul burned to realize ? Had the old Italian masters no end apart from and above that of making pictures ? Did Homer sing merely that he might hear the sound of his own voice ? Did Herodotus and Thucydides write but for the sake of writing, and Demosthenes and Cicero speak but for the purpose of producing inimitable specimens of art ? Never yet has there appeared a noble work of art which came not from the artist's attempt to gain an end separate from that of producing a work of art. Always does the artist seek to affect the minds or the hearts of his like, to move, persuade, convince, please, instruct, or ennoble. To this end he chants a poem, composes a melody, laughs in a comedy, weeps in a tragedy, gives us an oration, a treatise, a picture, a statue, a temple. In all the masterpieces of ancient and modern literature, we see the artist has been in earnest, a real man, filled with an idea, wedded to some great cause, ambitious to gain some end. Always has he found his inspiration in his cause, and his success may always be measured by the magnitude of that cause, and the ardor of his attachment to it." — *Boston Quarterly Review*, Vol. II. pp. 22 - 25.

There are a few turns of expression in this which we should now avoid, but the principle is sound, and applicable not merely to American literature, but to literature in general, if either is to have any significance. In writing, whatever the work, the end for which we write must always be above and beyond that of making a book, or a contribution to the literature of the nation or the world. The book, treatise, dissertation, essay, address, poem, must always be held as a means to an end, and be adopted because, time, place, and persons considered, it is the only, or at least the fittest, means of gaining it. The author must will the means only in willing the end ; and it must be the end, not the means, that moves him, fills his soul, captivates his heart, unlocks his thoughts, and compels him to

write or sing. As men become filled with the strong desire of realizing ends to which literature directly or indirectly contributes, they will resort to it ; and as they become filled with a sense of their obligation to seek the true end, or to fulfil the real purpose, of life, they will, in proportion as there is occasion, produce, with more or less success, the kind of literature which is desirable, and the only kind which it is not better to be without.

The end to be sought in literary effort is determined by God himself, and we have no option about it, except to consult it under that particular aspect which is most consonant to our special vocation, individual talent, genius, and taste. But in seeking the end Almighty God appoints, under one or another aspect, we are at liberty, nay, are bound, to use all diligence to adapt our means to it, to make them as effectual as possible in gaining it. Under this point of view the question of form becomes important, and is never to be neglected. All our faculties, even our sensibilities, taste, fancy, imagination, wit, and humor, were given us for a purpose, and are proper to be exercised, used,—only not to be exercised and used for their own sake, for low, worthless, or sinful ends, but for God, for the great and solemn purpose of life itself. Christianity commands total self-denial ; but the self-denial it commands is moral, not physical,—the moral annihilation, not the physical annihilation, of ourselves. We retain as Christians all our faculties, essential qualities, and properties as men, none of which are bad in themselves,—for nothing bad ever came from the hand of the Creator ; but we retain and exercise them no longer for their own sakes, or for the sake of ourselves, or the pleasure which results from their exercise. We retain and exercise them only for God. We live, but we live not for ourselves. The self-denial is the denial of self as an end, and the substitution, as the end of existence, as the end of all exertion, of God in the place of self. It is, indeed, something more than the mere subordination of self to God, worldly motives to religious motives ; for we are to love God not only supremely, above all things, but exclusively, and therefore are to love ourselves and our neighbours only in him and for him. Nevertheless, denying or annihilating self as the end or motive, and referring all to God, our nature remains physically in all its strength, and all our faculties are good, and to be exercised in their appropriate sphere and degree ; and, in point of fact, they are never so active, so powerful, so ef-

ficient, as when diverted from all selfish ends, elevated by grace to divine ends, and exercised for God and for God alone. True religion strengthens the intellect as well as the will, and purifies the taste in purifying the heart. The power which men of the world seem to find in those who forget God, and think and speak only of what is human, is, in fact, only weakness. It is the fool who says in his heart, — "God is not"; and all our faculties run to waste and become unproductive in proportion as we remove from God, in whom we live, move, and are.

In seeking to subject literature to the empire of religion, we are far from seeking to deprive it of any of its power, its variety, extent, delicacy, or grace. We are seeking to provide for these in a higher degree, to give to literature itself a higher order of excellence. Form may still be studied, and must be; and the more truly beautiful and appropriate it is rendered, all the better. Religion looks with no favor on the literary sloven. What is worth doing at all is worth doing well, and no man has the right to send out a literary production, great or small, without having made it as perfect in its kind as possible in his circumstances, and with the other duties of his vocation. Crude and hasty productions, on which the author bestows no thought, and which he makes no effort to mature and perfect, are reprehensible under a moral as well as under a literary point of view. Accomplished scholarship, wide and varied erudition, science in its deepest principles and minutest details, are never to be depreciated, but sought, though not for their own sake. The past may be explored, the present surveyed, all nature, moral, intellectual, social, physical, investigated, experimented, and its facts collected and classified, the boundless regions of fancy and imagination may be traversed and laid under contribution, and should be, so far as requisite or useful to the improvement or perfection of the work on which we are engaged. No time, no labor, no patience, no research, is to be spared, when requisite to the accomplishment, or better accomplishment, of the ends we have in view, and which religion imposes or sanctions. Even the old classics, so far as they can aid in the improvement or perfection of the literary form, where the improvement and perfection of the form is sought only for the purpose of subserving the cause of truth or virtue, by rendering our works better adapted to the ends for which they are designed, may be studied, and, no doubt, with profit; for under the relation of form they are unsurpassed, and not to be surpassed. To the pure all things are pure.

The only restriction laid on the scholar or the author is a restriction on his motives, that whatever he does he do it from religious motives, for the sake of subserving the great and solemn purpose of existence. Religion, therefore, while it restricts the will, the intention, the motive, by the law of God, leaves as wide a margin for the display of the powers and capacities of the human mind, and for the production of a free, pure, rich, graceful, pleasing, influential, and soul-stirring literature, as the maddest of the modern worshippers of humanity can possibly wish.

Now it is clear to all who are not stark blind, that before a literature like the one we commend can be created or flourish, or even be esteemed, men must be Christians ; and therefore that the effort should never be directly for the literature, but to make men Christians. It is only a Christian literature that is desirable or allowable. The dominion of the world belongs to Christ, to whom belong all things. All things are his by virtue of his own proper divinity, his consubstantiality with the Father ; all are his by inheritance, for as the Only Begotten Son of the Father he is heir of all things ; all are his by the gift of the Father ; and all are his by his own conquest, effected by his voluntarily consenting to become man, his voluntary sufferings and death, by which he overcame death and hell, and rose again and led captivity itself captive. We have, therefore, no complaisance to show to unbelievers or their literature. They and their literature are out of the normal order, and have no right to the least favor or indulgence. They have no rights in modern society. Modern society is bound by the law of God to be Christian, and the only appropriate literature of a Christian society is a Christian literature. Christian literature is, then, the only literature which has any right to be, and therefore the only literature for which provision can rightfully be made. But a Christian literature obviously can be produced only by Christians. Men do not gather grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles. The great question even as to literature, then, as well as to religion, is that of making men Christians. Literature may be safely left to itself. It must be produced by Christians ; and in proportion as men turn their attention to Christianity, become filled with its spirit, and find literature necessary or useful to its purposes, they will produce it, and only in that proportion.

The special question of American literature cannot now detain us long. The ends for which literature is needed, the

principles on which it must rest, and the spirit which must inform it, are and can be peculiar to no nation, but, like all true religion and morality, nay, like all genuine science and art, are catholic ; national life will and cannot but affect the form and coloring, but the more free the literature is from all national or individual idiosyncrasies, the more perfect it is. Whatever is narrow, contracted, sectarian, is, however we may tolerate it, defective, never to be sought or approved. No doubt, each nation has its peculiar wants, and its peculiar modes or habits of thought and feeling, which to some extent are to be consulted and addressed ; but that which is addressed to them should be peculiar to no particular time or place, but universally true and applicable in its principle. It is not necessary or proper to say the same things and use the same arguments to all sorts of persons. Where the social order is unsound, oppression reigns, and man is deprived of his rights and means of well-being, it may be necessary on the one hand to preach submission, resignation, and on the other to demand judicious and salutary reforms ; where liberty is denied, where the laws have no dominion, and the people are subjected to mere will and arbitrariness, it may be necessary and proper to call for freedom, for the concession and guaranty of rights ; but where, on the other hand, liberty is already excessive, where legal order hardly exists, where we hear constantly of the *rights*, seldom or never of the *duties*, of man, and where the tendency is to political and social dissolution, it is necessary to call out for legal order and to insist on authority, subordination, submission, loyalty. So, again, where unbelief, heresy, and schism are rife, and men contend that they are not to be held accountable to the law of God for their thoughts and words, if in fact for their deeds, it becomes necessary to show the vanity, the nothingness, the sinfulness of all that sets itself up against God, or that refuses to submit in thought, word, and deed to his law, and to bring out in bold relief the grounds of religious faith, and to exhibit and defend in clear, earnest, and unflinching tones the truth, beauty, excellence, and authority of the Church of God ; but where all nominally assent to the truth, profess the true religion, acknowledge, in words, their obligation to obey it, we need only to labor to make men practise their religion, and adorn it by well-ordered lives and godly conversation. The same principle must govern us in relation to all other questions. In meeting the peculiar wants of our age or country, we must adapt our means to the end, use such forms of address, adopt

such modes of expression, and such peculiar arguments and illustrations, as will render us most easily understood and most persuasive ; and this will unquestionably give a local coloring to our literary productions, and determine their age and country. But even in doing this, nothing in itself local or temporary is ever to be urged. Whether we preach submission or reform, demand order or liberty, defend religion against the unbelieving or the tepid, the heretical or the scandalous, the principles we adopt, the doctrines we set forth, the ends we insist upon, must be of all times and places, peculiar to no age, country, or individual. So far as adapting our literature to our peculiar needs as a nation is producing a national literature, a national literature is necessary and proper, but no farther ; for if the literature be so adapted, it makes no manner of difference whether it be a home production or a foreign importation. American literature, as such, then, can demand no special attention.

We cannot give in to the cant so common about American authors, and the propriety and necessity of giving them a special preference and encouragement. We have no respect for mere professional authors, whether American or not. An author class, whose vocation is simple authorship, has no normal functions, in either the religious or the social hierarchy. Our Lord, in organizing his Church, made no provision for professional authors, and in the original constitution of society they have no place assigned them. They have and can have no normal existence, for the simple reason that literature is never an end, and can never be rightfully pursued save as a means. Authors we respect, when they are authors only for the sake of discharging or better discharging duties which devolve on them in some other capacity. Authors whose profession is authorship are the lineal descendants of the old Sophists, and are not a whit more respectable than their pagan ancestors. We can respect Cicero, Cæsar, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, because authorship was not their profession, and was resorted to only as incidental to the main business of their lives ; we can and do reverence the Fathers of the Church, for they wrote their immortal works not for the sake of writing them, but as subsidiary to the discharge of the solemn duties of their ministry ; we also honor Calhoun or Webster when either publishes a speech, because it is intended to subserve the purposes of their vocation, and that vocation is not authorship. We call no man a professional author, though nearly his whole life be devoted to

authorship, who merely uses authorship as a means of effecting the ends of a legitimate vocation ; and in speaking against authorship, it is only against it as it is itself adopted as a vocation or a profession.

We say, very frankly, that we regard an author class, or a class of professional authors, whose vocation is simply authorship, not only as not desirable, but as a positive nuisance. They constitute one of the greatest pests of modern society. Nothing can be conceived more ruinous to the state, more destructive of faith and manners, of all that constitutes the worth or glory of society or individuals, than a class of men of which your Bulwers, Byrons, Shelleys, Dickenses, Victor Hugos, Balzacs, Eugene Sues, Paul de Kocks, and, pardoning the bull, George Sands, not to mention a whole host of Germans and some Americans, are distinguished specimens. Such a class is a moral excrescence on the body of society, and it would be well if some Christian Socrates would arise to treat its members as the pagan Socrates did the Sophists of old. It is not for the interest of our country, nor of any country, whether we speak of moral and social or of religious interest, to support or encourage such a class ; and they who complain of the want of encouragement extended to professional authors hardly know what they do. Too much encouragement is already extended to them, as the multitude of our petty novels, Knickerbockers, Graham's Magazines, Lady Books, Saturday Couriers, and Olive Branches can abundantly testify. Every dapper little fellow, every sentimental young lady, or not young, married unhappily, or despairing of getting married, who can scribble a few lines each beginning with a capital letter, or dash off a murderous tale about love, or an amorous tale about murder, is encouraged to turn author by profession, and finds no lack of opportunity to aid in deluging the land with nonsense, cant, sentimentality, sensuality, obscenity, and blasphemy. For decency's sake let us hear no more of professional authors, of the liberal provision which should be made for them, the indifference of the public, the timidity or penuriousness of booksellers.

The *Literary World* takes a different view of authors from this, and, wishing to encourage American literature and American authors, in common with many respectable individuals, contends for an international copyright law. The actual effect of such a law, if established, we cannot pretend to indicate, for it is a subject we have not investigated. Mr. Charles Dick-

ens, lugging it in so impertinently and in such bad taste in all his replies to the civilities our citizens good-naturedly extended to him, when he visited us a few years ago, so disgusted us, that we have never been able to hear of an international copyright since, without a certain nausea at the stomach ; and we make no doubt, that if Mr. Dickens had staid at home, and British authors had remained silent, such a law would before now have been enacted by Congress. We, as a people, though singularly free from national prejudices, are very reluctant to legislate at the call or the dictation of foreigners. But be all this as it may, we have no disposition to support an international copyright law for the sake of encouraging our authors ; yet if such a law, by raising the price of books, would exert some influence in diminishing the quantity of the wretched and demoralizing literature now poured in upon us from the English press, we should regard its passage as a national blessing. We detest cheap literature, for such literature is necessarily prepared for and addressed to the tastes of the mob ; and, though a good republican and attached as strongly as any man to the institutions of our country, we have a sovereign detestation of the rule of the mob, in politics, morals, religion, or literature. Any means, not unlawful in themselves, which could be adopted to diminish the mass of cheap literature, and to check its production by diminishing the demand for it or the ability to obtain it, would receive the countenance of every man who understands and loves the true interests of his country. Whether an international copyright law would have any effect this way, we are unable to say ; but we fear it would not have much.

In conclusion, we confess that we see little that can be done in a direct way in relation to literature, either in checking the growth of a corrupt and licentious literature, or in the production of a pure and wholesome literature. Mere professional authors may and should be left to take care of themselves, and there need be no tears shed over their fate, save for individual sufferings ; others must be left to choose their own time and place to speak, and they may safely trust to their position, or their cause, to sustain them. As literature in general, and American literature in particular, is no primary want of individuals or of society, we may leave it to take care of itself, and trouble ourselves no further about it than to guard, as far as possible, against its corruptions.

Scholars, educated men, in the fullest and highest sense of the word, are always a want, a necessity, and in no country

more than in our own ; for in no country have the mass of the people so direct a voice in public affairs. It is all-important that there should be with us a large and highly educated class, far better educated than, under any possible circumstances, the bulk of the people can be, from which may be selected persons qualified to fill places of trust and influence. Too much attention cannot be paid to our higher schools and colleges. The best, in fact the only real, encouragement we can extend to American literature is to elevate the character of our colleges and universities, to place instruction on a more solid basis, and to make the course of studies more complete and more thorough. More time should be spent in the collegiate course, and young men should not be permitted to go forth as having finished their studies, when they are only able to commence them with credit. Let an effort be made to send out from our colleges and universities riper and more thoroughly disciplined scholars. Let the people learn, if they can learn any thing, that a man is not fitted for high public trusts in the church, the state, or the army, in proportion to his want of education ; and let the senseless babble, of which we hear so much, about self-education and self-educated men, cease, and American literature will soon be placed on a solid and respectable footing.

It is well, no doubt, to look after the education of the people, and to introduce and sustain as perfect a system of common schools as can be devised ; but there is no greater folly than that of relying solely or chiefly on common school education. Do your best, with all your provisions and appliances, you cannot make the bulk of the people even tolerable scholars. The welfare of the many is unquestionably to be sought ; but it must needs be sought by the few, and the chief concern of a nation seeking the welfare of the many is therefore the education of the few. For these the highest standard of scholarship is necessary, and the most liberal provisions should be made. It would be well, if we had somewhere in the country a university proper, a university worthy of the name, to which the brightest and most promising of our youths, after graduating at our colleges, might be sent, and where they might reside some six or seven years and continue their studies. Such a university would soon raise the standard of scholarship, and in time we should have, in every department of literary, scientific, and public life, scholars worthy of the name, — masters, not mere pupils, who would be a credit to their age and country, and

from whom would descend a most salutary influence upon the people below them.

But this, it is objected, is anti-democratic, and you are false to your country in proposing it. And is every thing necessary and good, wise and prudent, to be forborne lest we appear to be anti-democratic? We have studied religion and history and philosophy to little purpose, if all good influences do not come from above, instead of below. The modern dreams of equality may appear delightful to generous youth and inexperience, but there is truth as well as point in the remark of old Chief Justice Parsons, "The young man who is not a democrat is a knave; the old man that is, is a fool." Establish and preserve equality of suffrage and eligibility, establish and maintain equality before the laws, — all the equality known to our institutions, — but there stop. That is all the equality desirable or attainable; and the sooner we all become convinced of that, the wiser shall we be, and the better will it be for our country. Society must subsist; it must provide for its own being, and, as Cromwell would say, even for its own "well-being"; and if it does, some are and must be greater than the rest; but not therefore necessarily better, happier, or more favored than the rest. The modern doctrine of equality is based on pride, and proceeds, not from a contempt of rank and distinction, but from an undue love of them. We see that in the nature of things all cannot share them, as all the crew cannot be captains, and so we resolve that there shall be no diversity of ranks or of positions. We look upon the distinguished few as specially favored, and hence our antipathy to every measure which seeks to benefit the many through the medium of the few. All this is very silly. The distinctions of this world are not worth counting, and we show our folly as much in seeking to destroy them as in seeking to obtain them. There are and must be diversities of rank and condition, and it is for the interest of each and of all that there should be; but it does not follow that it is more desirable to be in one than in another: —

"Act well your part; there all the honor lies."

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *General Evidences of Catholicity; being the Substance of a Course of Lectures lately delivered in the Cathedral of St. Louis, Louisville.* By M. J. SPALDING, D. D. Louisville: Webb & Brother. 1847. 12mo. pp. 396.

THE author of this volume is the Very Reverend Dr. Spalding, of Louisville, Ky., a native Kentuckian, educated in the College of the Propaganda, Rome, and favorably known to the Catholic public by several able, learned, and eloquent essays in the United States Catholic Magazine, of which periodical he is one of the editors,—and more especially by a work, published some three years since, in review of D'Aubigné's *History of the Grand Reformation*. This review, though less a review of D'Aubigné than of the Reformation itself, is a work of solid merit, and one of the best essays on the character, the men, and the consequences to religion, morals, manners, and literature of the great Protestant rebellion, that are accessible to the general reader, and has gained the author a high reputation, both at home and abroad.

The work now before us will increase the reputation of the author as an able and eloquent divine, and give him a high rank among the popular defenders of the Catholic faith. The Lectures are marked by talent, learning, eloquence, a deep and tender piety, an ardent charity, earnest zeal, and a true Christian independence, and give us a popular, but solid and unanswerable, argument for our holy faith,—establishing beyond the possibility of contradiction, that the evidences for Catholicity and those of Christianity are not only parallel, but identical, and that whoever establishes the one establishes the other. Here and there, in the course of the work, we have detected an expression not perhaps quite exact, and now and then a sentence to which we might wish a different turn had been given; but we have read the work with great interest and pleasure, with instruction and edification; and we have no need to say that we warmly commend it to all who have the least desire to learn the way of salvation. To the sincere Protestant who wishes for the truth the book cannot fail to be of the highest utility, while Catholics themselves will find their faith refreshed and invigorated by its study, and themselves furnished with ready and solid replies to the various objections and cavils they are daily liable to hear urged against their Church by their heretical and scoffing neighbours. It is, after the works of the learned Bishop of Philadelphia, the most considerable contribution made to our Catholic literature, and we give it a thousand

welcomes, and pray to our Father in heaven that the life and health of the author may be long spared to us, and that this may prove but an earnest of still greater contributions which we are to expect from the same source.

A full review of the work, with an exposition of its plan, and general statement of what it has done, is due to the author, and we regret that we have no space for it in our present number; but we intend to recur to the work in our next Review, and to speak of it at length, and more worthily than we can in this brief notice. In the mean time, we commend the work heartily to our readers, as one which they will do well to read for themselves, and which they will find an excellent work to put into the hands of all such of their Protestant friends as are seriously disposed to seek the way of salvation.

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2. — *Perlen aus Jerusalem, ein katholisches Andachtsbuch.* Von P. ALEXANDER MARTIN. Mit drei lithographirten Ansichten aus Jerusalem. Boston: Gedruckt von Wilhelm Neeb. 1847. 32mo. pp. 280.

THESE are indeed pearls from Jerusalem, brought to us by one who is himself a pearl in our American Catholic Church, and who shows by his untiring zeal, his fidelity, and disinterestedness in the work of his ministry, that he, in very deed, sells all that he has, that he may purchase the priceless pearl of eternal life. The prayers, hymns, and devotions contained in the work, the author has brought with him from the Chapel of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, and are those which for a thousand years have been offered to our God by the pious worshippers in that holy place. The work is entitled to high merit in a simple literary point of view. Its contents, in great part, have never appeared in English, and are little known beyond the Holy City, except to the thousands of pilgrims who visit it to pray and worship where our Lord lived, suffered, and died, and rose again. But so far as we have examined, it is really one of the best prayer-books for private or public worship we are acquainted with, and we are not quite willing that our German brethren should have the exclusive enjoyment of it. We should like to see it done into English, and, if well done, it would soon become a favorite with the Catholic public. We copy the Preface.

“*Undächtiger Leser!*

“Hier überreiche ich dir in der Form eines Gebetbuches einige Christliche Kostbarkeiten, die ich zu Jerusalem gesammelt, und aus der h. Stadt mitgebracht habe. Ich nenne sie ‘Perlen aus Jerusalem’ weil es erstens kostbare Ueberliefer-

ungen sind, welche im Meere tausendjähriger Verwüstungen und Blutvergießungen sich an den Felsen rechtsgläubiger Christenherzen zu Jerusalem erhalten haben, und weil es zweitens Gebete, Anmuthungen und Lieder sind, die schon seit vielen Jahrhunderten, so wie noch jetzt in der Kirche des h. Grabes J. C. zu Jerusalem aus dem Munde der armen verfolgten arabischen Katholiken und ihrer Missionäre tagtäglich erschallen, und von denselben gleich einer kostbaren Perle vor den Entehrungen der Türken und Römer fortwährend bewahrt und beschützt werden müssen. Perlen aus Jerusalem nenne ich endlich drittens mit Rechte die dem Gebetbuche beigegebenen Bilder, weil sie drei der merkwürdigsten Orte aus der Leidensgeschichte Jesu darstellen, und diesel so getreu, wie vielleicht noch kein Bild dieser Art. Denn sie wurden etwa nicht einer andern Zeichnung nachgemacht, sondern zu Jerusalem an der Stelle selbst von der Meisterhand eines deutschen Katholiken unter meinen Augen abgezeichnet, und zwar so genau daß jedes Fenster, ja fast jedes Gras, jeder Stein in denselben ausgedrückt ist.

„Mit diesem Büchlein in der Hand kannst du daher dich im Geiste recht lebendig nach Jerusalem versetzen, die h. Orte betrachten, welche dein leidender Jesus vom Garten Gethsemani bis zum Calvarienberge mit seinen blutigen Tritten geheiligt hat; von dort aus dich hinabbegeben zu den frommen Wächtern des h. Grabes (Franziskaner) um neben ihnen an diesem h. Orte niederzutreten, und mit ihnen zu beten; kannst dann mit eben diesen Priestern sowohl, als auch mit den bedrängten arabischen Katholiken dich vereinigen, um in Procession die h. Geheimnisseorte zu besuchen, und dabei die nämlichen Gebete, die sie zu Gott hinauffenden, mitbeten, die nämlichen Lieder mitsingen, mit denen sie täglich Jesum unsern Erlöser preisen.

„Sollte dies wohl nicht manchem Christlichen Herzen zur Freude dienen? Sollte dies wohl nicht wenigstens Etwas dazu beitragen, die Ehre Gottes und das Heil der Seelen zu befördern? Dies war wenigstens mein Zweck, mein Wunsch bei Bearbeitung dieses kleinen Wertes. Gott gebe hiezu sein Amen!

„Boston, im Februar 1847.

„P. X. R.“

When we add, that the work is published with the authority and recommendation of the Rt. Rev. the Bishop of Boston, we need say no more to commend it to all our Catholic brethren whose mother tongue is the German.

3. — 1. *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays, to which are added a few Poems.* By ALEXANDER H. EVERETT. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1845. 12mo. pp. 563.

2. *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays.* By the same. Second Series. Boston: The same. 1846. 12mo. pp. 475.

THESE elegant and instructive volumes deserve a more extended notice than we are at the present moment able to give them. Mr. Everett, their distinguished author, we have no occasion to say, ranks high in our republic of letters, and as a contributor to the higher and more solid periodical literature of the country stands unsurpassed, if not unrivalled. He is a man of a richly cultivated mind, a scholar of varied and extensive attainments, a

deep and earnest thinker on moral, political, and philosophical subjects, a writer worthy of being studied for the purity of his diction, and the classic grace, ease, and repose of his style. His essays are free from all the usual faults of our American writers. They are never childish or bald, never feverish or florid, turgid or inflated, but calm and flowing, strong and clear, chaste and manly. No man among us has done more to check the tendency to extravagance and corrupting neologisms, and to keep our authors within the current of pure and genuine English style and diction.

Of Mr. Everett's poems we have not much to say; but some of his translations from the German are very well done, show a correct appreciation of poetic beauty, and a command of poetic language not always to be found in translators of much higher pretensions. We have been particularly pleased with the translation of the *Spirit Land*, or Invocation to the second part of Goethe's Faust, *The Worth of Woman*, or, as we prefer to say, *Dignity of Woman*, from Schiller, and the *Spectre Bridegroom*, imitated from Bürger's *Leonora*. Among the purely literary articles, the one in which he proves the Spanish original of *Gil Blas* has interested us the most. It has always seemed to us that a work so peculiarly national in its spirit, tone, and coloring could not possibly have been written by any but a native Spaniard. Mr. Everett, we think, makes it clear that Le Sage was its translator, not its author. The philosophical essays compose a large part of the second series, and have great interest for us, both from their intrinsic importance, and from their carrying us back to the time when we enjoyed the personal intimacy of the author, and were ourselves all-engrossed with the questions they discuss. A few years ago, all minds here were turned to the discussion of metaphysical topics, and all the world were becoming philosophers. A change has come over the spirit of their dream now, and other tendencies and other topics have their hour. We do not always agree with Mr. Everett in his philosophical views, but we find him always sober, always free from cant and Transcendentalism, and though he may not always be sound, and though his tendencies to liberalism and rationalism are too decided, he is always sounder and more trustworthy than the authors he opposes. He never gives in his adhesion to modern pantheism, socialism, or progressivism; and though he may sometimes yield too much to the popular speculations of the day, he is never a no-government man, never a radical at bottom, but in fact a legitimist in the true sense, and the supporter of law and order; and, except in their indirect bearing on religion, his essays may in general be read with pleasure and profit, and in a country where so little is produced that a Catholic citizen is not obliged to condemn, they may even be commended as likely to exert a salutary influence.

4. — *A Protestant converted to Catholicity by her Bible and Prayer-book.* By MRS. FANNY MARIA PITTAR. Philadelphia : Henry M'Grath. 1847. 24mo. pp. 154.

THIS book bears a false title, if we are to credit the narrative itself ; for according to that Mrs. Pittar was converted, not by her Bible and prayer-book, as the title says, but by a Catholic friend and a Catholic bishop, aided by the grace of God ; and all the Bible and prayer-book had to do with her conversion was simply, that, after her eyes were opened to Catholic truth by other means, she was able to perceive it in the Bible, and some vestiges of it in the Book of Common Prayer. We could relate instances in which persons living far remote from all Catholics, never having had any intercourse with them, have been led, by reading the Protestant version of the Holy Scriptures, and with no other external means of knowing the faith of Catholics, to a knowledge and belief of Catholicity. Such persons we may say were converted by the Bible ; but to assume that a lady brought up in the Catholic city of Dublin, full of zeal against Catholics, and first led to the perception of Catholic truth by the conversation of a Catholic friend and the sermons of an eminent Catholic divine, was converted by her Bible and prayer-book, is quite too loose a way of speaking, and cannot fail to convey a false impression. Moreover, when works written in Ireland, where the word Protestant is almost exclusively applied to the members of the Anglican sect, are republished in this country, the editor should note the fact that the term is so applied ; for, according to American usage, the term Protestant is applied indiscriminately to all the sects, from the High Church Episcopalian down to the followers of Mr. Parker or William Henry Channing. Aside from these objections, the little work before us may be read with interest and with profit. It contains nothing very wonderful, nothing which it was absolutely incumbent upon the excellent authoress to publish to the world ; yet now it is published, we have no doubt it will do good. If Mrs. Pittar had waited a month or two longer, she would have come to the conclusion that God had wrought a blessed work in her soul, for which she could never sufficiently thank him ; but she would most likely have also concluded that she had nothing more remarkable or edifying to relate than have the great majority of those who have been brought from the sects to the Church. She writes with warmth, with genuine feeling, in a good spirit, and shows that she was not disobedient to the heavenly vision, but prepared to obey it at any sacrifice. Still she writes in the excitement and flush of her first impressions ; and we prefer for ourselves the calm and subdued tone of the practical Catholic, long familiar with the faith, and long accustomed to be nourished with the Bread of Life.

5. — *The Library of American Biography.* Conducted by JARED SPARKS. Second Series. Vols. XII. and XIII. Boston : Little & Brown. 1847.

THIS series of works is continued in its usual spirit, and without any falling off in interest or ability. We wish the biographies of distinguished Americans could have been written from the Catholic point of view, in the spirit of Catholic faith and piety, for then they would have been not only interesting but edifying; but since that could not be, or cannot be at present, we know not that they could be written under better influences than those of Mr. Sparks, who, if no Catholic Christian, is no Protestant bigot.

The two volumes before us contain the lives of Edward Preble and William Penn, Daniel Boone and Benjamin Lincoln. The life of Commodore Preble is written by Lorenzo Sabine, an author who is wholly unknown to us. He appears to write with candor, and to aim to be just and true. We wish, however, the life of the Commodore, one of the founders of our navy, and earliest contributors to our naval glory, had been committed to abler hands, and to a man brought up in a more Christian school of morals. To praise a boy for disobedience to his father is not the best comment on the text, "Children, obey your parents," nor the best way to correct what is a crying evil among us, — the want of reverence in children for their superiors. The strictures on the naval policy of Mr. Jefferson's administration are unjust, if we accept his peace policy. Mr. Jefferson and his party wished to prevent this country from ever engaging in a career of foreign war and conquest, and to tie up its hands so that it could never fight except when actually invaded. Hence their opposition to a naval establishment. We for ourselves are a Jeffersonian, so far as to be firmly and unalterably opposed to every war of conquest; but we can conceive many cases in which a foreign war is necessary, and true policy would forbid suffering the war to be brought to our own doors. Experience has proved that Mr. Jefferson and his friends, though admirable speculatists, were not always remarkably sound or wise as practical statesmen; and we suppose there is no point on which it will be more generally admitted that they egregiously blundered, than on the navy. But Mr. Jefferson and his early partisans have gone to their final reckoning, and we can see no good, now that the country is generally agreed as to the wisdom of sustaining a naval establishment, in raking up old controversies, and reviving old passions. We had enough of this in the life of Decatur, by Captain Mackenzie, the executioner of Spencer, Cromwell, and Small.

The life of William Penn, by Mr. George E. Ellis, Unitarian

minister of Charlestown, in this State, is written with ability, in a liberal tone, and with much patience of research, and is as unexceptionable as we could expect. The author has a high estimate of William Penn, but he does not deify him; he does no more than justice to him as a man of the world, and the founder of the colony of Pennsylvania; but though he does not give in to all his Quaker fanaticism, he shows quite too much enthusiasm for his religious character. The Quakers are nothing but a sect of Theosophists, or mystical Deists, whom the devil suffers to pursue the even tenor of their way, and whom God rewards with a good share of this world's goods, due to their worldly wisdom, virtue, and shrewdness. But being unbaptized, and despising the sacrament of faith, they cannot be included, even nominally, in the pale of Christendom; and, though they have been eminent for many of the natural virtues, their influence on society, under a religious point of view, has been destructive to a degree which could hardly have been expected from the paucity of their numbers. There is no disguising the fact, that Quakerism, few as the avowed Quakers really are, is the reigning doctrine of this country, and is the greatest hindrance to the spread of Gospel truth that can be named. We wish Mr. Ellis, who has had opportunities enough of learning at least the essential doctrines of Christianity, had been less lavish in his praise of the principal founder of a sect that has done and is doing so much to obliterate every distinctive feature of our holy religion.

The life of Daniel Boone is quite interesting; but it strips the character of that bold and hardy pioneer of the greater part of the romance with which popular tradition has invested it. The life of Benjamin Lincoln, a brave officer in the Revolution, who distinguished himself at the battle of Saratoga, we have not read; but as it is written by the editor of the *North American Review*, Mr. Francis Bowen, it needs no recommendation from us.

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6. — *Tales Explanatory of the Sacraments.* By the Authoress of "Geraldine, a Tale of Conscience," and "The Young Communicant." Philadelphia: William J. Cunningham. 1847. pp. 151.

THESE tales are published with the approbation of the Rt. Rev. the Bishop of Philadelphia, and are therefore to be presumed to contain nothing contrary to faith or good morals. They are, in fact, considering they are written by a lady, remarkable for correctness of doctrine and exactness of language. As stories they are quite interesting, perhaps too intensely so for the sacred pur-

pose for which they were written. Personally, we are far from liking the plan of mixing up truth of doctrine with the fictions of the imagination, but it is the fashion of the day.

7. — *The Catholic Choralist*. To be issued regularly every Two Months ; to contain a Choice Collection of Catholic Music, viz. Litanies, Hymns, Masses, &c., designed for Choirs. The arrangement will be under the direction of an able Professor of Music, who will use every means to make it deserving of patronage. Price, Twenty-five cents per Number. Philadelphia : W. J. Ashe. 1847.

THIS musical publication is very neatly executed, and does great credit to the printer. Of the contents of the number before us we cannot speak in terms so flattering as we could wish. There is a general want of fulness of harmony. The *Stabat Mater*, said, on what authority we know not, to be sung in the Pope's chapel, is very well ; but we suspect, if Mozart were here, he would be not a little surprised to find the passage taken from his *Magic Flute* — originally composed, if we recollect aright, to be sung by a half-idiot with a bell accompaniment — arranged as a sacred piece to be sung by our choirs. Are the singers in our choirs expected to accompany themselves with bells, or to personate half-idiot, when singing the praises of God, or a hymn to the Blessed Virgin ? The less we say of the *Tantum Ergo*, the better. We wish well to an undertaking of the sort Mr. Ashe promises, for a really choice collection of Catholic music, placed within the reach and means of our choirs, is needed and would be a public benefit ; but we hope the editor of this proposed work will hereafter change somewhat the plan indicated in this number, and give us *religious* choral music from Catholic masters, either of the German or Italian school, and if he does so, he will deserve patronage and not fail to receive it.

8. — *The Following of Christ, in Four Books*. By THOMAS A KEMPIS. Translated from the Original Latin by the Rt. Rev. and Ven. RICHARD CHALLONER, D. D., V. A. To which are added Practical Reflections and a Prayer at the End of each Chapter. Translated from the French. By the Rev. JAMES JONES. Second American Edition. Baltimore : J. Murphy. 1845. 48mo. pp. 547.

To speak of the merits of *The Following of Christ* would be almost like speaking of the merits of the New Testament, with

which it may, without irreverence, be bound up. It is only necessary to notice the edition before us, which is an exceedingly beautiful one, and is sold at a price, the publisher informs us, which makes it, for the amount of matter it contains, the cheapest book ever printed in this country. We find only one fault. The work is ascribed to Thomas à Kempis as author, without the least intimation of any doubt of the fact. We think the evidence is clear, that À Kempis was only its transcriber; that the book was in existence before his time; and that it was in all probability written, not as the French critics say, by Gerson, the Chancellor of the University, but by the Abbot Gersen, as contend the Italians, with Pope Pius the Seventh at their head. But, however this may be, Murphy's edition of the work is the best in this country which we have seen.

9. — *The Devout Communicant; or, Pious Meditations and Aspirations for Three Days before and Three Days after receiving the Holy Eucharist.* By the Rev. P. BAKER, O. S. F. Revised, with Additions. Baltimore: F. Lucas, Jr. 1847. 24mo. pp. 232.

AN excellent work, to which the publisher has added morning and evening exercises, devotions for mass, &c. The hymns of the Church, which are annexed, "done into English," really require to be done over again, unless we would have them a standing disgrace to us. What is the reason that we cannot have translations of our hymns for which we need not blush, or that we must have such as remind those of us who have been Protestants of Sternhold and Hopkins, or the early New England metrical version of the Psalms, — the first book ever printed in New England?

* * * THE author of *Pauline Seward* has represented himself to us as aggrieved by our remark, in our last Review, that the romance of his work was "hashed up from Bulwer, James, Dickens, and others"; for he says he had never read the authors named prior to writing his own work. He has taken our remark too literally. We did not mean to say, that he had actually, as a matter of fact, taken the romance of his work from those authors, but that it was precisely similar in its spirit, character, tendency, &c., to what is to be found in them, and may be read there in substance, as well as in *Pauline Seward*. We hope this explanation will be satisfactory to the author.